embarassing
VIP
VI. Violations of the charcoal ban
200. The overall magnitude of illegal exports of charcoal from Somalia remains similar to the previous mandate, but there have been some new trends worth noting. Al-Shabaab, in contrast to much of 2015 and 2016, when it had intermittently banned the charcoal trade in areas under its control (see S/2016/919, para. 129), has resumed the systematic taxation of charcoal at checkpoints en route to the stockpiles near the ports at Buur Gaabo and Kismayo. A conservative estimate would be that Al-Shabaab currently earns at least $10 million a year from the illicit charcoal trade.
201. Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and particularly Port Al Hamriya, continues to be the primary export destination, although there have been some attempts by charcoal traffickers to diversify to other ports in the region, including Bahrain, Kuwait and possibly Oman. The most prevalent type of false paperwork used to conceal the Somali origin of charcoal cargoes during the current mandate has been Djibouti certificates of origin. Meanwhile, transnational criminal networks, based primarily in Dubai and Kismayo, seem to be working towards a more formal structure for collaboration.
202. With the notable exceptions of the efforts made by the Combined Maritime Forces and Kuwait, implementation of the charcoal ban has been poor, particularly by the Interim Jubba Administration and the Kenyan Defence Forces contingent of AMISOM in Somalia, and the United Arab Emirates among the importing countries. A lack of commitment to consistent sanctions implementation, and in some cases a conspicuously deliberate failure to comply with the charcoal ban, enables Al-Shabaab financing and undermines counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency efforts in Somalia.
A. Production, transport and stockpiles
203. Charcoal production in Somalia, including for illicit export, has continued at a high rate. According to analysis of satellite imagery by FAO, there were approximately 26,000 total sites of charcoal production from 2011 to 2017, with approximately 4,000 sites identified during 2017.150 In 2017, the primary area of charcoal production has been south of Badhadhe, Lower Juba, in the south-east corner of Somalia, while the secondary area of charcoal production has been near Bu’ale, Middle Juba. Both have been Al-Shabaab-occupied territory.
204. The Monitoring Group has received information that, in contrast to tactics observed during the previous mandate, Al-Shabaab has resumed the systematic taxation of charcoal at checkpoints along routes from charcoal production areas to ports. The rate of taxation is $2.50 per bag of charcoal, or about $750 for a truck loaded with charcoal bags. The charcoal produced south of Badhadhe is transported by way of small roads to the Buur Gaabo stockpile, while the charcoal produced near Bu’ale would be transported along the road through Jilib and onward to the stockpiles at Kismayo.
205. The stockpiles at Kismayo and Buur Gaabo remain the main sources of exports of charcoal, while the stockpile at Barawe may also pose a threat to peace and security. On 11 and 12 June 2017, members of the Monitoring Group observed the two charcoal stockpiles located near the Port of Kismayo. The Group also subsequently obtained photos of the third Kismayo charcoal stockpile located in the north of the city. Between 11 and 14 June, members of the Group observed the stockpiles located near the Port of Kismayo and at Buur Gaabo (see satellite imagery of the stockpiles in annex 12.1). Finally, the Group remains concerned that the charcoal stockpile at Barawe constitutes a threat to peace and security, as it could be a target for an Al-Shabaab offensive or prompt conflict among charcoal traffickers (see S/2016/919, para. 131). On 3 March 2017, in a meeting with the President of the Interim South-West Administration, the Group reiterated that the Interim South-West Administration, in consultation with the Federal Government, should seek the Committee’s guidance regarding the Barawe charcoal stockpile.151
