Overview of the conflict
In the face of the Somali state collapse, traditional elders in Bari region (conflict setting) filled the leadership vacuum post-civil war by performing conventional government functions and maintaining law and order. Fast forward to 1998; at the grand conference where Northeastern Somali clans established a power sharing arrangement, mainly sponsored by the Garowe community m. As a result, a regional administration was formed that ensured relative peace. The power sharing drafted to guide this new administration grew unpopular among the warsangeli who traditionally settled in Bosaso and villages that overlap alongside the main road that links Bosaso to other major centers.
This in turn, manifested itself in violent conflict and rivalry for political dominance in and around the Bosaso environ. The fragile stability was fractured as marked by daily assassinations, originating from clan avenges. Puntland further exercised exclusionary policies under the guide of divisive rulers who intended to invoke loyalty by manipulating clan identities to acquire power.
These imbalances of power had set the stage for a bloody confrontation to take course in 2006, when former Puntland governer Mohamed Muuse Hirse (Ade) granted mineral exploration rights to an Australian mining company around the Bosaso environ. The move triggered uproar from the locals (Dubeiss/Warsangali) who then mobilized militias led by Mohamed Said Atom. On the aftermath of the conflict, Mr. Atam seized control of Galgala and nearby settlements in the Golis mountain range.
Politicization of the conflict
On his announcement of war, many expressed anxious sentiments towards all the hype and chest beating for destruction. The militarization of the Galgala issue reflected Faroole’s (ex governor of Puntland) dependence on the use of the gun to achieve his goals, with little regard for basic rules of governance, raising questions of his ability to rule without coercion and armed force. Elders of Bari and Sanaag provinces made notable efforts to intervene in order to get each side to save human and capital loss. The plea for Consensus was bypassed; demeaning the role of tradition and the kinship relationship between the brotherly communities.
The governor’s decision to turn his back on numerous peace overtures is largely branded as a tactical policy to politicize the Galgala conflict. The question that arises is what political gain can one acquire from escalating a potentially explosive situation? Let’s revisit the political literature applied by Puntland following the Karin skirmish. Faroole used three significant terms; “Terrorist,” “Alshabaab,” “Radical,” sketching his primary political strategy. Even when Ataminsisted that he was no-way linked to any of these terms, the administration (Puntland) continued to market these terms as a campaign ad for their offensives. After nine months of accusations, the regime had not provided single evidence backing their claim. The political rational is simple, considering the amount of attention thetransitional government (Mogadishu) received with their committed assurance of fighting Islamist militants. Puntland’s strategy was to duplicate the “Mogadishu formula” in order to generate increased aid and gain political significance.
International press caught on immediately as episodes unfolded, which in turn backfired on the custodians of the disastrous project. On September 29th of last year, the Voice of America published an article detailing the root cause of the conflict. The article stated;
“Leaders of the dubeis, a sub-clan of the larger Somali warsangeli tribe, say the conflict in the north is not about entirely about terrorism. They say it also is about long-held political and economicgrievances they have had against the Puntland government since the region declared autonomy in 1998.” “The rivalry between the sub-clans boiled over into a bloody confrontation in 2006, when Mohamed Said Atom’s militia attacked Puntland security forces to protest exploration rights the government gave to an Australian mining company in the mineral-rich Sanaag and western Bari regions.”
Quest for Natural Resources
Puntland’s quest for mining in the Galgala environ has also been associated as a leading factor of this conflict. Gary Hughes a reporter for The Age, an Australian newspaper published in Melbourne discusses a mysterious deal struck between Puntland and a small Perth company. Mr. Hughes writes on October 17, 2005 “A deal signed by Perth group Range Resources and a Somali regional government is adding to tension in the African nation. SOMALIA’S Government had raised concerns with the Australian Stock Exchange over a mysterious deal involving a small Perth company that claims it has secured the exclusive mineral and oil rights over a large slice of the war-torn African country.”
According to the Sydney Morning Herald; a newspaper published in Sydney Australia, Range Resources paid an attractive up-front and residual payments to secure exclusive mineral rights in the Majiyahan/Galgala area. Hughes describes the monetary gain from the buyers side (Range) as a result of this transaction. He notes, “Shares in Range Resources, which plans to fund the deal through a $3.45 million rights issue, were heavily traded after the announcement, and jumped about 30 per cent to more than 4 ¢. They closed on Friday at 3.8 ¢.”
