Bring to the table what manuscripts you have of somali history. Im talking letters, journals, photos, colonial, or otherwise. This will make research a lot easier, and please do cite your source if you can.
Gathering and collection of historical somali documents and photographs
- Thread starter Libaaxseendheer
- Start date
“On getting this news I moved my force from Bohotele via Yaheyl and Weyla Hedd to Firdiddin, and attacked the Mullah at later place. The Mullah's Mijjertein rifelmen were in considerable strength with Lebel and Martini-henry rifles. His force were however scattered, and he himself was driven back into Italian territory.The Mijjertein lost heavily, and also the Mullah's own family. His brother-in-law, Gaibdeed, was killed, as well as two sons-in-law, Haji Sudi's brother and nephews, &c. Sultan Nur's camels and the Mullah's cattle were captured. The pursuit was carried on into the bush in the Haud” Command Papers volume 69 1902.Page 15
“The Gerad Ali Farah, the Sultan of the Dolbahanta, made so bold as to send a message to the Consul-General to the effect that his old friendly relations with us remained unchanged although, owing to the evil influence of the Mullah, his orders were no longer obeyed by his tribe. For this act the Sultan was treacherously murdered by the Mullah's command ; and the bodies of the twelve principal sheikhs in the Dolbahanta country were seized.”
Taleh
Author(s): W. A. MacFadyen Reviewed work(s):Source: The Geographical Journal, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Aug., 1931), pp. 125-128Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute ofBritish Geographers)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1784443 .
South of the main cave-well is the considerable tomb of 'Abdullah Hasan
senior, well plastered inside and out; it is now said to be empty. Adjoining this
on the west is a walled garden with massive gateway and guard-house; the rest
ofthe wall is not more than 5 feet high and plastered. There are still odd bushes
and signs of cultivation to be seen, but the comparatively deep well in the middle
is dry. To the east lies a row of four tombs. The most northerly is that of one
Soldan Nur of the Habr Yunis tribe; the next two, neither being plastered.
and the first with the top left unfinished, are those of Hawiya notables whose
names my Somalis did not know. The most southerly tomb is that of a
man of the Habr Jaalo tribe. The isolated tomb still farther east is that of
'AbdullahHasan's mother. All the tombs are provided with narrow but very
massive wooden doors, swinging about vertical extensions from top and base
of one side.
A little east of Soldan Nur's tomb is a shallow nulla, seen as a dark line in the
photograph, and known as Hed Kaldig, the Place of Blood. This was the
execution ground where those to whom the Mullah had taken a dislike were
shot, with or without torture. Had such anticipated trouble and escaped, any
members of their families on whom hands could be laid, including women and
children, are said to have been shot in their stead, and their bodies left for the
hyaenas. After the capture of Taleh pious Somalis collected the quantities of
human bones found hereabouts and gave them burial. However this may be
there are no human bones about now.
According to Jardine the R.A.F. bombed Taleh on 4 February 1920, and
set fire to brushwood huts inside and outside Silsilat, but did little damage to
the main structures, which is not surprising. The place was attacked by our
tribal levies under Captain Gibb on the evening of February 9; 'Abdullah
Hasan had already fled, and by the morning of the 10th the levies were in com?
plete possession. A detachment of the Camel Corps remained for two or three
weeks to demolish the fortifications. Dar Ilalo,Taleh, and Falat were severely
damaged and made unusable, and the strong points fronting Silsilat were
partly destroyed. Razing such a structure would have required much further
work and explosives, so that a considerable part has been left with little damage.
It will remain as a relic of that rather remarkable person its builder, the only
Somali who has so far created substantial buildings in his country
“The Gerad Ali Farah, the Sultan of the Dolbahanta, made so bold as to send a message to the Consul-General to the effect that his old friendly relations with us remained unchanged although, owing to the evil influence of the Mullah, his orders were no longer obeyed by his tribe. For this act the Sultan was treacherously murdered by the Mullah's command ; and the bodies of the twelve principal sheikhs in the Dolbahanta country were seized.”
Taleh
Author(s): W. A. MacFadyen Reviewed work(s):Source: The Geographical Journal, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Aug., 1931), pp. 125-128Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute ofBritish Geographers)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1784443 .
South of the main cave-well is the considerable tomb of 'Abdullah Hasan
senior, well plastered inside and out; it is now said to be empty. Adjoining this
on the west is a walled garden with massive gateway and guard-house; the rest
ofthe wall is not more than 5 feet high and plastered. There are still odd bushes
and signs of cultivation to be seen, but the comparatively deep well in the middle
is dry. To the east lies a row of four tombs. The most northerly is that of one
Soldan Nur of the Habr Yunis tribe; the next two, neither being plastered.
and the first with the top left unfinished, are those of Hawiya notables whose
names my Somalis did not know. The most southerly tomb is that of a
man of the Habr Jaalo tribe. The isolated tomb still farther east is that of
'AbdullahHasan's mother. All the tombs are provided with narrow but very
massive wooden doors, swinging about vertical extensions from top and base
of one side.
A little east of Soldan Nur's tomb is a shallow nulla, seen as a dark line in the
photograph, and known as Hed Kaldig, the Place of Blood. This was the
execution ground where those to whom the Mullah had taken a dislike were
shot, with or without torture. Had such anticipated trouble and escaped, any
members of their families on whom hands could be laid, including women and
children, are said to have been shot in their stead, and their bodies left for the
hyaenas. After the capture of Taleh pious Somalis collected the quantities of
human bones found hereabouts and gave them burial. However this may be
there are no human bones about now.
According to Jardine the R.A.F. bombed Taleh on 4 February 1920, and
set fire to brushwood huts inside and outside Silsilat, but did little damage to
the main structures, which is not surprising. The place was attacked by our
tribal levies under Captain Gibb on the evening of February 9; 'Abdullah
Hasan had already fled, and by the morning of the 10th the levies were in com?
plete possession. A detachment of the Camel Corps remained for two or three
weeks to demolish the fortifications. Dar Ilalo,Taleh, and Falat were severely
damaged and made unusable, and the strong points fronting Silsilat were
partly destroyed. Razing such a structure would have required much further
work and explosives, so that a considerable part has been left with little damage.