209. The patterns of the illicit charcoal trade observed by the Monitoring Group have indicated transnational criminal networks operating in Somalia and the United Arab Emirates (see S/2016/919, annex 9.6). During the current mandate, these transnational criminal networks may have assumed a more formal structure. The Group has obtained information regarding the All Star Group, also known as the All Star General Trading Company, which comprises the main illicit charcoal suppliers, traffickers and investors in Kismayo and Dubai. The Group has not been able to confirm multiple reports that the All Star Group has an exclusive agreement with the President of the Interim Jubba Administration, Ahmed Madobe, for the export of charcoal from Somalia. Likewise, the Group has not been able to confirm claims regarding a revenue sharing agreement between the All Star Group and Al-Shabaab. This would, however, be consistent with information that Ali Ahmed Naaji, a former Al-Shabaab tax collector, current All Star Group member and long-time associate of Madobe (see S/2016/919, para. 133), had received death threats from the Amniyat demanding a resumption of charcoal revenue sharing.153
D. Implementation of the charcoal ban
210. Although the Security Council reiterated in paragraph 22 of its resolution 2317 (2016) that Somali authorities should take necessary measures to prevent the export of charcoal from Somalia, in practice the Federal Government does not control the ports at either Kismayo or Buur Gaabo. The Interim Jubba Administration, which continues to be dependent on taxing illicit charcoal exports to finance its operations, has systematically failed to implement the charcoal ban since it was imposed in February 2012. AMISOM, whose Kenyan Defence Forces contingents remain deployed at the ports of Kismayo and Buur Gaabo, has neither assisted the Somali authorities in implementing the charcoal ban nor facilitated Monitoring Group access to charcoal exporting ports, as stipulated in paragraph 23 of resolution 2317 (2016). On 14 June 2017, after having arrived at Buur Gaabo by way of a United Nations helicopter from Kismayo, three members of the Group were not permitted to leave a Kenyan Defence Forces AMISOM base to inspect the nearby charcoal stockpile.154
211. The implementation of the charcoal ban by other Member States has been uneven. The United Arab Emirates, despite progress during the previous mandate, including the confiscation of several cargoes of illicit charcoal, has regressed in terms of consistency and effectiveness (see annexes 12.2.2 and 12.2.4). Djibouti, in particular the Ambassador of Djibouti to the United Arab Emirates, Osman Moussa Darar, bears substantial responsibility for undermining the implementation of the charcoal ban through repeatedly attesting that the false certificates of origin were legal (see annex 12.2.2). Kuwait has exhibited a high standard of proactive commitment towards the ban’s implementation and has cooperated extensively with the Monitoring Group (see annex 12.2.3). Bahrain should also be noted for its cooperation with the Group, leading to the partial seizure of one cargo shipment (see annex 12.2.1).
212. The Monitoring Group would like to note cooperation by the Combined Maritime Forces, particularly Combined Task Force 152, in implementing the charcoal ban. This included the prompt sharing of information and facilitating the Group’s contact with Kuwaiti authorities during April and May, enabling the confiscation of charcoal from two dhows (see annex 12.2.3). In July and August, the Combined Maritime Forces undertook aerial reconnaissance of five dhows en route from Somalia to Port Al Hamriya anchorage that had been identified by the Group. The Combined Maritime Forces then shared dhow descriptions, location data and photos with the United Arab Emirates authorities, who have the jurisdiction to board and inspect the dhows within that country’s territorial waters. At the time of writing, the outcome remains pending (see annex 12.2.4).
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4. In a letter to the UAE dated 2 March 2017, the SEMG summarized the evidence obtained during its official mission to Djibouti. The SEMG then met with the UAE authorities in Dubai on 23 March 2017, where it presented this evidence proving Djibouti certificates of origin to be false. In response to a request by the SEMG, the UAE authorities provided copies of Djibouti charcoal certificates of origin for 15 dhows that it had already accepted, with a combined cargo of 435,000 bags of charcoal weighing more than 10,000 metric tons. The Djibouti certificates of origin had been attested to by Ambassador Osman M. Darar at the Embassy of the Republic of Djibouti in Abu Dhabi between 4 November 2016 and 7 February 2017, and then submitted to UAE customs for processing. The UAE authorities agreed to cease accepting Djibouti certificates of origin on an interim basis, pending the outcome of their own investigation, including a meeting with Ambassador Darar.
