Gathering and collection of historical somali documents and photographs

Z

ZakWantsToPlay

Audience matters. Clan politics is not the same as common Somali history. I personally wouldn't waste someone's time on the clan wars of the 1990s.

Post common Somali history every Somali individual might be inclined to appreciate.

Old Somali kingdoms, habashi invasions of Somali lands, Somali freedom fighters, our Origins, our recorded ancient history etc.

Let us stay away clan themed posts, Every Somali has a clan and will not accept an opposite view of their clan history.
 
Libaaxseendheer

Libaaxseendheer

There ensued a long series of diplomatic correspondence between the Colonial office, which had in the meantime taken over the protectorate from the foreign office, and the commissioners in Somaliland. The Commissioners urged again and again that a strong expedition be sent out, while the Foreign Office thought that the Mad Mullah might be bought off by subsidy. To this Capt. Cordeaux replied:
“It would provide him with the means of purchasing more arms and ammunition and would encourage him to make further demands, which would become more extravagant as his strength increased.”
In Capt. Cordeaux’s opinion only two courses were open: A total withdrawal from the protectorate or the dispatch of a well equipped expedition. To this the Colonial Office replied:

“A forward movement against the Mullah is quite out of the question.”

Then came this from the commissioner:

“I do not hesitate to say withdrawal in the face of an actively hostile Mullah would be disastrous not only to our tribes but also to our prestige throughout Northeast Africa."
 
Libaaxseendheer

Libaaxseendheer

on July 16 the Mullah was reported by the somali spies to be at Ferdiddin, barely foruteen miles away, and it was at once decided to make a night march,and attack the enemy at dawn. The mounted Corps were sent forward to reconnoitre.Porceeding forward the mounted corps under major Benyon , Captain Friedrichs,and Lietutenant Walshe, supported by 350 Dhulbahnate horsemen soon rounded a spure some two miles ahead.Heavy firing commented almost immediatly from behind the spure and from the crest of some hills near by, and Captain Friedrichs was killed at the very commencement of the action..Somaliland by Angus Hamilton page82-83.
 
Libaaxseendheer

Libaaxseendheer

"scattered tribes and assemble them on the nearest grazing ground to Burao. On the 13th February, however, before arrangements could be completed to obtain the necessary water transport to move the levies out to the assistance of the tribes, the latter were attacked at Bale-Shele-Shale, 43 miles to the south of Burao. Men, women, and children were killed indiscriminately, and all the livestock -was driven off.

On the 7th February the Mullah had despatched another raiding force against our Jama Siad friendly tribes, 100 miles the east of the scene of his raid of the 13th February, and here again our tribes suffered heavily. Burao
and Berbera became filled with destitute refugees, and 2,000 persons were fed daily at Burao alone.
After Jidbale :THE LONDON GAZETTE, SEPTEMBER 2, 1904.



Its interesting to note that after twice traversing the whole breadth of the Dolbahanta, and after our expedition has thrice encountered the Mullah's forces and routed them, the facts recorded by Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne in the two inclosures to this despatch fully bear out the opinions I have expressed to yonr Lordship from time to tinie as to the character of this movement, the absence of any hostility to the Administration on the part of the Dolbahanta per se, the defenceless position of the tribes in the face of the Mullah's riflemen, and the great danger, and still further danger to be apprehended, from the influx of arms from without among a savage population hostile to civilization.

The Dolbahanta have no wish to be inimical to us, but, if the Mullah returns and again dominates their country, they will be forced to be so. They have all submitted to us. Now they will natnrally ask, „If the Mullah attacks us, will you defend us?" This will be a somewhat awkward question. It is evident we could, under no circumstances, undertake to send an expedition to the far end of the Dolbahanta every time the Mullah threatened the border. The Dolbahanta have now come in to us because they found us in strength in their country."
 