It will remain as a relic of that rather remarkable person its builder, the only
Somali who has so far created substantial buildings in his country
From July to December, 1912, the Dervishes had remained concentrated in the Gerrowei district; and the Ain Valley was left deserted not only by the Mullah's forces, but also by the lawful occupants, most of whom were afraid to return to this danger zone. Amir, the Mullah's uncle and emissary in the Ogaden country, spent this period of quiescence in obtaining supplies of food, clothing, and ammunition from Abyssinian sources. No reply to the Commissioner's suggestion for an armistice had been received, and there was no doubt that the Mullah was temporising to see whether the formation of the Camel Constabulary was a prelude to a Government expedition, as was generally rumoured. In December, however, he established a small party of 150 Dervishes at Ainabo, with instructions to win over the Dolbahanta to his cause. The various sections of the tribe were offered the return of all stock captured during the past three years if they would but join him ; and a reward of 100 camels would be made to any individual rifleman or horseman deserting to the haroun. The Mullah pointed out to the Dolbahanta that they had been severely punished for their allegiance to an infidel Government which afforded them no real protection ; and they were advised to throw in their lot with their own kith and kin. If they declined these terms, they must step aside entirely and afford the Dervishes a free passage through the valley. One month he allowed for deliberation and upon their decision depended their future safety or destruction.
The Mad Mullah Of Somaliland by Douglas Jardine.
- The State of the clans in 1911-1912 , H.Y , H.J , Dhulos and H.Awal:.
"The various sections of the Habr Toljaala were continually at each other's throats. Similarly, the Aidegalla split into two main sections and carried on a desultory warfare with one another. The eastern Habr Yunis came into frequent collision with the western sections of the tribe ; and the tribe as a whole attempted to recuperate its strength by a large and successful raid upon the Ogaden, which culminated in an enquiry by a British officer in Abyssinian territory, as the result of which the Habr Yunis were called upon to return a balance of no less than 1,330 camels to the Ogden “
As might be expected, the coastal Habr Awal were an easy prey to the more virile tribes of the interior ,until, emboldened by adversity, they retaliated by waylaying and looting traders' caravans as they passed to and from the coast .In this holocaust, in which it is estimated that not less than one-third of the male population of Somaliland perished, there was no tribe that did not suffer either from internal schisms or from attacks by their neighbours. But the most pitiful lot of all fell to certain sections of the Dolbahanta. Ousted from their ancestral grazing grounds by the Mullah's advance and bereft of all their stock, the remnants wandered like veritable Ishmaelites in the Ishaak country, deprived of asylum and almost of access to the coast, owing to the inveterate hatred which the Ishaak harbour for the Darod.” In the following month, Bohotle was occupied as a Dervish post. Thus were the Mullah's forces re-established in British territory. Their success had been gained by striking sudden and unexpected blows when the Dolbahanta were scattered, and had been attended by the artistic mutilation of the vanquished and many unspeakable atrocities.
The Mad Mullah Of Somaliland by Douglas Jardine.
- The State of the clans in 1911-1912 , H.Y , H.J , Dhulos and H.Awal:.
"The various sections of the Habr Toljaala were continually at each other's throats. Similarly, the Aidegalla split into two main sections and carried on a desultory warfare with one another. The eastern Habr Yunis came into frequent collision with the western sections of the tribe ; and the tribe as a whole attempted to recuperate its strength by a large and successful raid upon the Ogaden, which culminated in an enquiry by a British officer in Abyssinian territory, as the result of which the Habr Yunis were called upon to return a balance of no less than 1,330 camels to the Ogden “
As might be expected, the coastal Habr Awal were an easy prey to the more virile tribes of the interior ,until, emboldened by adversity, they retaliated by waylaying and looting traders' caravans as they passed to and from the coast .In this holocaust, in which it is estimated that not less than one-third of the male population of Somaliland perished, there was no tribe that did not suffer either from internal schisms or from attacks by their neighbours. But the most pitiful lot of all fell to certain sections of the Dolbahanta. Ousted from their ancestral grazing grounds by the Mullah's advance and bereft of all their stock, the remnants wandered like veritable Ishmaelites in the Ishaak country, deprived of asylum and almost of access to the coast, owing to the inveterate hatred which the Ishaak harbour for the Darod.” In the following month, Bohotle was occupied as a Dervish post. Thus were the Mullah's forces re-established in British territory. Their success had been gained by striking sudden and unexpected blows when the Dolbahanta were scattered, and had been attended by the artistic mutilation of the vanquished and many unspeakable atrocities.
In January, 1913, the Camel Constabulary moved across from Mandera to Burao to effect settlements between the eastern tribes. Mr. Corfield's success in this work exceeded the most sanguine expectations ; and even the hitherto intractable Habr Yunis vied with each other in rapid compliance with his orders. By mid-March, all serious matters of dispute had been dealt with in this district, and in one instance only had there been any reluctance to carry out the Commandant's instructions. One section of the Habr Toljaala failed to comply with an order to pay over stock within a fixed time, and Mr. Corfield, with the Commissioner's approval, made a rapid descent upon them and drove off more than the amount of stock required to meet their liabilities and to pay the additional fine to Government .
