General Asad
And What Is Not There Is Always More Than There.
Source: pintrest
Gathering and collection of historical somali documents and photographs
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Source: pintrest
General Asad
And What Is Not There Is Always More Than There.
Borama script
Colonialist rendition of berbera warriors of zeila
Marehan
Jubbaland and its inhabitants by F.E Ellliot
As a result of this manifest weakening of the Wardei they were attacked on
all fronts and it is no surprise that they could not defend themselves but had to flee for their lives. According Turnbull, 'the main contlict was in the east; and the actions fought at Afmadu, on the Deshek Wama, and at EI Lein are still- spoken of by the tribe
Ogaden were at this point led by the grand old man of the Abd Wak, Abdi Ibrahim , the Sultan, while there were a number of ' invasion commanders under him: Abdi Ibrahim was noted for his bravery and skill in war strategy which eventually led to the Ogaden dominance in the Jubaland. His remarkable leadership qualities are still remembered to this day by the Ogaden. Notable among his commanders were Magan Yussuf, the Sultan of the Mohamed Zubeer Ogaden, and Hassan Bejan of the Abdalla/Ogaden
having virtually conquered and suhordinated the Galla to Somali domination. According to Turnbull the attack lof 1865 by the Somali when the Wardei were weakened by plague was so unexpected and so violent that the Wardei were utterly broken by it.
Scattered through the fighting was, hundreds were killed; those who survived either fled to neighhouring tribes or became serfs to the Mohamed Zuheir, the Telemuggeh, or the Magabul. Many were sold as slaves in the markets of Lamu, and Zanzibar.
Had it not been for the arrival of Imperial British East African Company rule in 1885, the Wardei would have ceased to exist as a community with a separate cultural and political identity."
As a result of this manifest weakening of the Wardei they were attacked on
all fronts and it is no surprise that they could not defend themselves but had to flee for their lives. According Turnbull, 'the main contlict was in the east; and the actions fought at Afmadu, on the Deshek Wama, and at EI Lein are still- spoken of by the tribe
Ogaden were at this point led by the grand old man of the Abd Wak, Abdi Ibrahim , the Sultan, while there were a number of ' invasion commanders under him: Abdi Ibrahim was noted for his bravery and skill in war strategy which eventually led to the Ogaden dominance in the Jubaland. His remarkable leadership qualities are still remembered to this day by the Ogaden. Notable among his commanders were Magan Yussuf, the Sultan of the Mohamed Zubeer Ogaden, and Hassan Bejan of the Abdalla/Ogaden
having virtually conquered and suhordinated the Galla to Somali domination. According to Turnbull the attack lof 1865 by the Somali when the Wardei were weakened by plague was so unexpected and so violent that the Wardei were utterly broken by it.
Scattered through the fighting was, hundreds were killed; those who survived either fled to neighhouring tribes or became serfs to the Mohamed Zuheir, the Telemuggeh, or the Magabul. Many were sold as slaves in the markets of Lamu, and Zanzibar.
Had it not been for the arrival of Imperial British East African Company rule in 1885, the Wardei would have ceased to exist as a community with a separate cultural and political identity."
Harti, marehan, garre
and Charles elliott in 1905 also said in the "The East Africa Protectorate"
"The future of the Somali race is to my mind one of the most interesting and difficult of the problems presented by East Africa. For the present, I advise that we leave them alone, or at least avoid as far as possible the task of attacking them in their own territory. They are naturally isolated, and, if our officers will only avoid getting killed, can do little harm by quarrelling with one another in Jubaland. Our real task at present is rather to see that they do not encroach to the south, and to prevent them from raiding the Tana River and the Lamu Archipelago. But we can hardly avoid in the future the further task of making a permanent settlement in Jubaland, and the delimitation of the Abyssinian (meaning stop Somali Region expansion) frontier may perhaps precipitate that settlement.