5. The previous day, 22 March 2017, the Monitoring Group had met with Ambassador Darar at his office in Abu Dhabi. The SEMG presented evidence collected from Djibouti authorities during the official mission 20-24 February indicating that Djibouti had not exported any bulk cargoes of charcoal going back to at least 2014, and that the Djibouti certificates of origin from the Chamber of Commerce had been fraudulently obtained. When asked why he had attested to false paperwork, how many certificates of origin he had attested to, and who had brought him the false paperwork, Ambassador Darar directed the SEMG to address its queries through official channels. Accordingly, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to Djibouti on 28 March 2017, requesting information regarding attestation of charcoal certificates of origin by its embassy in Abu Dhabi. This included not only 435,500 bags weighing more than 10,000 metric tons from November 2016 to February 2017, but also charcoal cargoes of more than 2 million bags weighing more than 50,000 metric tons during 2014 and 2015. As of this writing, Djibouti had not replied.
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Annex 12.2.4: Selected cases of sanctions implementation — United Arab Emirates (June 2017– August 2017)
1. On 27 June 2017, the SEMG contacted the CMF regarding four dhows departing from Kismayo with a total cargo of 101,000 bags that had been loaded in Kismayo on 23 and 24 June. On 30 June, SEMG contacted the CMF regarding a fifth dhow that had loaded 40,0000 bags in Buur Gaabo on 28 June. SEMG estimated the location of the first four dhows to be on the Somalia coastline somewhere between Hobyo and Eyl, with their course set through the Strait of Socotra and onward to Port Al Hamriya. The SEMG also noted that based on a recent official mission to Kismayo and Buur Gaabo, where the charcoal stockpiles had been observed, the dhow cargoes would be comprised of typically green charcoal bags. The CMF was also informed that should there be an opportunity for maritime interdiction, the dhows may possess a false ship registration but likely no paperwork regarding their illicit cargo, as this would be received from charcoal traffickers at Port Al Hamriya anchorage. On 1 July, the CMF informed the SEMG that “contacts of interest” matching the description of the dhows with charcoal cargoes had been identified and were being tracked.
2. On 6 July, the Monitoring Group wrote to the UAE regarding the impending arrival of five dhows with a total cargo of 141,000 bags of charcoal from Somalia. The SEMG noted that checkpoint taxation in Somalia by Al-Shabaab at a rate of $2.50 per bag likely generated at least $350,000 in income for the armed group. The UAE was informed that the CMF was tracking the five dhows and their anticipated destination was Port Al Hamriya anchorage. The letter further explained that the names and registrations of the dhows would be altered, so the best way to identify them would be through reference to the size of their cargo and the type of charcoal bags coming from Kismayo and Buur Gaabo — a distinctive green colour with possible markings of “Bay and Bakool” or the image of a palm tree (see figure 1). The Monitoring Group also noted that the dhows may attempt to dock with false Côte d’Ivoire paperwork and requested copies of all Côte d’Ivoire certificates of origin submitted since April 2017 — when the UAE stopped taking false Djibouti certificates of origin.
3. The CMF subsequently located at Port Al Hamriya anchorage — within the territorial waters of the UAE — the five dhows it had tracked en route from Somalia, through the Strait of Socotra, and along the Yemen and Oman coastlines (see annex 12.2.5, strictly confidential). On more than a dozen distinct occasions between 14 July and 22 August, detailed information was communicated from the CMF to the UAE authorities regarding these dhows in anticipation that they would take sanctions enforcement action.5 The lines of communication to the UAE authorities included via the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), the US Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and the US Defence Attaché to the UAE. The UAE authorities that were regularly notified regarding these dhows included the UAE Coast Guard, UAE Navy, UAE Federal Customs Authority, and the Dubai Police. Initially, the information shared included descriptions of the dhows and their cargoes, plus their precise geographic locations; subsequently, this was expanded to sharing more detailed reports, including imagery and analysis.
