Prince of Lasanod
Eid trim pending
Some slight errors but overall, a good read.
Since 2006, the east African region in general, and Somalia in particular, has been terrorized by the Alshabab group. So many studies have been done and many articles written about the group’s savage bombings and suicide attacks against both civilians and governments. However, very little has been written about one question that bewilders those who closely watch the group: why does Alshabab avoid attacking the Ethiopians while it attacks all the other countries in the region?
Keep in mind Ethiopia was the first country that sent its troops to Somalia and was accused of killing tens of thousands of Somali civilians in Mogadishu between 2007 and 2009, when it occupied southern Somalia. Also keep in mind that of all the Horn/East African countries, Ethiopia is the country where the largest number of ethnic Somalis live in with the exception of Somalia. The Ogaden region where the ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia live, has endured decades of government oppression and genocide, making it a potential recruiting ground for anyone conducting attacks against Ethiopian. There is also at least one ethnic Somali rebel group fighting the Ethiopian government in Ogaden.
The Ethiopians remained unscathed, however, while Alshabab’s suicide bombers have struck as far as Kampala. Not only that, Alshabab has almost never attacked Ethiopian AMISOM forces in Somalia while it conducts nearly daily attacks against other AMISOM troops. Alshabab forces always conducted a smooth withdrawal whenever the Ethiopian forces arrived in an area. An interesting point that many observers have missed is that the Ethiopians don’t even use their tanks, airplanes, or artillery when “capturing” territory from Alshabab. Why waste fuel when you know “your enemy” will withdraw his forces on your command! It took the Kenyans with their warplanes, tanks, and heavy artillery, years of constant fighting to reach Kismaayo. It took many years for the Ugandan/Burundian AMISOM forces to move from Mogadishu to the Lower Shabelle using large armored forces (and they had to withdraw from most of that after constant attacks). The Djiboutian forces in Beledweyne can hardly go outside their bases. But the Ethiopians criss-cross all the southern states in Ural trucks!
On several occasions in the last few months, Ethiopian government officials have tried to come up with some reasons after many people in Kenya (including the wealthy businessman Jacob Juma who twitted “..Ethiopia is a suspect”) accused Ethiopia of secretly supporting Alshabab. Some Ethiopian officials tried to explain the matter by simply saying that the Ethiopian forces are too brave for Alshabab. That’s hardly convincing because no one, no matter how brave they are, can scare away a suicide bomber. According to Tewolde Mulugeta, the Ethiopian foreign ministry spokesman, the reason there was never a single attack by Alshabab in Ethiopia is because of “public involvement” in the security of Ethiopia. A more careful look inside Alshabab, however, shows a much murkier reason.
The orgins of Alshabab
What we know today as Alshabab have their roots in the now defunct Islamic Courts Union (ICU) organization, which briefly took control of southern Somalia in the summer of 2006. In late 2006, several factions of the ICU, representing the more radical elements within ICU, such as the Raskamboni brigade, the Salahudin group, and Mogadishu’s CC district group, came together to form a powerful faction within the ICU. This new faction was to be called “Alshabab”. Alshabab, thus, became the military muscle of the ICU. Then came the Ethiopian invasion at the end of 2006. The Ethiopian army, supported by the American special operations forces, quickly routed the lightly armed ICU forces. The ICU leaders scattered. The most senior members fled to Eritrea, where they worked with nationalist groups to form a united front against the Ethiopians. Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the ICU chief, would later become the president of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia after negotiations. As part of the agreement, Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia. The Ethiopian invasion’s impact on Alshabab was, however, to be far more covert and longer lasting.
THE COVERT COUP: Ethiopian Intelligence takes over Alshabab
When Alshabab was first created in 2006, the top leadership of the organization consisted of well known members from the Islamist movement in Somalia. Adan Hashi Ayro, the ICU’s top military commander, was chosen to be the overall commander of the new Alshabab forces. Sheikh Hasan Turki, the leader of the powerful Raskamboni Brigade, was elected as the new group’s chairman of the Shura council. Ismail Arale, a moderate Islamist from the Somaliland region, was elected as the Amir (leader) of the group. Ahmed Madobe, the current president of the Jubba regional Administration, was elected as the deputy Amir.