“The force marched south-east towards Ber, and, on the road, retreating tribesmen reported that the Dervishes in large numbers, under the command of Ow Yussuf bin Abdulla Hassan, the Mullah's brother, having raided and pillaged in all directions, were withdrawing the looted stock in the direction of Idoweina, thirty miles southeast of Burao, which they had made their rendezvous.the force was halted eleven miles northeast of Idoweina; and here fifteen men of the Constabulary, mounted on ponies, who had been sent on ahead, confirmed the news which had been received on the road. They had exchanged shots with the Dervishes whose strength they estimated at over 2,000 footmen all armed with rifles and 150 horsemen. At 8 p.m. the Constabulary moved slowly on again, and at 9 p.m. they halted for the night within four miles of Idoweina. A zariba was made, and the Constabulary were formed up in column of sections, with the Maxim gun mounted and ready for action on the left front and the camels in the centre. All military precautions were taken to guard against a night attack. From the enemy camp occasional shots were heard throughout the night, and the African sky, radiant with a myriad stars, was also aglow with the reflection of the Dervish camp-fires. The Constabulary were joined by some 300 Dolbahanta who were anxious to recover their lost stock from the Dervishes; and some ammunition from the precious reserve was distributed to them. The immediate object was to prevent the Dervishes from driving off the stock they had looted from the Dolbahanta, and the ultimate object was to restore our damaged prestige. In both these objects we failed lamentably.
For the Dervishes got away with the stock*,Estimated at 5,000-6,000 camels and 20,000-30,000 sheep. The numbers were so large that the Dervishes had to send to the haroun for assistance to drive in their loot.”
“The force marched south-east towards Ber, and, on the road, retreating tribesmen reported that the Dervishes in large numbers, under the command of Ow Yussuf bin Abdulla Hassan, the Mullah's brother, having raided and pillaged in all directions, were withdrawing the looted stock in the direction of Idoweina, thirty miles southeast of Burao, which they had made their rendezvous.the force was halted eleven miles northeast of Idoweina; and here fifteen men of the Constabulary, mounted on ponies, who had been sent on ahead, confirmed the news which had been received on the road. They had exchanged shots with the Dervishes whose strength they estimated at over 2,000 footmen all armed with rifles and 150 horsemen. At 8 p.m. the Constabulary moved slowly on again, and at 9 p.m. they halted for the night within four miles of Idoweina. A zariba was made, and the Constabulary were formed up in column of sections, with the Maxim gun mounted and ready for action on the left front and the camels in the centre. All military precautions were taken to guard against a night attack. From the enemy camp occasional shots were heard throughout the night, and the African sky, radiant with a myriad stars, was also aglow with the reflection of the Dervish camp-fires. The Constabulary were joined by some 300 Dolbahanta who were anxious to recover their lost stock from the Dervishes; and some ammunition from the precious reserve was distributed to them. The immediate object was to prevent the Dervishes from driving off the stock they had looted from the Dolbahanta, and the ultimate object was to restore our damaged prestige. In both these objects we failed lamentably.
For the Dervishes got away with the stock*,Estimated at 5,000-6,000 camels and 20,000-30,000 sheep. The numbers were so large that the Dervishes had to send to the haroun for assistance to drive in their loot.”
A little east of Soldan Nur's tomb is a shallow nulla, seen as a dark line in the
photograph, and known as Hed Kaldig, the Place of Blood. This was the execution
ground where those to whom the Mullah had taken a dislike were shot, with or
without torture. Had such anticipated trouble and escaped, any members of their
families on whom hands could be laid, including women and children, are said to
have been shot in their stead, and their bodies left for the hyaenas. After the capture
of Taleh pious Somalis collected the quantities of human bones found hereabouts
and gave them burial. However this may be there are no human bones about now.
"In 1910 , in the British House of common , the goverment soothingly stated that the power of the Mad Mullah was now completely broken. But in 1911 , Mahammed Abdille Hassan attacked the Dolbahanata , took their stoclks , and moved again into the pasture land of the Nogal Vally. Tales reached the British in Berbera that the Sayyid was becoming more ruthless with the disenting tribes that he was mutilating prisoners." page 43 Heart Of A Stranger
To resume, the Mullah followed up his first coup of April 1899 by a further successful foray against the Habr Yunis in August, and he reoccupied Burao with a force estimated at 5000 men. He gave himself out as the Mahdi; and ominous rumours spread foretelling an advance on Berbera. The Consul General urged an expedition on the Home Government, but our commitments elsewhere, more particularly in south Africa, were such as to preclude the immediate adoption of this course. During the first seven months of 1900, the Mullah was comparatively inactive, but in August he suddenly swooped down upon the Aidegalla tribe and caused all the friendly tribes to evacuate the Haud in confusion. Next month the Habr Awal tribe suffered severely at his hands
Although the British annihilation of the Somali leader, Mohamed Abdullah Hassan - in England normally known as "the mad Mullah" - took twenty years and was finally made utilizing an independent air force unit, this war is not well known to the public. And yet this is the story of one of the first examples of the utilization of modern arms against a powerful people's army, who had the nearly total control of an immense area with strong-points which could not be overrun without extremely severe losses, and with utilization of the sanctuary on the other side of international borders. The parallel with Vietnam is obvious.
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The British considered him a religious, fanatic rebel, although an opposition member of the Parliament in London described him as "a. brave man, striving to be free".
In 1907 Mohamed Abdullah was forced to withdraw to the Italian side of the border, but two years later he was back and the British had to withdraw to Berbera and two other coastal towns and leave the tribes in the hinterland to their own. In order to have some control, the British supplied rifles and ammunition to "friendly" tribes [bloody iidoor minions].
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During the First World War, Sheik Mohamed Abdullah got help from the new Turkish oriented Ethiopian Emperor, Lij Yasu, who provided him with weapons, ammunition and a Turkish fortress architect, who assisted in the construction of about 30 stone forts in Northern Somalia and the Ogaden.
In the main fort, Taleh, he had a German mechanic, Emil Kirsch, producing ammunition. Kirsch had fled from Djibouti to Ethiopia in 1917 and was sent by Lij Yasu to Sheik Mohamed as a "present" on a 5 month contract. The Dervishes wanted him to produce rifles without supplying tools and raw materials and to repair Maxim machine-guns without any spare parts.
He succeeded in a "rope-escape" with his Nyasa servant from the 10 meter high tower, but died of thirst after six days without food and water.
After the First World War it was decided that the British should go into the offensive to annihilate the Mullah and his regime.
