Prime Minister
Somali Promotion Agent
Officially numbering 27,000 soldiers (but more likely composed of around 23,000), the SNA is riddled with ghost soldiers, old and sick soldiers incapable of effective fighting or patrolling, and untrained units. Although vetting procedures for recruitment now exist on paper, they are not implemented, allowing a steady flow of unqualified people onto the army’s payroll. Many soldiers do not own a weapon. Around 60 per cent of the army’s personnel lack any real military capacity.13 The SNA also lacks logistical, sustainment and medevac capacities. Although Turkey now runs a respected military academy for non-commissioned officers in Mogadishu, and British training of the SNA receives high accolades, many SNA soldiers have not received even basic training, let alone training at the battalion level or higher.14 The army lacks embedded international advisors, with the exception of the Danab Brigade, which has been trained and mentored by US special operations forces. These shortfalls are remarkable, given the USD $1 billion international investment in the SNA since 2012.15 All these deficiencies mean that, even if it has some 23,000–27,000 soldiers, a far smaller number of SNA fighters are actually capable of military operations against al-Shabaab. The army has struggled to defend its forward operating bases, let alone surrounding territories.
Forward operating bases are regularly overrun and destroyed by al-Shabaab; thus, the SNA is often forced to pay off al-Shabaab units operating in the region to avoid an attack.16 At the end of 2019, the SNA’s military operations to secure the arteries out of Mogadishu ground to a halt, as nearly 40 per cent of the force tasked with that mission simply disappeared.17 The SNA’s poor performance points to a crucial characteristic of Somalia’s army: it is more of a conglomeration of militias than a coherent fighting force. After its complete collapse in 2009, the SNA was reconstituted via a clan-based recruitment drive in which fully formed clanand warlord-based militias were incorporated into the army. Many newly recruited units were merely handed booklets about their new role within the SNA, and received no additional training or instructions about the chain of command.18 As a result, newly formed SNA units remained strongly linked to the dominant clans of their home areas. They continue to rely on clan leaders to receive any of the heavier weaponry for combat. Units are restricted in their geographic mobility, as clan leaders refuse to allow their weaponry and resources to be moved from their territory.
Another consequence of the clan-based origins of the new SNA units is that units eventually deployed outside of their home communities often prey on civilians. Widespread theft of land, water and other resources have fed into deep resentment by local communities against the SNA, and has often triggered the formation of new militias to fight against the SNA presence (rather than against al-Shabaab). These militias, in turn, also tend to prey on communities in the surrounding regions, feeding a cycle of violence and the proliferation of armed actors. This troubling situation has prompted a debate among international donors as to whether the SNA should continue focusing on creating multiclan units — an approach embraced by the US and Turkey — or merely accept the basic clan feature of the SNA. The answer to this question is of fundamental importance, given the lack of clan homogeneity in some areas, the need to have mobile troops to combat nimble alShabaab forces and the broader coordination requirements across the SNA.
A related issue is that of soldier loyalty to the SNA versus clan leadership. Strong clan connections within an SNA unit often mean that the unit follows the clan more than the chain of command. Within the international donor and expert community, a debate exists concerning how to reinforce loyalty to the SNA. One possible solution is more reliable pay to soldiers.19 Existing pay is between USD $75 and $150 per month for soldiers and USD $270 for officers. These amounts fall far short of monthly expenditures, particularly in deployments away from home areas. Yet, even a small raise to USD $200 is well beyond the Somali Government’s current means. In any case, much of the current soldiers’ pay ends up stolen by higher up officials who control distributions. Efforts to break up clan-based SNA units aside, finding new sources of funding for soldiers appears a promising path towards greater cohesion and loyalty.
Like the SNA, AMISOM has conducted almost no offensive operations against al-Shabaab since 2016. This is partially a tactical decision, given that the SNA lack the forces necessary to hold any newly captured territory. Wishing to avoid still greater responsibilities to protect larger populations, AMISOM has remained mostly hunkered in “garrison mode.”20 Unannounced withdrawals in 2017 of several Ethiopian military contingents left behind significant power vacuums in key locations, which in turn were rapidly filled by al-Shabaab. The current AMISOM mission is authorized by the United Nations Security Council through 2021, but there is really no expectation that the AU forces could realistically be withdrawn even by then given the continued weakness of the SNA.
Forward operating bases are regularly overrun and destroyed by al-Shabaab; thus, the SNA is often forced to pay off al-Shabaab units operating in the region to avoid an attack.16 At the end of 2019, the SNA’s military operations to secure the arteries out of Mogadishu ground to a halt, as nearly 40 per cent of the force tasked with that mission simply disappeared.17 The SNA’s poor performance points to a crucial characteristic of Somalia’s army: it is more of a conglomeration of militias than a coherent fighting force. After its complete collapse in 2009, the SNA was reconstituted via a clan-based recruitment drive in which fully formed clanand warlord-based militias were incorporated into the army. Many newly recruited units were merely handed booklets about their new role within the SNA, and received no additional training or instructions about the chain of command.18 As a result, newly formed SNA units remained strongly linked to the dominant clans of their home areas. They continue to rely on clan leaders to receive any of the heavier weaponry for combat. Units are restricted in their geographic mobility, as clan leaders refuse to allow their weaponry and resources to be moved from their territory.
Another consequence of the clan-based origins of the new SNA units is that units eventually deployed outside of their home communities often prey on civilians. Widespread theft of land, water and other resources have fed into deep resentment by local communities against the SNA, and has often triggered the formation of new militias to fight against the SNA presence (rather than against al-Shabaab). These militias, in turn, also tend to prey on communities in the surrounding regions, feeding a cycle of violence and the proliferation of armed actors. This troubling situation has prompted a debate among international donors as to whether the SNA should continue focusing on creating multiclan units — an approach embraced by the US and Turkey — or merely accept the basic clan feature of the SNA. The answer to this question is of fundamental importance, given the lack of clan homogeneity in some areas, the need to have mobile troops to combat nimble alShabaab forces and the broader coordination requirements across the SNA.
A related issue is that of soldier loyalty to the SNA versus clan leadership. Strong clan connections within an SNA unit often mean that the unit follows the clan more than the chain of command. Within the international donor and expert community, a debate exists concerning how to reinforce loyalty to the SNA. One possible solution is more reliable pay to soldiers.19 Existing pay is between USD $75 and $150 per month for soldiers and USD $270 for officers. These amounts fall far short of monthly expenditures, particularly in deployments away from home areas. Yet, even a small raise to USD $200 is well beyond the Somali Government’s current means. In any case, much of the current soldiers’ pay ends up stolen by higher up officials who control distributions. Efforts to break up clan-based SNA units aside, finding new sources of funding for soldiers appears a promising path towards greater cohesion and loyalty.
Like the SNA, AMISOM has conducted almost no offensive operations against al-Shabaab since 2016. This is partially a tactical decision, given that the SNA lack the forces necessary to hold any newly captured territory. Wishing to avoid still greater responsibilities to protect larger populations, AMISOM has remained mostly hunkered in “garrison mode.”20 Unannounced withdrawals in 2017 of several Ethiopian military contingents left behind significant power vacuums in key locations, which in turn were rapidly filled by al-Shabaab. The current AMISOM mission is authorized by the United Nations Security Council through 2021, but there is really no expectation that the AU forces could realistically be withdrawn even by then given the continued weakness of the SNA.