The Ethiopian intelligence worked hard to not only decimate the original Alshabab leadership, but also to infiltrate the group and control it. In January of 2007, the Ethiopian forces with the support of American Special Forces captured Ahmed Madobe, the deputy Amir of Alshabab, after he was wounded by an American air strike. Allegedly, he was betrayed by informants who were part of his group as he was targeted while deep inside the lower Jubba jungle west of the city of Kismayo. But the worst was yet to come for Alshabab. The Amir of the group, Ismail Arale, was captured by American forces in Djibouti while on his way to Eritrea for the opposition conference. He was transferred to Guantanamo Bay where he was incarcerated for several years (as prisoner number DJ9SO-010027DP) before he was finally released.
The way Mr Arale was lured into Djibouti and then arrested shines some lights on the nature of the current Alshabab leadership. Khalif Adale, one of the current top leaders of Alshabab, was then an aide to Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former chief of ICU. Khalif was responsible for facilitating the travel of ICU leaders inside Somalia to Eritrea for the opposition summit. The interesting part is that even though Ismail Arale was not on the list of the delegates invited to come to the summit, Khalif Adale sent an invitation letter (allegedly forged) to Mr Arale who was in hiding then. Khalif Adale also sent to Mr Arale $15,000 to facilitate his travel and instructed him to meet him in Djibouti so they could go together to Eritrea for the summit. The Alshabab Amir took the bait and traveled to Djibouti using a forged passport with a false name. He was not arrested initially as he landed in Djibouti, perhaps because he was using an unknown name. However, after he met Khalif Adale in Djibouti, and as they were trying to board a plane to Eritrea, Ismail Arale was promptly arrested by Djiboutian security agents who were waiting for him at the airport. The Djiboutians immediately turned him over to the American forces in Djibouti.
With both Alshabab’s Amir and his deputy arrested, and the remaining Alshabab leaders scattered, a group of young, unfamiliar individuals within the organization grabbed the opportunity, and, after a quick, unscheduled conference, announced a new leadership for Alshabab. The new leadership was led by men who were unknown within the Islamist movement in Somalia. A mysterious man by the name “Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr” was now elected as the Amir of Alshabab. His real name turned out to be Ahmed Abdi Godane. He was one of about a dozen young men (the Hargeisa network, as I call them, because their network was organized in Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland region) who came from the northern Somaliland region at the time of the ICU revolution in southern Somalia. He was rather an unknown figure within the Islamists in both southern Somalia and Somaliland. A fellow Hargeisa network member, Mahad Karatay, became his security chief and right hand man.
Mahad Karatay: Ethiopia’s Alshabab boss
If Ahmed Godane was a questionable figure for the leadership position he got, Mahad Karatay’s ascend was outright suspicious. Mr Karatay was a young man in his early twenties when he joined the Islamist organization “Al-itihad Al-islam” in the early ‘90s. In 1997, after Ethiopian forces defeated Al-itihad forces in the Gedo region (bordering Kenya), Mr Karatay became disillusioned with Al-Itihad’s project and left for Kenya. In an event that is yet to be explained, Kenyan intelligence picked up Mr Karatay from Nairobi and handed him over to the Ethiopia intelligence. Ironically, many years later, Mr Karatay, this time working for the Ethiopian intelligence, would have his Alshabab men terrorize Kenya.
It was not until 2005 that Mr Karatay surfaced again, mysteriously, in the high security “Mandera” prison in Somaliland. Apparently, the Ethiopian intelligence, which had and still has an unchecked influence over the Somaliland leadership, wanted Mr Karatay (whom they kept for many years) to be released for a mission without attracting any ridicule. During the chaotic 2005 presidential elections in Somaliland, Mr Karatay was quietly released from the Mandera prison. During the short period he was inside the Mandera prison, he organized a network of young desperate Islamists in the prison, who would, when later released, come join him in Alshabab. When he was released from the prison, Mr Karatay linked up with another team of secretive young men in Hargeisa, who were perhaps separately organized by the Ethiopian intelligence. This later team was headed by Ahmed Godane. The whole group traveled to southern Somalia and with their money and tight organization, quickly climbed through the ranks of the ICU leadership. Before the ICU collapsed, Mr Karatay was named the chief immigration officer at the Mogadishu international airport. This position allowed him (and his Ethiopian handlers) to keep an eye on the movements of the foreign jihadists arriving to join the ICU and also the travel itineraries of the ICU leaders. Mr Karatay’s colleague, Ahmed Godane, meanwhile, got an extremely sensitive post in the ICU. He became the chief secretary of the ICU.