Force Z arrives
As previous operations had been costly and had given no permanent results, it was decided to try an air expedition. The advantages of such an operation would be:
•It could be carried out at a relatively low cost;
•Only a force of 250 men would be needed, compared to a long term army campaign with at least 5.000 troops;
•An aerial expedition could be prepared and transferred rapidly
•If a failure, the losses would be bearable.
It was decided to dispatch a self contained RAF unit "Force Z" to Berbera under the command of Group Captain R. Gordon in the last half of 1919 [OK Xaar Belaayo, tell us this British guy was your uncle]. The group had 12 DH9 aeroplanes out of which one was an ambulance plane, 36 officers (incl. 4 medical officers) and 189 other ranks (incl. 25 medical personnel) and had rations, fuel, spare parts, ammunition etc. to operate independently for 6 months 3).
In November 1919 Gordon arrived at Berbera together with his aerodrome engineer and his supply-officer as an advance party. In order to keep the plans secret, they wore no RAF insignia, but came as the advance party for an oil-exploring company.
They started up with preparing an aerodrome ("site for drilling equipment") at Berbera. Next an aerodrome was made near Burao, 140 km. from Berbera and 150 km. from Eli Dur Elan fort, where the Mullah was suspected to be.
Force Z blev transporteret til Berbera ombord på HMS Ark Royal 4).
Fra An Extract from Jane's Fighting Ships for 1919.
During December more than 20 tons of supplies as well as 2.000 camels were moved to the aerodrome at Burao - a 6 day's ride.
On 30th December, the main force, with the aeroplanes, arrived by Royal Navy to Berbera.
The same day the Governor, F. G. Archer, sent a flysheet to "the Dervishes of the Mullah Mohamed Ben Abdullah Hassan of Ogaden" carried by British Officer "who like the birds in the air flies fast and far" granting safe conduct for the followers of the Mullah if they surrendered and offering a reward for the capture of the Mullah: 5.000 piaster, 500 to 1.100 for his brothers and 250 to 500 piaster for his sons and some of his leaders.
Phase 1 - Air Attacks
On the 19th January, Force Z was ready in Burao and two days later it was ready for the first phase: to locate and bomb the Fort of Medish and Jid Ali.
The first bomb hit next to Mohamed Abdullah, and his sister and the man standing next to him were killed.
Phase 2 - Combined Operations
After 4 days of bombing and strafing where a great part of the camels and cattle were killed, it was decided to go on to the second phase, a combined operation with the Camel Corps.
On the 27th, the camel corps was at Jid Ali Fort and after bombing by RAF the fortress fell with no losses on the British side. The Mullah had fled towards the east, presumably to Taleh. On the 29th the RAF found Taleh: no sign of troop movements, but the aerial photographs taken on the 1st of February revealed a huge fort complex.
The main fort was 100x200 yards and had 12 turrets more than 10 meters high, with grain silos for each turret and accommodations for more than 5.000 soldiers with camels.
It was decided to make a new aerodrome at Gaolo. This would take approximately 3 weeks but after a bombing of Taleh on the 3rd where the forts were bombed with 112 20 and 2-lbs. bombs, the village was bombed with incendiary bombs and the cattle and camels strafed with machine guns.
Major Aller's Sources
•Naval Review 1921, p. 627.
•Wing Commander W. Turrel's papers, Imperial War Museum, London.
•Royal Air Force & Civil Aviation Record 9-1920.
•Personal visits to Taleh and North-western Somalia.
1899 april 12, berbera
The tribes over whom this Mullah has more immediately conim
solidatecl his influence are: in the Dolbahanta, the Balir-as-Samah, the
Arar Sarnah, and the Ali Gheri; other sections uf tlic Girad Farah are
under his sway, and the powerful Mahmood Girad, against whom he
threatened to send an expedition, are now said to have sent him a deputation
of 300 horsemen. In the Habr Toljaala country the Aden
Madoba and the Yesaf have joined themselves to him, and possibly other
tribes in that vicinity. || In the Habr Gerhajis country, beyond espousing
the cause of Madar Hirsi, he failed to effect anything — they would have
none of him.
Camp Sheikh, June 5, 1899. (June 27.)
(Extract.) || The position of affairs in the Dolbahanta shows no
improvement, and the reports which reach me point to a further extension
of Mullah Abdullah's influence. || He is now on his way back from an
expedition against the Mahmood Girad, who lately raided the Ali Gheri.
He is Said to have been well received by this tribe, who returned the
looted property and gave him a present of fifty horses. How far they
have otherwise come under his influence is not reported
1899 july 16 hargeisa
My Lord, In my dispatch of the 16th, I informed your Lordship of the state of affairs amongst the Habr Yunis tribe, and noted that I was awaiting an opportunity of ascertaining the attitude that would be assumed by Sultan Nur. This, I regret to say, is one of declared hostility. I waited for some time after he had returned to his country, and then sent him a civil letter, pointing out that he had not as yet come to visit me, as is usual when my camp is in his limits,and desiring him to come in, as there were several matters I wished to discuss with him. This was on the 27tt ultimo, and my camp was then at Bagan, in Habr Yunis territory. || No reply was sent to this letter; but on the instant the camel sowar who had conveyed it to Sultan Nur returned to my camp near Hargaisa without his camel, arms, and uniform, of which he reported he badly stripped by order of Sultan Nur. Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury
Sultan Nur hastily left eastwards, and is supposed to have repaired to Burao, whence he will probably rejoin the Mullah. The eastern sections of the Habr Yunis are still with the Mullah, but the Position has so far improved that the westerly sections, whose attitude had before been doubtful, are now said to have definitely declared against Sultan Nur and the Mullah. At this point there is now every reason to believe this movement will now stop in its movement westwards,leaving the line of division as reported i n my previous despatch. Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury
The tribes over whom this Mullah has more immediately conim
solidatecl his influence are: in the Dolbahanta, the Balir-as-Samah, the
Arar Sarnah, and the Ali Gheri; other sections uf tlic Girad Farah are
under his sway, and the powerful Mahmood Girad, against whom he
threatened to send an expedition, are now said to have sent him a deputation
of 300 horsemen. In the Habr Toljaala country the Aden
Madoba and the Yesaf have joined themselves to him, and possibly other
tribes in that vicinity. || In the Habr Gerhajis country, beyond espousing
the cause of Madar Hirsi, he failed to effect anything — they would have
none of him.