4. Meanwhile, events at Port Al Hamriya anchorage seemed to indicate that the charcoal traffickers had become aware that the UAE authorities had been notified and that the CMF was tracking the dhows, as had been indicated in the SEMG’s confidential letter dated 6 July. On 6 August, the UAE replied to the SEMG’s letter of 6 July, stating the relevant customs authorities had been informed and requesting the registrations of the five dhows, despite the Monitoring Group already having indicated that the charcoal traffickers would utilize fake names and registrations for the dhows. That same day, the CMF aerial surveillance documented dhows which had been tracked from near the Somalia coastline transferring their cargo of charcoal onto other dhows while anchored within UAE territorial waters (see annex 12.2.5, strictly confidential). Despite having received detailed real-time information from the CMF on more than a dozen occasions, the UAE Coast Guard, which had the jurisdiction to take enforcement action, failed to board and inspect the dhows at Port Al Hamriya anchorage.
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9}/s_2017_924.pdf
200. The overall magnitude of illegal exports of charcoal from Somalia remains similar to the previous mandate, but there have been some new trends worth noting. Al-Shabaab, in contrast to much of 2015 and 2016, when it had intermittently banned the charcoal trade in areas under its control (see S/2016/919, para. 129), has resumed the systematic taxation of charcoal at checkpoints en route to the stockpiles near the ports at Buur Gaabo and Kismayo. A conservative estimate would be that Al-Shabaab currently earns at least $10 million a year from the illicit charcoal trade.
201. Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and particularly Port Al Hamriya, continues to be the primary export destination, although there have been some attempts by charcoal traffickers to diversify to other ports in the region, including Bahrain, Kuwait and possibly Oman. The most prevalent type of false paperwork used to conceal the Somali origin of charcoal cargoes during the current mandate has been Djibouti certificates of origin. Meanwhile, transnational criminal networks, based primarily in Dubai and Kismayo, seem to be working towards a more formal structure for collaboration.
202. With the notable exceptions of the efforts made by the Combined Maritime Forces and Kuwait, implementation of the charcoal ban has been poor, particularly by the Interim Jubba Administration and the Kenyan Defence Forces contingent of AMISOM in Somalia, and the United Arab Emirates among the importing countries. A lack of commitment to consistent sanctions implementation, and in some cases a conspicuously deliberate failure to comply with the charcoal ban, enables Al-Shabaab financing and undermines counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency efforts in Somalia.
A. Production, transport and stockpiles
203. Charcoal production in Somalia, including for illicit export, has continued at a high rate. According to analysis of satellite imagery by FAO, there were approximately 26,000 total sites of charcoal production from 2011 to 2017, with approximately 4,000 sites identified during 2017.150 In 2017, the primary area of charcoal production has been south of Badhadhe, Lower Juba, in the south-east corner of Somalia, while the secondary area of charcoal production has been near Bu’ale, Middle Juba. Both have been Al-Shabaab-occupied territory.
204. The Monitoring Group has received information that, in contrast to tactics observed during the previous mandate, Al-Shabaab has resumed the systematic taxation of charcoal at checkpoints along routes from charcoal production areas to ports. The rate of taxation is $2.50 per bag of charcoal, or about $750 for a truck loaded with charcoal bags. The charcoal produced south of Badhadhe is transported by way of small roads to the Buur Gaabo stockpile, while the charcoal produced near Bu’ale would be transported along the road through Jilib and onward to the stockpiles at Kismayo.