When both the ICU and Alshabab leadership collapsed following the Ethiopian invasion, the Hargeisa network members quickly seized the moment and got the Alshabab leadership for themselves.The remnants of the original Alshabab leadership were simply sidelined, except for Adan Hashi Ayro. Ayro, the young, apolitical commander of the Alshabab forces was too powerful and too popular among the fighters to be sidelined. At first, he was accommodated by the network members because the network members also didn’t want to be seen as instigating a coup and grapping the power for themselves. But he would be eliminated later, thanks to the Ethiopian intelligence giving away his location to their American counterparts.
The New Alshabab
The first act of the new leadership was to create a powerful intelligence agency, the so-called Amniyat. Mahad Karatay, who acted as the security chief of the Hargeisa network, quickly put into action this secret organization. Although none of the members of the Hargeisa network had any official military or security background, it didn’t take much time to assemble and put into action this new powerful intelligence agency. This is because the core membership and leaders of the Amniyat were already, just like Mahad Karatay himself, members of the Ethiopian intelligence. The Hargeisa network members used the Amniyat to consolidate power. All of the original commanders and leaders of Alshabab were either assassinated or replaced. And in their place, Amniyat members were put in charge.
After consolidating their hold on power, the new Alshabab leaders worked hard to do what their handlers wanted: manipulate the ignorant, zealous, young men in Alshabab to do Ethiopian intelligence’s dirty work. Ethiopia’s enemies in Somalia were to be eliminated by the “mujahidin” of Alshabab. The new Alshabab’s first task was to attack and punish the two most anti-Ethiopian clans who were at the forefront of the resistance war against the Ethiopian occupation: the Ayr clan and the Ogadeb clan. After brutal and relentless attacks, the Ayr were forced to seek the help of their former enemies, the Ethiopians. And the Ogadenis were pushed against the Kenyan border and forced to accept Kenyan help.
Alshabab also hunted down suspected ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) members in Somalia. ONLF established small bases in the Lower Jubba region during the war against the Ethiopian occupation. However, one year after the Ethiopians withdrew from Somalia, Alshabab destroyed those bases on behalf of their Ethiopian handlers. Hisbul Islaam, another armed, anti-Ethiopian, islamist organization, also had to be disarmed and destroyed.
Ethiopia also used Alshabab to eliminate those within the federal government whom it saw as a threat: Islamists. Alshabab conducted a systematic campaign to rid the federal government of Islamists. It’s a known fact that when Sharif Sheikh Ahmed became the president of the federal government back in 2009, he gave almost half of the ministerial posts and more than half of the top security posts to the Islamists. Today, there is barely any visible position held by the Islamists within the government, thanks to Alshabab’s relentless assassination and bombing campaigns to exterminate the Islamists within the government. On the other hand, Alshabab never targeted any of the former warlords and other pro-Ethiopian officials within the federal government.
Ethiopia also used alshabab to emblement its design for the region. Ethiopia’s magical economic growth for the last few years was directly a result of Alshabab deliberately targeting the economy of Kenya and chasing away business from Kenya.
In Somalia, Alshabab had to maintain a level of violence that made Mogadishu, and Somalia in general, unsafe for foreign investment and dependent on Ethiopian and other foreign troops for security.
For those in the region who are frustrated by the seemingly undefeatable Alshabab menace, it may be time to look around and see who’s feeding this animal.
Najib Gardad
http://www.raxanreeb.com/2015/09/how-ethiopian-intelligence-infiltrated-and-took-control-of-alshabaab-by-najib-gardad/