It is certainly to be desired that we should utilise the Somalis. There can be no doubt that they are the most intelligent race in the Protectorate, though it may be urged with some justice that they are also proud, treacherous, fanatical, and vindictive. Too much stress, I think, is often laid on these bad qualities, and it is certain that the average Englishman has little sympathy for the Somali. He tolerates a black man who admits his inferiority, and even those who show a good fight and give in ; but he cannot tolerate dark colour combined with an intelligence in any way equal to his own. This is the secret of the almost universal dislike of the Babu, and it reappears in the unpopularity of the Somali among East African officials. The Somali are not willing to agree to the simple plan of having a fair fight and then shaking hands when defeated, but constantly indicate that they think themselves our equals or superiors, and not unfrequently prove it. Whenever it is worth our while to occupy Jubaland, and let them see a few hundred white men instead of half-a-dozen officials, which is literally all that they know of us at present, I anticipate that we shall not have much difficulty in getting on with them. The attractions of civilisation are so great for them, and our superiority in this respect so incontestable, that there can hardly be any doubt as to the result. What will happen in the wider limits of Somaliland, north of the Juba, it is hard to predict, but the area to the south is sufficiently small to offer an easy field for the extension of European influence when it is commercially and financially worth while. But meanwhile I think we had better let the Somalis alone, and avoid these conflicts between a lion and a swallow."
"The future of the Somali race is to my mind one of the most interesting and difficult of the problems presented by East Africa. For the present, I advise that we leave them alone, or at least avoid as far as possible the task of attacking them in their own territory. They are naturally isolated, and, if our officers will only avoid getting killed, can do little harm by quarrelling with one another in Jubaland. Our real task at present is rather to see that they do not encroach to the south, and to prevent them from raiding the Tana River and the Lamu Archipelago. But we can hardly avoid in the future the further task of making a permanent settlement in Jubaland, and the delimitation of the Abyssinian (meaning stop Somali Region expansion) frontier may perhaps precipitate that settlement.
It is certainly to be desired that we should utilise the Somalis. There can be no doubt that they are the most intelligent race in the Protectorate, though it may be urged with some justice that they are also proud, treacherous, fanatical, and vindictive. Too much stress, I think, is often laid on these bad qualities, and it is certain that the average Englishman has little sympathy for the Somali. He tolerates a black man who admits his inferiority, and even those who show a good fight and give in ; but he cannot tolerate dark colour combined with an intelligence in any way equal to his own. This is the secret of the almost universal dislike of the Babu, and it reappears in the unpopularity of the Somali among East African officials. The Somali are not willing to agree to the simple plan of having a fair fight and then shaking hands when defeated, but constantly indicate that they think themselves our equals or superiors, and not unfrequently prove it. Whenever it is worth our while to occupy Jubaland, and let them see a few hundred white men instead of half-a-dozen officials, which is literally all that they know of us at present, I anticipate that we shall not have much difficulty in getting on with them. The attractions of civilisation are so great for them, and our superiority in this respect so incontestable, that there can hardly be any doubt as to the result. What will happen in the wider limits of Somaliland, north of the Juba, it is hard to predict, but the area to the south is sufficiently small to offer an easy field for the extension of European influence when it is commercially and financially worth while. But meanwhile I think we had better let the Somalis alone, and avoid these conflicts between a lion and a swallow."
"A Somali always felt himself to be twice as good as any white man, or any other kind of man at all, and still does, even when he is wrong."
-gerald hanley
Ddsi oil basin
-gerald hanley
Ddsi oil basin
Warriors life and death among the somalis - gerald hanley
http://shcas.shnu.edu.cn/_upload/ar...d4e2/7b2a673e-fa6e-4c1b-835d-2eb34c65098e.pdf
https://books.google.com/books?id=0...age&q=the Omani Sultanate and Baraawe&f=false
http://shcas.shnu.edu.cn/_upload/ar...d4e2/7b2a673e-fa6e-4c1b-835d-2eb34c65098e.pdf
https://books.google.com/books?id=0...age&q=the Omani Sultanate and Baraawe&f=false
First footsteps in eastafrica-richard burton
Mad mullah wives
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the southward thrust of
the Somali peoples was intensified and they pushed still farther towards
the Tana River and the fertile coastlands of what is now Kenya. In the
nineteenth century the pace grew even faster, and by 1850 they had crossed
the Juba. There can be no doubt that had it not been for European
intervention the Somalis, pushing before them the Galla and the remnants
of other displaced tribes, would by then have swept through Kenya. The
local Bantu and Nilotic tribesmen could scarcely have held them for a day,
and even the Masai at the height of their power would have proved no
sort of a match for the fighting men of the Herti Marehan and Ogaden
Somalis.