205. The stockpiles at Kismayo and Buur Gaabo remain the main sources of exports of charcoal, while the stockpile at Barawe may also pose a threat to peace and security. On 11 and 12 June 2017, members of the Monitoring Group observed the two charcoal stockpiles located near the Port of Kismayo. The Group also subsequently obtained photos of the third Kismayo charcoal stockpile located in the north of the city. Between 11 and 14 June, members of the Group observed the stockpiles located near the Port of Kismayo and at Buur Gaabo (see satellite imagery of the stockpiles in annex 12.1). Finally, the Group remains concerned that the charcoal stockpile at Barawe constitutes a threat to peace and security, as it could be a target for an Al-Shabaab offensive or prompt conflict among charcoal traffickers (see S/2016/919, para. 131). On 3 March 2017, in a meeting with the President of the Interim South-West Administration, the Group reiterated that the Interim South-West Administration, in consultation with the Federal Government, should seek the Committee’s guidance regarding the Barawe charcoal stockpile.151
- Illicit export of charcoal
206. The available evidence suggests that the scale of illicit charcoal exports from Somalia has not substantially changed from the Monitoring Group’s previous mandate. The Group conservatively estimates that, other than during the monsoon season from August to October, approximately 15 dhows per month, or about 135 dhows per year, depart from Kismayo and Buur Gaabo with cargoes of charcoal.152 With cargoes averaging a volume of 30,000 bags, each weighing 25 kg, that would equal 750,000 kg of charcoal per dhow or more than 100,000 metric tons of charcoal exported per year. At an estimated value of $30 per bag wholesale in export markets (see S/2016/919, annex 9.2), approximately four million bags per year of charcoal exports would be worth $120 million.
207. The United Arab Emirates, particularly Port Al Hamriya in Dubai, continues to be the principal destination for illegal exports of charcoal from Somalia. The Monitoring Group has also received information during the current mandate regarding Somali charcoal being imported through the Port of Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, although the quantities have not yet been verified. Other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, such as Bahrain and Kuwait, have also been confirmed as destinations for Somali charcoal (see annex 12.2). The Group has also received reports regarding charcoal dhows bound for ports in Oman, but these have not been verified.
- Paperwork and criminal networks
208. The utilization of falsified customs documentation, such as certificates of origin, continues to be the primary method for facilitating the illicit import of Somali charcoal. During the previous mandate, the main types of false charcoal paperwork were certificates of origin from the Comoros, Ghana and Pakistan (see S/2016/919, para. 138 and annex 9.7). During the current mandate, the most prevalent type of false charcoal paperwork has been Djibouti certificates of origin, with this paperwork having circulated at Port Al Hamriya in the United Arab Emirates, as well as being submitted at the Port of Doha, Kuwait. Investigations by the Monitoring Group indicate that the primary source of the false Djibouti charcoal paperwork is Basheer Khalif Moosa, a national of Djibouti currently residing in Dubai (see annex 12.2.2). False Ghana certificates of origin have also been submitted at Port Al Hamriya and the Port of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates during the current mandate. Other types of possibly false charcoal paperwork still under investigation by the Group include Côte d’Ivoire and United Republic of Tanzania certificates of origin. The Group has also discovered the use of falsified Sri Lankan ship registration documents by charcoal traffickers (see annex 12.2.3).
209. The patterns of the illicit charcoal trade observed by the Monitoring Group have indicated transnational criminal networks operating in Somalia and the United Arab Emirates (see S/2016/919, annex 9.6). During the current mandate, these transnational criminal networks may have assumed a more formal structure. The Group has obtained information regarding the All Star Group, also known as the All Star General Trading Company, which comprises the main illicit charcoal suppliers, traffickers and investors in Kismayo and Dubai. The Group has not been able to confirm multiple reports that the All Star Group has an exclusive agreement with the President of the Interim Jubba Administration, Ahmed Madobe, for the export of charcoal from Somalia. Likewise, the Group has not been able to confirm claims regarding a revenue sharing agreement between the All Star Group and Al-Shabaab. This would, however, be consistent with information that Ali Ahmed Naaji, a former Al-Shabaab tax collector, current All Star Group member and long-time associate of Madobe (see S/2016/919, para. 133), had received death threats from the Amniyat demanding a resumption of charcoal revenue sharing.153