More mysterious foreign deals were struck as Puntland took full control of Galgala and other Western Bari settlements late last year. On December 2nd of last year, the Associated Press reported the creation of a well-armed and private militia force being trained in Western Bari (conflict setting) region of Puntland. Saracen International was hired to train 1,050 men in Puntland by a mysterious donor with no clear mandate. Saracen’s CEO Bill Pelser, was linked to a South African mercenary outfit credited with defeating rebel forces in Sierra Leone in return for mineral concessions.
The International community was concerned about the mercenary trained force and the possibility of a more effective combat force in Somalia that might fall under the control of a warlord seeking to become the new dictator of Somalia. As a result, Puntland latter suspended the deal with the mercenary firm Saracen International.
The untold suffering of the masses
“Among the calamities of war may be jointly numbered the diminution of the love of truth, by the falsehoods which interest dictates and credulity encourages.” Samuel Johnson (1758)
Between August 20 and September 13 of 2010, Puntland offensives in Western-Bari region displaced an estimated 1,800 families from Galgala, Bari region, according to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Theses offensives were inherently destructive and yet unreported due to Puntland’s harsh media practices. The application of anti-aircraft weapons, the destruction of homes, farms and blockades of critical roads are some examples of the destroying impact these offensives had on the civilian masses of Galgala and Western-Bari.
The voiceless of Western-Bari, the farming villagers and travelling nomads have suffered and continue to suffer severe economic reverses, as a result of indiscriminate shelling, security sweeps and road blockades. The blockades of critical roads that link Western-Bari and Sanaag towns to the main road have restricted traditional economy, causing deterioration of food security for the population. “If this Puntland imposed embargo is maintained, many children could die from chronic malnutrition,” says Dr.Abdulkadir Isse, a family physician in the town of Maraje of Western Bari.
Puntland officials argue that they have warned locals to evacuate prior to the offensives, but locals don’t have adequate transport to flee with. Mohamed Cisman Cali, an elder from Af-urur told SPR that villagers want to flee the conflict but are unable due to lack of transportation. The elder added that Puntland was unwilling to extend aid, “we only received empty promises from Puntland.” Humanitarian agencies also failed to act because of fear to be targeted, according to U.N. sources. U.N. Personnel were warned of attacks, and the possibility that they may be mistaken for foreign mining companies.
In the face of the Somali state collapse, traditional elders in Bari region (conflict setting) filled the leadership vacuum post-civil war by performing conventional government functions and maintaining law and order. Fast forward to 1998; at the grand conference where Northeastern Somali clans established a power sharing arrangement, mainly sponsored by the Garowe community m. As a result, a regional administration was formed that ensured relative peace. The power sharing drafted to guide this new administration grew unpopular among the warsangeli who traditionally settled in Bosaso and villages that overlap alongside the main road that links Bosaso to other major centers.
This in turn, manifested itself in violent conflict and rivalry for political dominance in and around the Bosaso environ. The fragile stability was fractured as marked by daily assassinations, originating from clan avenges. Puntland further exercised exclusionary policies under the guide of divisive rulers who intended to invoke loyalty by manipulating clan identities to acquire power.
These imbalances of power had set the stage for a bloody confrontation to take course in 2006, when former Puntland governer Mohamed Muuse Hirse (Ade) granted mineral exploration rights to an Australian mining company around the Bosaso environ. The move triggered uproar from the locals (Dubeiss/Warsangali) who then mobilized militias led by Mohamed Said Atom. On the aftermath of the conflict, Mr. Atam seized control of Galgala and nearby settlements in the Golis mountain range.
Politicization of the conflict
On his announcement of war, many expressed anxious sentiments towards all the hype and chest beating for destruction. The militarization of the Galgala issue reflected Faroole’s (ex governor of Puntland) dependence on the use of the gun to achieve his goals, with little regard for basic rules of governance, raising questions of his ability to rule without coercion and armed force. Elders of Bari and Sanaag provinces made notable efforts to intervene in order to get each side to save human and capital loss. The plea for Consensus was bypassed; demeaning the role of tradition and the kinship relationship between the brotherly communities.
The governor’s decision to turn his back on numerous peace overtures is largely branded as a tactical policy to politicize the Galgala conflict. The question that arises is what political gain can one acquire from escalating a potentially explosive situation? Let’s revisit the political literature applied by Puntland following the Karin skirmish. Faroole used three significant terms; “Terrorist,” “Alshabaab,” “Radical,” sketching his primary political strategy. Even when Ataminsisted that he was no-way linked to any of these terms, the administration (Puntland) continued to market these terms as a campaign ad for their offensives. After nine months of accusations, the regime had not provided single evidence backing their claim. The political rational is simple, considering the amount of attention thetransitional government (Mogadishu) received with their committed assurance of fighting Islamist militants. Puntland’s strategy was to duplicate the “Mogadishu formula” in order to generate increased aid and gain political significance.