Camp Sheikh, June 5, 1899. (June 27.)
(Extract.) || The position of affairs in the Dolbahanta shows no
improvement, and the reports which reach me point to a further extension
of Mullah Abdullah's influence. || He is now on his way back from an
expedition against the Mahmood Girad, who lately raided the Ali Gheri.
He is Said to have been well received by this tribe, who returned the
looted property and gave him a present of fifty horses. How far they
have otherwise come under his influence is not reported
1899 july 16 hargeisa
My Lord, In my dispatch of the 16th, I informed your Lordship of the state of affairs amongst the Habr Yunis tribe, and noted that I was awaiting an opportunity of ascertaining the attitude that would be assumed by Sultan Nur. This, I regret to say, is one of declared hostility. I waited for some time after he had returned to his country, and then sent him a civil letter, pointing out that he had not as yet come to visit me, as is usual when my camp is in his limits,and desiring him to come in, as there were several matters I wished to discuss with him. This was on the 27tt ultimo, and my camp was then at Bagan, in Habr Yunis territory. || No reply was sent to this letter; but on the instant the camel sowar who had conveyed it to Sultan Nur returned to my camp near Hargaisa without his camel, arms, and uniform, of which he reported he badly stripped by order of Sultan Nur. Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury
Sultan Nur hastily left eastwards, and is supposed to have repaired to Burao, whence he will probably rejoin the Mullah. The eastern sections of the Habr Yunis are still with the Mullah, but the Position has so far improved that the westerly sections, whose attitude had before been doubtful, are now said to have definitely declared against Sultan Nur and the Mullah. At this point there is now every reason to believe this movement will now stop in its movement westwards,leaving the line of division as reported i n my previous despatch. Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury
Berbera, September 14, 1899. (October 2.)
My Lord, On the instant information was received that the Mullah Muhammad Abdullah, had left Burao and occupied Odweina, in the western Habr Yunis country. He is there coercing the western Habr Yunis tribes who water at Odweina, Adadleh, and Syk, and who had declared themselves against him and Sultan Nur. He has seized some of their principal men and a considerable quantity of their livestock grazing in the Arori and Toyo Plains. | it is unfortunate that we could not get earlier information of the Mullah's Intention to move to Burao. I have before alluded to the secrecy which covers his proceedings, and to the difficulty of obtaining reliable Information from the Dolbahanta, It will be observed from late reports that I considered the movement was subsiding, and, although we were aware that Sultan Nur had sent several letters to the Mullah to assist him in coercing the western Habr Yunis tribes, our Information was to the effect that all attempts to raise a force had failed. Such was certainly the opinion of Sheikh Mattar, of Hargaisa, whose means of obtaining information are probably unequalled in the Protectorate, and whose good faith there is no reason to question. He did not consider there was any probability of a move on the Mullah's part tiU next spring rains, when he thought that, if he found himself strong enough, he would then create trouble in the western part of the Protectorate, or move into the Ogaden. This opinion was expressed the day I left Hargaisa on my return journey. There seems to have been an altercation, too, between the Mullah and Sultan Nur, the latter saying that he had not collected men and supplies at Burao, as the Mullah had moved earlier than he had expected.
Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury
My Lord, On the instant information was received that the Mullah Muhammad Abdullah, had left Burao and occupied Odweina, in the western Habr Yunis country. He is there coercing the western Habr Yunis tribes who water at Odweina, Adadleh, and Syk, and who had declared themselves against him and Sultan Nur. He has seized some of their principal men and a considerable quantity of their livestock grazing in the Arori and Toyo Plains. | it is unfortunate that we could not get earlier information of the Mullah's Intention to move to Burao. I have before alluded to the secrecy which covers his proceedings, and to the difficulty of obtaining reliable Information from the Dolbahanta, It will be observed from late reports that I considered the movement was subsiding, and, although we were aware that Sultan Nur had sent several letters to the Mullah to assist him in coercing the western Habr Yunis tribes, our Information was to the effect that all attempts to raise a force had failed. Such was certainly the opinion of Sheikh Mattar, of Hargaisa, whose means of obtaining information are probably unequalled in the Protectorate, and whose good faith there is no reason to question. He did not consider there was any probability of a move on the Mullah's part tiU next spring rains, when he thought that, if he found himself strong enough, he would then create trouble in the western part of the Protectorate, or move into the Ogaden. This opinion was expressed the day I left Hargaisa on my return journey. There seems to have been an altercation, too, between the Mullah and Sultan Nur, the latter saying that he had not collected men and supplies at Burao, as the Mullah had moved earlier than he had expected.
Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury
In the unlikely event of the:
1- Mullah offering to surrender, in his case and that of the Following:
2-Ahmed Warsame (known as Haji Sudi)
3-Deria Araale (Diiriye Caraale)
4-Deria Gure (Diiriye Guure) Only an unconditional surrender should be accepted, no gurantee of any kind as to future treatment being given.
5- Sultan Nuur (Suldaan Nuur Axmed Amaan) the late sultan of the Habar Yunis, may be
guranteed his life.
J. Hayes-Sadler, His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Somali Coast Protectorate. Aden April 11, 1901
Reference: Sadler to Salisbury-Correspondence Respecting the Rising of the Mullah Muhammed Abdullah in Somaliland, and Consequent Military Operations, 1899-1901.(published 1901) 88pp.
1- Mullah offering to surrender, in his case and that of the Following:
2-Ahmed Warsame (known as Haji Sudi)
3-Deria Araale (Diiriye Caraale)
4-Deria Gure (Diiriye Guure) Only an unconditional surrender should be accepted, no gurantee of any kind as to future treatment being given.