D. Implementation of the charcoal ban
210. Although the Security Council reiterated in paragraph 22 of its resolution 2317 (2016) that Somali authorities should take necessary measures to prevent the export of charcoal from Somalia, in practice the Federal Government does not control the ports at either Kismayo or Buur Gaabo. The Interim Jubba Administration, which continues to be dependent on taxing illicit charcoal exports to finance its operations, has systematically failed to implement the charcoal ban since it was imposed in February 2012. AMISOM, whose Kenyan Defence Forces contingents remain deployed at the ports of Kismayo and Buur Gaabo, has neither assisted the Somali authorities in implementing the charcoal ban nor facilitated Monitoring Group access to charcoal exporting ports, as stipulated in paragraph 23 of resolution 2317 (2016). On 14 June 2017, after having arrived at Buur Gaabo by way of a United Nations helicopter from Kismayo, three members of the Group were not permitted to leave a Kenyan Defence Forces AMISOM base to inspect the nearby charcoal stockpile.154
211. The implementation of the charcoal ban by other Member States has been uneven. The United Arab Emirates, despite progress during the previous mandate, including the confiscation of several cargoes of illicit charcoal, has regressed in terms of consistency and effectiveness (see annexes 12.2.2 and 12.2.4). Djibouti, in particular the Ambassador of Djibouti to the United Arab Emirates, Osman Moussa Darar, bears substantial responsibility for undermining the implementation of the charcoal ban through repeatedly attesting that the false certificates of origin were legal (see annex 12.2.2). Kuwait has exhibited a high standard of proactive commitment towards the ban’s implementation and has cooperated extensively with the Monitoring Group (see annex 12.2.3). Bahrain should also be noted for its cooperation with the Group, leading to the partial seizure of one cargo shipment (see annex 12.2.1).
212. The Monitoring Group would like to note cooperation by the Combined Maritime Forces, particularly Combined Task Force 152, in implementing the charcoal ban. This included the prompt sharing of information and facilitating the Group’s contact with Kuwaiti authorities during April and May, enabling the confiscation of charcoal from two dhows (see annex 12.2.3). In July and August, the Combined Maritime Forces undertook aerial reconnaissance of five dhows en route from Somalia to Port Al Hamriya anchorage that had been identified by the Group. The Combined Maritime Forces then shared dhow descriptions, location data and photos with the United Arab Emirates authorities, who have the jurisdiction to board and inspect the dhows within that country’s territorial waters. At the time of writing, the outcome remains pending (see annex 12.2.4).
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4. In a letter to the UAE dated 2 March 2017, the SEMG summarized the evidence obtained during its official mission to Djibouti. The SEMG then met with the UAE authorities in Dubai on 23 March 2017, where it presented this evidence proving Djibouti certificates of origin to be false. In response to a request by the SEMG, the UAE authorities provided copies of Djibouti charcoal certificates of origin for 15 dhows that it had already accepted, with a combined cargo of 435,000 bags of charcoal weighing more than 10,000 metric tons. The Djibouti certificates of origin had been attested to by Ambassador Osman M. Darar at the Embassy of the Republic of Djibouti in Abu Dhabi between 4 November 2016 and 7 February 2017, and then submitted to UAE customs for processing. The UAE authorities agreed to cease accepting Djibouti certificates of origin on an interim basis, pending the outcome of their own investigation, including a meeting with Ambassador Darar.
5. The previous day, 22 March 2017, the Monitoring Group had met with Ambassador Darar at his office in Abu Dhabi. The SEMG presented evidence collected from Djibouti authorities during the official mission 20-24 February indicating that Djibouti had not exported any bulk cargoes of charcoal going back to at least 2014, and that the Djibouti certificates of origin from the Chamber of Commerce had been fraudulently obtained. When asked why he had attested to false paperwork, how many certificates of origin he had attested to, and who had brought him the false paperwork, Ambassador Darar directed the SEMG to address its queries through official channels. Accordingly, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to Djibouti on 28 March 2017, requesting information regarding attestation of charcoal certificates of origin by its embassy in Abu Dhabi. This included not only 435,500 bags weighing more than 10,000 metric tons from November 2016 to February 2017, but also charcoal cargoes of more than 2 million bags weighing more than 50,000 metric tons during 2014 and 2015. As of this writing, Djibouti had not replied.