International press caught on immediately as episodes unfolded, which in turn backfired on the custodians of the disastrous project. On September 29th of last year, the Voice of America published an article detailing the root cause of the conflict. The article stated;
“Leaders of the dubeis, a sub-clan of the larger Somali warsangeli tribe, say the conflict in the north is not about entirely about terrorism. They say it also is about long-held political and economicgrievances they have had against the Puntland government since the region declared autonomy in 1998.” “The rivalry between the sub-clans boiled over into a bloody confrontation in 2006, when Mohamed Said Atom’s militia attacked Puntland security forces to protest exploration rights the government gave to an Australian mining company in the mineral-rich Sanaag and western Bari regions.”
Quest for Natural Resources
Puntland’s quest for mining in the Galgala environ has also been associated as a leading factor of this conflict. Gary Hughes a reporter for The Age, an Australian newspaper published in Melbourne discusses a mysterious deal struck between Puntland and a small Perth company. Mr. Hughes writes on October 17, 2005 “A deal signed by Perth group Range Resources and a Somali regional government is adding to tension in the African nation. SOMALIA’S Government had raised concerns with the Australian Stock Exchange over a mysterious deal involving a small Perth company that claims it has secured the exclusive mineral and oil rights over a large slice of the war-torn African country.”
According to the Sydney Morning Herald; a newspaper published in Sydney Australia, Range Resources paid an attractive up-front and residual payments to secure exclusive mineral rights in the Majiyahan/Galgala area. Hughes describes the monetary gain from the buyers side (Range) as a result of this transaction. He notes, “Shares in Range Resources, which plans to fund the deal through a $3.45 million rights issue, were heavily traded after the announcement, and jumped about 30 per cent to more than 4 ¢. They closed on Friday at 3.8 ¢.”
More mysterious foreign deals were struck as Puntland took full control of Galgala and other Western Bari settlements late last year. On December 2nd of last year, the Associated Press reported the creation of a well-armed and private militia force being trained in Western Bari (conflict setting) region of Puntland. Saracen International was hired to train 1,050 men in Puntland by a mysterious donor with no clear mandate. Saracen’s CEO Bill Pelser, was linked to a South African mercenary outfit credited with defeating rebel forces in Sierra Leone in return for mineral concessions.
The International community was concerned about the mercenary trained force and the possibility of a more effective combat force in Somalia that might fall under the control of a warlord seeking to become the new dictator of Somalia. As a result, Puntland latter suspended the deal with the mercenary firm Saracen International.
The untold suffering of the masses
“Among the calamities of war may be jointly numbered the diminution of the love of truth, by the falsehoods which interest dictates and credulity encourages.” Samuel Johnson (1758)
Between August 20 and September 13 of 2010, Puntland offensives in Western-Bari region displaced an estimated 1,800 families from Galgala, Bari region, according to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Theses offensives were inherently destructive and yet unreported due to Puntland’s harsh media practices. The application of anti-aircraft weapons, the destruction of homes, farms and blockades of critical roads are some examples of the destroying impact these offensives had on the civilian masses of Galgala and Western-Bari.
The voiceless of Western-Bari, the farming villagers and travelling nomads have suffered and continue to suffer severe economic reverses, as a result of indiscriminate shelling, security sweeps and road blockades. The blockades of critical roads that link Western-Bari and Sanaag towns to the main road have restricted traditional economy, causing deterioration of food security for the population. “If this Puntland imposed embargo is maintained, many children could die from chronic malnutrition,” says Dr.Abdulkadir Isse, a family physician in the town of Maraje of Western Bari.
Puntland officials argue that they have warned locals to evacuate prior to the offensives, but locals don’t have adequate transport to flee with. Mohamed Cisman Cali, an elder from Af-urur told SPR that villagers want to flee the conflict but are unable due to lack of transportation. The elder added that Puntland was unwilling to extend aid, “we only received empty promises from Puntland.” Humanitarian agencies also failed to act because of fear to be targeted, according to U.N. sources. U.N. Personnel were warned of attacks, and the possibility that they may be mistaken for foreign mining companies.
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