5- Sultan Nuur (Suldaan Nuur Axmed Amaan) the late sultan of the Habar Yunis, may be
guranteed his life.
J. Hayes-Sadler, His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Somali Coast Protectorate. Aden April 11, 1901
Reference: Sadler to Salisbury-Correspondence Respecting the Rising of the Mullah Muhammed Abdullah in Somaliland, and Consequent Military Operations, 1899-1901.(published 1901) 88pp.
MacNeil’s zariba (Sanala
“Early next morning our patrols began coming in at intervals with prisoners, and we heard for the first time of Captain M-Neill's fight at Sanala, and the accounts they gave us turned out subsequently to be very correct. More patrols were sent out during the course of the morning, and several small skirmishes took place with stray parties of the enemy, and we secured about 20 horses. At I p.m. numerous horsemen were seen by our patrols passing along the open plains to the north, on the far side of the ridge, and evidently making for the central opening to our valley, whilst some 4,000 odd spearmen were heading for the western entrance. As The Camel Corps and Mounted Infantry were sent on ahead, whilst we proceeded with all our transport to cross the afore- mentioned nullah, which consisted of a pre- cipitous descent into a river-bed, and an equally precipitous ascent on the far side. Barely half the column was across this when the Mullah, Sultan Nur, and Hadji Sudi, with some 200 horsemen, appeared through the northern opening to the valley, and wheel- ing into two lines came straight for the rear of our column. We subsequently discovered that they were unaware of our presence, and were making for a pass which was a short cut to the Mullah's headquarters at Wayla-hed. On their dis- covering us, they immediately turned about and rode straight down the valley, upon which our rearguard fired a volley, but they were too far off for this to have much effect.
“Early next morning our patrols began coming in at intervals with prisoners, and we heard for the first time of Captain M-Neill's fight at Sanala, and the accounts they gave us turned out subsequently to be very correct. More patrols were sent out during the course of the morning, and several small skirmishes took place with stray parties of the enemy, and we secured about 20 horses. At I p.m. numerous horsemen were seen by our patrols passing along the open plains to the north, on the far side of the ridge, and evidently making for the central opening to our valley, whilst some 4,000 odd spearmen were heading for the western entrance. As The Camel Corps and Mounted Infantry were sent on ahead, whilst we proceeded with all our transport to cross the afore- mentioned nullah, which consisted of a pre- cipitous descent into a river-bed, and an equally precipitous ascent on the far side. Barely half the column was across this when the Mullah, Sultan Nur, and Hadji Sudi, with some 200 horsemen, appeared through the northern opening to the valley, and wheel- ing into two lines came straight for the rear of our column. We subsequently discovered that they were unaware of our presence, and were making for a pass which was a short cut to the Mullah's headquarters at Wayla-hed. On their dis- covering us, they immediately turned about and rode straight down the valley, upon which our rearguard fired a volley, but they were too far off for this to have much effect.
Hayes sadler
Fardhidin
1901
The strength of the force Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne attacked is not stated, but it is reported that the Mullah's Mijjertein riflemen were present in considerable numbers. This shows that he has succeeded in enlisting the aid of the Mijjertein tribes, hostile to Yusuf Ali, on the eastern borders of the Dolbahanta, and it is to the rifle fire of these men that our casualties are principally due. I regret to have to report that Captain Friedrichs, R. E., was killed in these Operations In him the Service loses a valuable and experienced officer. He met his death in the Performance of a gallant action. Our other casualties were Lieutenant Dickinson, severe flesh wound in the middle of left thigh, and nine of the levy killed, and sixteen wounded. No other British officers were hurt, and the wounded are all reported to be doing well. I do not quite understand Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne's allusions to my despatches to him. The first that reached him was evidently the despatch I wrote on the 5th July, informing him of the Instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th June. In the second I wrote that if he had not already left Bohotele to return to Burao he should now do so; and with regard to the Nogal Valley, I said that no Operations should now be undertaken there or elsewhere. I can, however, quite understand that when Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne came up with the Mullah's rear-guard at Cour Girad he felt himself bound to go on. He could not have done otherwise . It will be observed that Mahmud Girad, the powerful tribe occupying the northern Dolbahanta, joined the expedition, but would not face the Mullah's rifles. This is typical of the Situation throughout; the tribes are powerless against the Mullah's rifles. Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury
Fardhidin
1901
The strength of the force Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne attacked is not stated, but it is reported that the Mullah's Mijjertein riflemen were present in considerable numbers. This shows that he has succeeded in enlisting the aid of the Mijjertein tribes, hostile to Yusuf Ali, on the eastern borders of the Dolbahanta, and it is to the rifle fire of these men that our casualties are principally due. I regret to have to report that Captain Friedrichs, R. E., was killed in these Operations In him the Service loses a valuable and experienced officer. He met his death in the Performance of a gallant action. Our other casualties were Lieutenant Dickinson, severe flesh wound in the middle of left thigh, and nine of the levy killed, and sixteen wounded. No other British officers were hurt, and the wounded are all reported to be doing well. I do not quite understand Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne's allusions to my despatches to him. The first that reached him was evidently the despatch I wrote on the 5th July, informing him of the Instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th June. In the second I wrote that if he had not already left Bohotele to return to Burao he should now do so; and with regard to the Nogal Valley, I said that no Operations should now be undertaken there or elsewhere. I can, however, quite understand that when Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne came up with the Mullah's rear-guard at Cour Girad he felt himself bound to go on. He could not have done otherwise . It will be observed that Mahmud Girad, the powerful tribe occupying the northern Dolbahanta, joined the expedition, but would not face the Mullah's rifles. This is typical of the Situation throughout; the tribes are powerless against the Mullah's rifles. Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury
Almost before the ergo had voiced these sentiments there was to be striking proof of the wisdom of their forecast. For a party of Khalifs Dervishes and Ogaden made a successful raid on our tribes living near the southern frontier, driving off a large number of stock and killing many men, women, and children. For some years past the British Government had forbidden its tribes to raid the Ogaden in Abyssinian territory; but the latter, uncontrolled by their Government, fyad been free to advance into Britishterritory and loot our tribes living near the frontier whenever they wished. On the whole, our subjects had abided loyally by the Government order, but, in so far as they were by far the stronger, it had naturally been most irksome to them to do so. They now decided that the only course open to them was to advance in force against the u Dervish-Ogadenelements and smash them before they could become a yet more serious menace.