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Annex 12.2.4: Selected cases of sanctions implementation — United Arab Emirates (June 2017– August 2017)
1. On 27 June 2017, the SEMG contacted the CMF regarding four dhows departing from Kismayo with a total cargo of 101,000 bags that had been loaded in Kismayo on 23 and 24 June. On 30 June, SEMG contacted the CMF regarding a fifth dhow that had loaded 40,0000 bags in Buur Gaabo on 28 June. SEMG estimated the location of the first four dhows to be on the Somalia coastline somewhere between Hobyo and Eyl, with their course set through the Strait of Socotra and onward to Port Al Hamriya. The SEMG also noted that based on a recent official mission to Kismayo and Buur Gaabo, where the charcoal stockpiles had been observed, the dhow cargoes would be comprised of typically green charcoal bags. The CMF was also informed that should there be an opportunity for maritime interdiction, the dhows may possess a false ship registration but likely no paperwork regarding their illicit cargo, as this would be received from charcoal traffickers at Port Al Hamriya anchorage. On 1 July, the CMF informed the SEMG that “contacts of interest” matching the description of the dhows with charcoal cargoes had been identified and were being tracked.
2. On 6 July, the Monitoring Group wrote to the UAE regarding the impending arrival of five dhows with a total cargo of 141,000 bags of charcoal from Somalia. The SEMG noted that checkpoint taxation in Somalia by Al-Shabaab at a rate of $2.50 per bag likely generated at least $350,000 in income for the armed group. The UAE was informed that the CMF was tracking the five dhows and their anticipated destination was Port Al Hamriya anchorage. The letter further explained that the names and registrations of the dhows would be altered, so the best way to identify them would be through reference to the size of their cargo and the type of charcoal bags coming from Kismayo and Buur Gaabo — a distinctive green colour with possible markings of “Bay and Bakool” or the image of a palm tree (see figure 1). The Monitoring Group also noted that the dhows may attempt to dock with false Côte d’Ivoire paperwork and requested copies of all Côte d’Ivoire certificates of origin submitted since April 2017 — when the UAE stopped taking false Djibouti certificates of origin.
3. The CMF subsequently located at Port Al Hamriya anchorage — within the territorial waters of the UAE — the five dhows it had tracked en route from Somalia, through the Strait of Socotra, and along the Yemen and Oman coastlines (see annex 12.2.5, strictly confidential). On more than a dozen distinct occasions between 14 July and 22 August, detailed information was communicated from the CMF to the UAE authorities regarding these dhows in anticipation that they would take sanctions enforcement action.5 The lines of communication to the UAE authorities included via the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), the US Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and the US Defence Attaché to the UAE. The UAE authorities that were regularly notified regarding these dhows included the UAE Coast Guard, UAE Navy, UAE Federal Customs Authority, and the Dubai Police. Initially, the information shared included descriptions of the dhows and their cargoes, plus their precise geographic locations; subsequently, this was expanded to sharing more detailed reports, including imagery and analysis.
4. Meanwhile, events at Port Al Hamriya anchorage seemed to indicate that the charcoal traffickers had become aware that the UAE authorities had been notified and that the CMF was tracking the dhows, as had been indicated in the SEMG’s confidential letter dated 6 July. On 6 August, the UAE replied to the SEMG’s letter of 6 July, stating the relevant customs authorities had been informed and requesting the registrations of the five dhows, despite the Monitoring Group already having indicated that the charcoal traffickers would utilize fake names and registrations for the dhows. That same day, the CMF aerial surveillance documented dhows which had been tracked from near the Somalia coastline transferring their cargo of charcoal onto other dhows while anchored within UAE territorial waters (see annex 12.2.5, strictly confidential). Despite having received detailed real-time information from the CMF on more than a dozen occasions, the UAE Coast Guard, which had the jurisdiction to take enforcement action, failed to board and inspect the dhows at Port Al Hamriya anchorage.
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9}/s_2017_924.pdf
Everytime an Arab blows his sheesha, Jubblaland becomes Puntland.