Libaaxseendheer

Libaaxseendheer

"It was now evident that the situation was such as to demand regular and seasoned troops. At the time of the action of Erigo, the force in Somaliland had consisted of 2400 rifles, of which no less than 1500 were local levies. This force was immediately increased by a further contingent of 900 King's African Rifles, and by 300 Indian infantry. A strong column was to advance from Obbia in Italian Somaliland and occupy the Mudug. Another column was to operate on the Berbera-Bohotleh line. And, simultaneously, an Abyssinian fores of 5000 rifles, accompanied by British officers, was to advance along the Webi Shebeli, to prevent the Mullah's retreat westward. The advance from Obbia commenced on the 22nd February 1903; and the enemy immediately fell back on Walwal and Wardair, denying us an opportunity of trying conclusions with his main force. On two occasions, however, small advance parties engaged large forces of Dervishes. At Gumburu, a reconnaissance of two companies of the 2nd King's African Rifles and 48 rifles of the 2nd Sikhs came up with the Mullah's main force, commanded, so it is said, by their chief in person. The fight which ensued appears to have lasted two and a half hours. The Dervishes charged the British square from dense bush some 300 to 600 yards distant, their horsemen and riflemen being driven back time and again with cruel losses. The square was eventually broken by a rush of spearmen, but not before all our ammunition had been exhausted. The Dervish casualties, estimated by some at 2700, are unknown: for no British officer survived to tell the true story of Gumburu. Our casualties were all officers (9) and 187 men killed and 29 men wounded. Another action at Daratoleh - in which were engaged some 800 Dervishes, flushed with their victory at Gumburu, with their leaders wearing the uniforms of the dead British officers - resulted in the infliction of heavy casualties on the enemy, our losses amounting to 2 officers and 13 men killed, and 4 officers and 25 men wounded. In the meantime the Abyssinians inflicted a crushing defeat on the Dervishes, claiming to have killed 1000 of their spearmen. Immediately after this engagement, which took place on the 31st May 1903, the Mullah made a daring but successful movement eastward to the Nogal valley. Unfortunately, however, it was impossible to intercept this movement, as, owing to camel transport and other difficulties, our troops were being withdrawn to Bohotleh."
@Teeri-Alpha @Khalaf @DR OSMAN
 
Libaaxseendheer

Libaaxseendheer

"During the night march we had seen several
big bonfires on the neighbouring hills, and at
one time we feared that the Mullah might
have got the alarm. It transpired that he had
heard about the Mahmud Gerard being " out,"
and had been told that they were coming to
attack him, but he had heard nothing about
the movements of our force. Now when our
mounted troops went on ahead at dawn, these
Mahmud Gerard, all of whom had ponies,
■dashed forward with the Camel Corps and
Mounted Infantry, and went towards where
the Mullah's Karia was. His men were,
173

In Pursuit of

however, ready for them, and opened fire,
whereupon these valiant raiders turned tail
and bolted as hard as their horses could lay
legs to the ground, nor did we see them again
that day. Our mounted troops had now to
face the fire of several hundred riflemen, and
as they were only about a hundred all told,
it was more than they could do to hold the
enemy back, emboldened as they were by the
flight of the Mahmud Gerard. Whether they
would have waited for the latter had they
known that even a hundred of our troops were
coming, is another matter — probably not, and
most certainly not had they known that our
whole force was so close up.

Be that as it may, when they saw that the
Mahmud Gerard had bolted and that none
of our Infantry were then in sight — the
mounted troops having pressed on very
rapidly since daylight — they probably thought
that this was merely a scouting or raiding
party sent on by us to help the Mahmud
Gerard. The enemy (who were said to have
about 6cx) riflemen) then opened a heavy fire

174

the " Mad " Mullah

on our people, who dismounted and held out
as long as they could, but were eventually
forced to retreat towards the spur which
the Mullah's men afterwards held."
 
Libaaxseendheer

Libaaxseendheer

:cosbyhmm:interesting so mahmoud gerad joined the british and abandoned them before the engagement...
"Hayes sadler
Fardhidin
1901
The strength of the force Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne attacked is not stated, but it is reported that the Mullah's Mijjertein riflemen were present in considerable numbers. This shows that he has succeeded in enlisting the aid of the Mijjertein tribes, hostile to Yusuf Ali, on the eastern borders of the Dolbahanta, and it is to the rifle fire of these men that our casualties are principally due. I regret to have to report that Captain Friedrichs, R. E., was killed in these Operations In him the Service loses a valuable and experienced officer. He met his death in the Performance of a gallant action. Our other casualties were Lieutenant Dickinson, severe flesh wound in the middle of left thigh, and nine of the levy killed, and sixteen wounded. No other British officers were hurt, and the wounded are all reported to be doing well. I do not quite understand Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne's allusions to my despatches to him. The first that reached him was evidently the despatch I wrote on the 5th July, informing him of the Instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th June. In the second I wrote that if he had not already left Bohotele to return to Burao he should now do so; and with regard to the Nogal Valley, I said that no Operations should now be undertaken there or elsewhere. I can, however, quite understand that when Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne came up with the Mullah's rear-guard at Cour Girad he felt himself bound to go on. He could not have done otherwise . It will be observed that Mahmud Girad, the powerful tribe occupying the northern Dolbahanta, joined the expedition, but would not face the Mullah's rifles. This is typical of the Situation throughout; the tribes are powerless against the Mullah's rifles. Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury"
 