All the responsible leaders were of this opinion, and when they approached the local Government to ask if they might put their project into effect, there seemed to be no further justification for adhering to a one-sided arrangement whereby our people, though the stronger, were restrained by their Government from raiding across the border while the Ogaden, free from all the shackles of civilised government and openly hostile to us, were at liberty to attack British subjects in British territory as and when they pleased. Consequently Akil Haji Mohammed Bullaleh, commonly known as Haji Waraba, or the holy hyaena, on account of his truculent and martial qualities, was allowed to organise a tribal army of some 3,000 Habr Yunis, Habr Toljaala, and Dolbahanta fighting men. Towards the end of July, 1920, they reached the Mullah's haroun at Gora'h, west of Shinileh, where the Mullah and some 800 Dervish and Ogaden riflemen were concentrated. Khalif and the Mullah's eldest son Mahdi had but recently died of the smallpox which was ravaging the district. The attack was delivered at dawn
All who stood and fought were killed by our tribal army; and some 60,000 head of stock and 700 rifles, numbers which give some idea of the growing strength of the Dervish- Ogaden concentration, were afterwards brought back into British territory. At the first onslaught, Haji Waraba himself, anxious to win the price set on the Mullah's head, had made straight for the Mullah's hut only to find that its occupant had fled. He must, however, have been taken very much by surprise : for his tea was still hot in its cup and his skull cap lay beside it on the ground. After calling upon the riflemen to hold up the attack until he had had time to get away, he had galloped out of the camp with a few of his intimates, intent as usual on saving his own skin.*
The Mad Mullah Of Somaliland By Douglas Jardin.
All the responsible leaders were of this opinion, and when they approached the local Government to ask if they might put their project into effect, there seemed to be no further justification for adhering to a one-sided arrangement whereby our people, though the stronger, were restrained by their Government from raiding across the border while the Ogaden, free from all the shackles of civilised government and openly hostile to us, were at liberty to attack British subjects in British territory as and when they pleased. Consequently Akil Haji Mohammed Bullaleh, commonly known as Haji Waraba, or the holy hyaena, on account of his truculent and martial qualities, was allowed to organise a tribal army of some 3,000 Habr Yunis, Habr Toljaala, and Dolbahanta fighting men. Towards the end of July, 1920, they reached the Mullah's haroun at Gora'h, west of Shinileh, where the Mullah and some 800 Dervish and Ogaden riflemen were concentrated. Khalif and the Mullah's eldest son Mahdi had but recently died of the smallpox which was ravaging the district. The attack was delivered at dawn
All who stood and fought were killed by our tribal army; and some 60,000 head of stock and 700 rifles, numbers which give some idea of the growing strength of the Dervish- Ogaden concentration, were afterwards brought back into British territory. At the first onslaught, Haji Waraba himself, anxious to win the price set on the Mullah's head, had made straight for the Mullah's hut only to find that its occupant had fled. He must, however, have been taken very much by surprise : for his tea was still hot in its cup and his skull cap lay beside it on the ground. After calling upon the riflemen to hold up the attack until he had had time to get away, he had galloped out of the camp with a few of his intimates, intent as usual on saving his own skin.*
The Mad Mullah Of Somaliland By Douglas Jardin.
All who stood and fought were killed by our tribal army; and some 60,000 head of stock and 700 rifles, numbers which give some idea of the growing strength of the Dervish- Ogaden concentration, were afterwards brought back into British territory. At the first onslaught, Haji Waraba himself, anxious to win the price set on the Mullah's head, had made straight for the Mullah's hut only to find that its occupant had fled. He must, however, have been taken very much by surprise : for his tea was still hot in its cup and his skull cap lay beside it on the ground. After calling upon the riflemen to hold up the attack until he had had time to get away, he had galloped out of the camp with a few of his intimates, intent as usual on saving his own skin.*
It was now apparent that all the remnants of the Dervish force from the Medishe and Jidali area were converging on Tale ; and the tribal leaders, although they had no proof, were convinced that the Mullah was in the fortress. A large party of Dervishes escorting the Mullah's main caravan had been successfully engaged by the Tribal Levy while trying to make their way into Tale. During the fight many notorious Dervishes had been killed,
274 THE MAD MULLAH OF SOMALILAND
including Haji Sudi, the ex-naval interpreter, and Ibrahim Boghol, the commander of the Mullah's forces in the northern area. The captures comprised many of the Mullah's personal belongings, his correspondence, his clothing and jewellery and, in addition, 1,400 camels, 450 cows, 50 ponies, 51 rifles, 2,000 rounds of ammunition, and 300 camel loads of supplies.
The Camel Corps had joined Gibb on the road to Gaolo which they reached together on the evening of the 8th February. On the following morning the Mullah's second son Abdurrahman Jahid, a feckless youth, and his uncle, Haji Osman, who had deserted the haroun overnight were brought into the Camel Corps zariba. They stated that the Mullah was in Tale but would have left the previous evening, had it not been for the presence of 200 men of the Tribal Levy who were in the vicinity watching developments. They were confident that the Mullah would leave that night. Acting on this information, which might or might not be trustworthy, Ismay and Gibb decided to make a demonstration round Tale that evening.