The Horn of Africa
Gerald Reece(1944)
@Crow @FBIsomalia @Diaspora ambassador
the Somali peoples was intensified and they pushed still farther towards
the Tana River and the fertile coastlands of what is now Kenya. In the
nineteenth century the pace grew even faster, and by 1850 they had crossed
the Juba. There can be no doubt that had it not been for European
intervention the Somalis, pushing before them the Galla and the remnants
of other displaced tribes, would by then have swept through Kenya. The
local Bantu and Nilotic tribesmen could scarcely have held them for a day,
and even the Masai at the height of their power would have proved no
sort of a match for the fighting men of the Herti Marehan and Ogaden
Somalis.
The Horn of Africa
Gerald Reece(1944)
@Crow @FBIsomalia @Diaspora ambassador
Banadir Resistance to Italian troops, drawing by Chris Hellier and Achille Beltrame 1897
On the 21st of January 1920 the RAF inaugurated their Bombing Campaign on the Dervish forts by Bombing their first ever Target. the small village of Medishe. On the 21/1/19 (Sunday) is the 99th anniversary of this historical event.
The Dervishes had been raiding the clans of Eastern Somaliland with impunity and had amassed tens of thousands of livestock, this not only hindered their movement, but it also attracted raiders, particularly the Majeeerten who were constantly raiding the Dervishes in the Taleh area. This forced the Mullah to relocate to Medishe among the Musa Ismail HY. Medishe was home to three dervish forts.
@Bohol are these forts still there?
On the 21st January, Six DH9 aircraft equipped with Lewis Machines guns and stocked with incendiary and explosive bombs took off from Eil Dur elan at 7:00 a.m. Due to the unfamiliarity of the terrain and clouds only one plane made its way to the target (The others proceeded to Jidali instead ). The Mullah and his followers saw the plane circling the fort and mistook it for Turks and so they came out to recieve it. The plane commenced its bombing of the main fort and managed to kill 20 dervish fighters, the most important of whom was Caamir Xasan, the Mullahs uncle. The Mullah himself almost died, he suffered severe burns from the incendiary. The Mullah fled with his followers and sought refuge in a nearby cavern. On the 22nd and 23rd the planes returned and further bombed the forts. The pilots also made sure to burn the village and machine gun all the remaining livestock. The Mullah and his followers were able to elude the bombers and fled southward to Taleh
The Dervishes had been raiding the clans of Eastern Somaliland with impunity and had amassed tens of thousands of livestock, this not only hindered their movement, but it also attracted raiders, particularly the Majeeerten who were constantly raiding the Dervishes in the Taleh area. This forced the Mullah to relocate to Medishe among the Musa Ismail HY. Medishe was home to three dervish forts.
@Bohol are these forts still there?
On the 21st January, Six DH9 aircraft equipped with Lewis Machines guns and stocked with incendiary and explosive bombs took off from Eil Dur elan at 7:00 a.m. Due to the unfamiliarity of the terrain and clouds only one plane made its way to the target (The others proceeded to Jidali instead ). The Mullah and his followers saw the plane circling the fort and mistook it for Turks and so they came out to recieve it. The plane commenced its bombing of the main fort and managed to kill 20 dervish fighters, the most important of whom was Caamir Xasan, the Mullahs uncle. The Mullah himself almost died, he suffered severe burns from the incendiary. The Mullah fled with his followers and sought refuge in a nearby cavern. On the 22nd and 23rd the planes returned and further bombed the forts. The pilots also made sure to burn the village and machine gun all the remaining livestock. The Mullah and his followers were able to elude the bombers and fled southward to Taleh
Many people are under the misconception that Taleh (Taleex) was the first to be bombed, but that's not true, Taleh was bombed on the 4th of feburary, two weeks after Medishe. Even the less known fort of Galbaribur , which is located bewteen Maydh and Ceerigaabo was bombed before Taleex, in fact Galibarur was bombed and was invaded by a naval force from the coast. The Galbaribur dervish were described by Brits as the "Bravest of the Brave".
Galbaribur ayaa daga? @Bohol @DR OSMAN
Galbaribur ayaa daga? @Bohol @DR OSMAN
Capture of Galbaribur
On 5th February the Naval force landed at Sanak from HMS Odin and HMS Clio. Captain Hewett’s command consisted of 8 officers, 91 Petty Officers, non-commissioned officers and seamen, 28 illaloes and 112 Somalis recruited to be gun coolies and transport drivers. Weapons carried were 104 rifles, 3 Lewis guns, 2 medium machine guns and one 12-pounder 4-cwt naval field gun. Full equipment plus 120 rounds of ammunition was carried along with an emergency ration of a quarter kilogram each of dates and biscuits. White naval uniforms had been stained khaki by coffee or Condy’s fluid (11). Rations for four days, reserve ammunition, blankets and one day’s supply of water (12)were packed in 27-kilogram donkey-loads.
After considerable confusion caused by the donkey drivers loading as little as possible onto their own donkeys, discipline was restored in a determined manner and the seamen marched off in a square formation, with the illaloes ahead and on either flank at about 5,000 metres distance. After a march of about 30 minutes, when the party was well away from the beach, the square halted for the night; there were no thorn trees to make a zareba but machine guns were placed at each corner, sentries posted, alarm posts and a main guard designated, and each man lay on his blanket facing outwards. The illaloes halted in their marching positions. The donkeys were unloaded and tethered inside the square, hot food was prepared and water was boiled for the next day’s ration. This routine was a training exercise for the seamen who were still protected by the ships’ guns offshore. During the night an illaloe patrol confirmed that dervishes were manning Galbaribur Fort.
At 0400 hours the square ‘stood-to’ with each man alert and prepared for a dervish attack, and when dawn had fully arrived breakfast was eaten, donkeys were loaded and the square resumed its march across a stony plain. After a couple of hours the route dropped down into a sandy ‘Tug’ (dry river bed) where water could be sourced by digging. The 31 gun-coolies had a hard time pulling the field gun on the sand but this problem had been predicted and caterpillar treads had been fitted around the gun wheels to assist movement on soft ground. After a 3-hour bully-beef and biscuits lunch break during the hottest part of the day the march resumed, and in the late afternoon Galbaribur Fort was sighted. Smoke surrounded the fort as the dervishes cleared their fields of fire by burning their surrounding huts. The RAF had bombed the fort but ineffectually.
On 5th February the Naval force landed at Sanak from HMS Odin and HMS Clio. Captain Hewett’s command consisted of 8 officers, 91 Petty Officers, non-commissioned officers and seamen, 28 illaloes and 112 Somalis recruited to be gun coolies and transport drivers. Weapons carried were 104 rifles, 3 Lewis guns, 2 medium machine guns and one 12-pounder 4-cwt naval field gun. Full equipment plus 120 rounds of ammunition was carried along with an emergency ration of a quarter kilogram each of dates and biscuits. White naval uniforms had been stained khaki by coffee or Condy’s fluid (11). Rations for four days, reserve ammunition, blankets and one day’s supply of water (12)were packed in 27-kilogram donkey-loads.
After considerable confusion caused by the donkey drivers loading as little as possible onto their own donkeys, discipline was restored in a determined manner and the seamen marched off in a square formation, with the illaloes ahead and on either flank at about 5,000 metres distance. After a march of about 30 minutes, when the party was well away from the beach, the square halted for the night; there were no thorn trees to make a zareba but machine guns were placed at each corner, sentries posted, alarm posts and a main guard designated, and each man lay on his blanket facing outwards. The illaloes halted in their marching positions. The donkeys were unloaded and tethered inside the square, hot food was prepared and water was boiled for the next day’s ration. This routine was a training exercise for the seamen who were still protected by the ships’ guns offshore. During the night an illaloe patrol confirmed that dervishes were manning Galbaribur Fort.
At 0400 hours the square ‘stood-to’ with each man alert and prepared for a dervish attack, and when dawn had fully arrived breakfast was eaten, donkeys were loaded and the square resumed its march across a stony plain. After a couple of hours the route dropped down into a sandy ‘Tug’ (dry river bed) where water could be sourced by digging. The 31 gun-coolies had a hard time pulling the field gun on the sand but this problem had been predicted and caterpillar treads had been fitted around the gun wheels to assist movement on soft ground. After a 3-hour bully-beef and biscuits lunch break during the hottest part of the day the march resumed, and in the late afternoon Galbaribur Fort was sighted. Smoke surrounded the fort as the dervishes cleared their fields of fire by burning their surrounding huts. The RAF had bombed the fort but ineffectually.