Libaaxseendheer

Libaaxseendheer

"Pending authority to follow the Mullah into Italian territory.
Colonel Swayne moved from Bohotleh against the Arasama and
Allegiri sections of the Dolbahanta tribe, who had helped the
Mullah [Sayid Mohamed A Hassan], and while concentrating at Bohotleh captured two
thousand camels and about fiifteen thousand sheep. On 26th,
at 1.45 A.M., they attacked the Allegiri Karias and captured
more stock, and on 8th July we find the main body again back
at Bohotleh.

Hearing of the Mullah's return to British territory, Colonel
Swayne left Bohotleh on 9th July to attack him ; and on the
evening of 16th July we find the force at Kur Gerad about to
make an early morning attack on the Mullah, the latter being
in position with a large force, ' including over six hundred rifle-
men, at Fir-Diddin [aka Fardhidin].

On the reserve infantry coming up, the Mullah retired in a
hurry, water-vessels, camel-mats, and other of his belongings
being scattered on the ground ; Our loss at this action of Fir-Diddin [Fardhidin] was one British officer and
eleven men killed, and one British officer (Lieut. Dickinson) and
seventeen men wounded."
@Darwiish97
 
Libaaxseendheer

Libaaxseendheer

Magaca Goobta Taariikhda ay dhacday

Afbakayle 3 juun,1901

Weyla xidh 3 juun,1901

Caana xarigle 4 juun,1901

Kur-garaad 4 juun,1901

fardhidin 16 luulyo,1901

Buurihiile 6 Oktoobar,1903

Beerdhiga 4Abriill ,1903

Cagaarweyne 17Abril,1902

Daraatoole, Gomburo 22Abril,1902

Taargooye 30Maj,1902

Yeed 30Maaj,1902

Jidbaale 10 Janaayo,1904

Jiidali Maarso,194

Iligdaldala 12Abril,1905

Xallin 12Abril,1905

Higlagaab 12Abril,1905

Badhan 12Abril,1905

Galbadhibuur 25Janaayo,1910

Jiidali 25Janaayo,1910

Ceeldheer 27 Janaayo,1910

Badhan 28 Janaayo,1910

Indho 8 Oktoobar,1917

Barbara 12 Maarso,1917

Oogo 18 Oktoobar,1919

Yanqarax 18 Oktoobar,1919

Badweyn 18 Oktoobar,1919

Badhan 28Janaayo,1920

Taleex 1Febaraayo,1920

Bixin Feebaraayo,1921

Shiniile Feebaraayo,1921

Ruuga,Dulmadoobe, 9 Ogosto,1923
 
F

Farjano-Walad

Libaaxseendheer said:
55 pages of journels of a british captain regarding the Mullah from 1899-1901
Lots and lots of details entailed.
https://archive.org/stream/staatsarchiv66inst#page/n6/mode/1upView attachment 81638
@DR OSMAN @Darwiish97 @Teeri-Alpha
Click to expand...


So if the Sayid was offering 1 camel for 15 rounds dude must have had a lot of camels,

i know for example my awows awow -great grandfather -gave the Sayidka 80 Horses and 80 Guns as back as 1895, just one family did that, imagine how much he got from dhulbahante, rest of Mohamed Zubeer, Bah gerri, Makahil, rest of Ogaden etc, heck even the richest camel owners on earth the Cawlyahan gave him massively and Umar Muxamuud who were his main MJ supporters

on top i am sure he confiscated 1door camel after they sided with Gaal, Ogaden always looted 1door camel anyways, specially Mohamed Zubeer used to loot 1door camels and force 1door boys/men to herd the camels for them by force, it was slave labour,
 
Libaaxseendheer

Libaaxseendheer

waa idin dagaayaa kufriga, aad u dabcaysane
dirhankuu idiin qubahayaa' dib u go'aysaane
marka hore dabkuu idin ka dhigi, dumarsidiisiye
marka xigana dabaqadda yuu,dareen siine

marka xiga dalkuu idin ku oran, duunya dhaafsadaye
marka xiga dushuu idinka rari, sida dameeraaye
marhadan dushii adari iyo, iimay dacaldhaafay
maxaad igaga digataan, beruu siin la soo degiye
 
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