It was now apparent that all the remnants of the Dervish force from the Medishe and Jidali area were converging on Tale ; and the tribal leaders, although they had no proof, were convinced that the Mullah was in the fortress. A large party of Dervishes escorting the Mullah's main caravan had been successfully engaged by the Tribal Levy while trying to make their way into Tale. During the fight many notorious Dervishes had been killed,
274 THE MAD MULLAH OF SOMALILAND
including Haji Sudi, the ex-naval interpreter, and Ibrahim Boghol, the commander of the Mullah's forces in the northern area. The captures comprised many of the Mullah's personal belongings, his correspondence, his clothing and jewellery and, in addition, 1,400 camels, 450 cows, 50 ponies, 51 rifles, 2,000 rounds of ammunition, and 300 camel loads of supplies.
The Camel Corps had joined Gibb on the road to Gaolo which they reached together on the evening of the 8th February. On the following morning the Mullah's second son Abdurrahman Jahid, a feckless youth, and his uncle, Haji Osman, who had deserted the haroun overnight were brought into the Camel Corps zariba. They stated that the Mullah was in Tale but would have left the previous evening, had it not been for the presence of 200 men of the Tribal Levy who were in the vicinity watching developments. They were confident that the Mullah would leave that night. Acting on this information, which might or might not be trustworthy, Ismay and Gibb decided to make a demonstration round Tale that evening.
To resume, the Mullah followed up his first coup of April 1899 by a further successful foray against the Habr Yunis in August, and he reoccupied Burao with a force estimated at 5000 men. He gave himself out as the Mahdi; and ominous rumours spread foretelling an advance on Berbera. The Consul General urged an expedition on the Home Government, but our commitments elsewhere, more particularly in south Africa, were such as to preclude the immediate adoption of this course. During the first seven months of 1900, the Mullah was comparatively inactive, but in August he suddenly swooped down upon the Aidegalla tribe and caused all the friendly tribes to evacuate the Haud in confusion. Next month the Habr Awal tribe suffered severely at his hands.
Muhammed Abdullah had, however, for some time enjoyed considerable influence over the Habr Toljaala and Dolbahanta tribes inhabiting the more remote portions of the Protectorate, and at first this influence appears to have been exercised for good. At the begining of last year, however, the Mullah, on the plea of a theft of camels committed by the Habr Yunis (who live within the Protectorate), raided the territory of that tribe, occupied the town of Burao. Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury
“Sultan Nur hastily left eastwards, and is supposed to have repaired to Burao, whence he will probably rejoin the Mullah. The eastern sections of the Habr Yunis are still with the Mullah, but the Position has so far improved that the westerly sections, whose attitude had before been doubtful, are now said to have definitely declared against Sultan Nur and the Mullah. At this point there is now every reason to believe this movement will now stop in its movement westwards,leaving the line of division as reported i n my previous despatch. Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury
“Sultan Nur hastily left eastwards, and is supposed to have repaired to Burao, whence he will probably rejoin the Mullah. The eastern sections of the Habr Yunis are still with the Mullah, but the Position has so far improved that the westerly sections, whose attitude had before been doubtful, are now said to have definitely declared against Sultan Nur and the Mullah. At this point there is now every reason to believe this movement will now stop in its movement westwards,leaving the line of division as reported i n my previous despatch. Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury
Berbera, September 14, 1899. (October 2.)
My Lord, On the instant information was received that the Mullah Muhammad Abdullah, had left Burao and occupied Odweina, in the western Habr Yunis country. He is there coercing the western Habr Yunis tribes who water at Odweina, Adadleh, and Syk, and who had declared themselves against him and Sultan Nur. He has seized some of their principal men and a considerable quantity of their livestock grazing in the Arori and Toyo Plains. |
It is unfortunate that we could not get earlier information of the Mullah's Intention to move to Burao. I have before alluded to the secrecy which covers his proceedings, and to the difficulty of obtaining reliable Information from the Dolbahanta, It will be observed from late reports that I considered the movement was subsiding, and, although we were aware that Sultan Nur had sent several letters to the Mullah to assist him in coercing the western Habr Yunis tribes, our Information was to the effect that all attempts to raise a force had failed. Such was certainly the opinion of Sheikh Mattar, of Hargaisa, whose means of obtaining information are probably unequalled in the Protectorate, and whose good faith there is no reason to question. He did not consider there was any probability of a move on the Mullah's part tiU next spring rains, when he thought that, if he found himself strong enough, he would then create trouble in the western part of the Protectorate, or move into the Ogaden. This opinion was expressed the day I left Hargaisa on my return journey. There seems to have been an altercation, too, between the Mullah and Sultan Nur, the latter saying that he had not collected men and supplies at Burao, as the Mullah had moved earlier than he had expected. Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury
My Lord, On the instant information was received that the Mullah Muhammad Abdullah, had left Burao and occupied Odweina, in the western Habr Yunis country. He is there coercing the western Habr Yunis tribes who water at Odweina, Adadleh, and Syk, and who had declared themselves against him and Sultan Nur. He has seized some of their principal men and a considerable quantity of their livestock grazing in the Arori and Toyo Plains. |
It is unfortunate that we could not get earlier information of the Mullah's Intention to move to Burao. I have before alluded to the secrecy which covers his proceedings, and to the difficulty of obtaining reliable Information from the Dolbahanta, It will be observed from late reports that I considered the movement was subsiding, and, although we were aware that Sultan Nur had sent several letters to the Mullah to assist him in coercing the western Habr Yunis tribes, our Information was to the effect that all attempts to raise a force had failed. Such was certainly the opinion of Sheikh Mattar, of Hargaisa, whose means of obtaining information are probably unequalled in the Protectorate, and whose good faith there is no reason to question. He did not consider there was any probability of a move on the Mullah's part tiU next spring rains, when he thought that, if he found himself strong enough, he would then create trouble in the western part of the Protectorate, or move into the Ogaden. This opinion was expressed the day I left Hargaisa on my return journey. There seems to have been an altercation, too, between the Mullah and Sultan Nur, the latter saying that he had not collected men and supplies at Burao, as the Mullah had moved earlier than he had expected. Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury
