From North Africa to the Gulf, the UAE has aggressively expanded its counter-revolutionary strategy in the wake of the Arab Spring
Earlier this month, Sudan’s government brought proceedings against the United Arab Emirates, accusing it of “complicity in genocide” in the Sudanese civil war.
The case sheds light on the Abu Dhabi network providing lethal and financial support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a violent non-state actor fighting Sudan’s government in a bloody civil war.
Not only was Abu Dhabi able to continue its war against “terrorism” - including both jihadist networks and Islamist civil society groups and politicians - but it could also expand (and later weaponise) its web of interdependence.
For Abu Dhabi, Somalia has been a key focal point in its policy to generate interconnectivity and weaponised interdependence. For state-owned logistics giants DP World and AD Ports, it offers ideal locations for transshipment hubs.
But bilateral relations between Abu Dhabi and the federal government in Mogadishu have had their ups and downs, making it an unreliable avenue to generate Emirati influence. The UAE has thus resorted to a policy of bypassing Mogadishu to engage directly with various states, especially those with a separatist agenda.
In 2010, the UAE set up a force of mercenaries in the region of Puntland to hunt down pirates on land and sea. The Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) was initially run by a UAE-based company, in violation of a UN arms embargo, and reported directly to the Puntland president, bypassing the sovereignty of the Somali federal government. The UAE has paid salaries and in 2022 opened a military base in Bosaso, which has become a node in the resupply network of the RSF in Sudan.
Since 2017, the UAE has also expanded its engagement with Somaliland, arguably the autonomous region with the strongest independence movement within the Somali federation. To strengthen its claim to autonomy, the Somaliland government accepted an Emirati bid to establish a military base in Berbera, an important geo-strategic location in the Gulf of Aden.
Abu Dhabi has also been training Somaliland forces to further separate the region’s security sector from the federal government in Mogadishu. Today, the UAE is the most important investor in Somaliland, and it is likely behind an effort to lobby the Trump administration to recognise the state as an independent nation in return for basing rights.
Since 2023, Abu Dhabi has also increased its footprint in Jubaland, strengthening the southern Somali region’s separatist claim at a time of heightened tensions with Mogadishu. The UAE has conducted drone strikes and provided military vehicles to Jubaland state forces. Jubaland leader Ahmed Madobe maintains intimate ties with Abu Dhabi, and has allowed the Emiratis to build a military base in the regional capital of Kismayo.
Upon realising that Mogadishu’s federal government did not want to put all its eggs in the Emirati basket, Abu Dhabi strategically diversified its approach in Somalia. Rather than going after the primary centre of power, the UAE decentralised its approach, going after alternative centres of power where it could guarantee a monopoly of patronage - at the expense of Somalia’s territorial integrity.
The value chain that Abu Dhabi has created across the region cannot be divorced from the UAE as a jurisdiction, but is maintained by an assemblage of state and corporate actors that do not directly feature the Bani Fatima.
Held together by the prospect of political autonomy from a central government, a profiteering motive, and access to the UAE’s exceptional financial and logistical infrastructure, the axis of secessionists has emerged as a resilient network across an important geo-strategic space.
Both middle and great powers cannot avoid engaging with Abu Dhabi in these jurisdictions, elevating the UAE’s global status to that of an indispensable broker - one that is able to pit one interest against another, while securing strategic bridgeheads for itself.
Russia’s mercenary and commodity-profiteering network of the Africa Corp, formerly known as Wagner - relies on the axis of secessionists to get in and out of Africa.
China’s hunger for resources requires secure supply chains across the African continent, and Beijing will find it hard to avoid key chokepoints that are now under direct or indirect Emirati influence. The Trump administration, meanwhile, is also entering the game of geo-economics, tapping into the connections Abu Dhabi has generated.
Through this axis, the traditional, small state of the UAE has been elevated to a regional great power, achieving far more effective levels of entanglement and interdependence than its larger neighbour Saudi Arabia, or its agile neighbour Qatar. For Abu Dhabi, this network has become the bedrock of strategic autonomy to pursue its own interests - even when at odds with western interests and values.
www.middleeasteye.net
Earlier this month, Sudan’s government brought proceedings against the United Arab Emirates, accusing it of “complicity in genocide” in the Sudanese civil war.
The case sheds light on the Abu Dhabi network providing lethal and financial support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a violent non-state actor fighting Sudan’s government in a bloody civil war.
Coming of age in Yemen
Amid the LNA’s consolidation of power in Libya, the UAE was called upon by Saudi Arabia in March 2015 to support its war against the Houthis in Yemen. For Abu Dhabi, Yemen offered an opportunity to develop strategic depth in the southern coastal areas, with Aden and the Bab al-Mandab Strait as one of the world’s key maritime chokepoints.Not only was Abu Dhabi able to continue its war against “terrorism” - including both jihadist networks and Islamist civil society groups and politicians - but it could also expand (and later weaponise) its web of interdependence.
Divide and rule in Somalia
Somalia is the physical manifestation of the Horn of Africa. Its immense strategic value to global shipping routes and trade corridors into the African hinterland put the country on the UAE’s radar as far back as 2010.For Abu Dhabi, Somalia has been a key focal point in its policy to generate interconnectivity and weaponised interdependence. For state-owned logistics giants DP World and AD Ports, it offers ideal locations for transshipment hubs.
But bilateral relations between Abu Dhabi and the federal government in Mogadishu have had their ups and downs, making it an unreliable avenue to generate Emirati influence. The UAE has thus resorted to a policy of bypassing Mogadishu to engage directly with various states, especially those with a separatist agenda.
In 2010, the UAE set up a force of mercenaries in the region of Puntland to hunt down pirates on land and sea. The Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) was initially run by a UAE-based company, in violation of a UN arms embargo, and reported directly to the Puntland president, bypassing the sovereignty of the Somali federal government. The UAE has paid salaries and in 2022 opened a military base in Bosaso, which has become a node in the resupply network of the RSF in Sudan.
Since 2017, the UAE has also expanded its engagement with Somaliland, arguably the autonomous region with the strongest independence movement within the Somali federation. To strengthen its claim to autonomy, the Somaliland government accepted an Emirati bid to establish a military base in Berbera, an important geo-strategic location in the Gulf of Aden.
Abu Dhabi has also been training Somaliland forces to further separate the region’s security sector from the federal government in Mogadishu. Today, the UAE is the most important investor in Somaliland, and it is likely behind an effort to lobby the Trump administration to recognise the state as an independent nation in return for basing rights.
Since 2023, Abu Dhabi has also increased its footprint in Jubaland, strengthening the southern Somali region’s separatist claim at a time of heightened tensions with Mogadishu. The UAE has conducted drone strikes and provided military vehicles to Jubaland state forces. Jubaland leader Ahmed Madobe maintains intimate ties with Abu Dhabi, and has allowed the Emiratis to build a military base in the regional capital of Kismayo.
Upon realising that Mogadishu’s federal government did not want to put all its eggs in the Emirati basket, Abu Dhabi strategically diversified its approach in Somalia. Rather than going after the primary centre of power, the UAE decentralised its approach, going after alternative centres of power where it could guarantee a monopoly of patronage - at the expense of Somalia’s territorial integrity.
Indispensable broker
The UAE’s support for the RSF is just one piece of a much wider networked puzzle, which aims to generate strategic depth through a web of intermediaries. Abu Dhabi has established itself as a hub in a regional network that not only augments the UAE’s limited capacity and status, but creates an organic, self-sustaining system of interdependence, where nodes operate with degrees of autonomy that in turn provide the UAE with plausible deniability.The value chain that Abu Dhabi has created across the region cannot be divorced from the UAE as a jurisdiction, but is maintained by an assemblage of state and corporate actors that do not directly feature the Bani Fatima.
Held together by the prospect of political autonomy from a central government, a profiteering motive, and access to the UAE’s exceptional financial and logistical infrastructure, the axis of secessionists has emerged as a resilient network across an important geo-strategic space.
Both middle and great powers cannot avoid engaging with Abu Dhabi in these jurisdictions, elevating the UAE’s global status to that of an indispensable broker - one that is able to pit one interest against another, while securing strategic bridgeheads for itself.
Russia’s mercenary and commodity-profiteering network of the Africa Corp, formerly known as Wagner - relies on the axis of secessionists to get in and out of Africa.
China’s hunger for resources requires secure supply chains across the African continent, and Beijing will find it hard to avoid key chokepoints that are now under direct or indirect Emirati influence. The Trump administration, meanwhile, is also entering the game of geo-economics, tapping into the connections Abu Dhabi has generated.
Through this axis, the traditional, small state of the UAE has been elevated to a regional great power, achieving far more effective levels of entanglement and interdependence than its larger neighbour Saudi Arabia, or its agile neighbour Qatar. For Abu Dhabi, this network has become the bedrock of strategic autonomy to pursue its own interests - even when at odds with western interests and values.
How Abu Dhabi built an axis of secessionists across the region
From North Africa to the Gulf, the UAE has aggressively expanded its counter-revolutionary strategy in the wake of the Arab Spring
www.middleeasteye.net
