Leadership Models in the Horn of Africa

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AI translation of this article (https://arcadia.sba.uniroma3.it/bit...li di leadership nel Corno d'Africa (...).pdf)

Leadership Models in the Horn of Africa

1. Introduction
This study focuses on the Sultanate of Migiurtinia, which officially came to an end between 1925 and 1928 when it was absorbed into the colony of Somalia. Since the late 19th century, the sultanate had been under a protectorate relationship with the Kingdom of Italy, meaning it was ostensibly a juridically limited autonomous entity, as it was barred from entering agreements with other powers that could undermine its dependent status. In practice, however, it remained entirely autonomous, even in its external relations, and was perceived as such by those responsible for its governance.

The Sultanate of Migiurtinia represented an anomalous case of statehood or, more precisely—as we will elaborate in the course of this article—an example of an acephalous society moving toward statehood through a process that began from traditional forms of hierarchy and leadership that had until then been sacred but had, for about a century, been undergoing a process of politicization and desacralization.

Revisiting traditional forms of leadership serves, first and foremost, to better understand the phenomenon broadly referred to as "tribalism." It also aims to explore potential solutions for the current reconstruction process, where traditional socio-political structures could regain—perhaps under a different form of authority—a central role in regional or communal representation.

Far from disappearing, these structures seem to be a natural point of reference for "developing" societies seeking internal solutions to today's dramatic crisis.

2. The Traditional Somali Social System
Much of contemporary anthropology, when examining traditional nomadic Somali society, emphasizes two key concepts: "xeer" and "diya" (or "mag" in Somali), considered fundamental for interpreting social relations among clans (in Somali, various terms are used interchangeably, though the most general is "reer").

A clan is understood as a more or less extensive exogamous kinship group whose members trace their descent to a common eponymous ancestor. The size of clans varies across contexts, but over time, there is a tendency toward fission—breaking into smaller segments due to environmental pressures, political fractures, traumatic events, or simply because the group becomes too large to maintain cohesion at an acceptable level.

Many societies are structured around clans as their primary social unit, often (though not exclusively) in nomadic economies (pastoralism, gathering, etc.). The clan tends to be an all-encompassing social structure, meaning that in most of these societies, all social relations either remain within the clan or are mediated through it. Societies evolving toward statehood, if they permit the clan's existence, limit its role, as individuals gain the freedom to voluntarily join other forms of social organization—unlike in clans, where membership is involuntary, determined by blood ties.

Clan-based societies thus present an alternative to state-based societies, which is why anthropology and ethnology have labeled them "stateless." Traditional Somali society is one such example. The potential anarchy of these stateless societies is seemingly avoided—at least in the Somali case—through gentlemen's agreements (patti gentilizi), or inter-clan pacts that establish conflict-resolution norms. In Somali society, "xeer" embodies such a pact between groups, while "diya" refers to compensation paid in kind for damages caused.

Where minimal agreements exist between neighboring groups, the state of anarchy becomes manageable through these pacts. However little importance is attributed to representative figures. As a result, these societies have often been described as acephalous by many anthropologists, who, in our view, have underestimated the significance of traditional leadership.

It should be noted that clans are typically dispersed across vast territories due to nomadic movements, and indeed, the most prominent leaders are rarely involved in resolving minor conflicts. Even in such cases, however, mediators are selected based on a hierarchy of status among clan segments or age-based seniority.

In reality, these leadership figures become increasingly important—as we will emphasize in our conclusions regarding the current situation—the more fragmented (or fissioned) the clan structure becomes.

In traditional Somali society, the leader’s role is entirely detached from centralized power and is strictly tied to a segmentation hierarchy. This reflects the absence of a bureaucratic state, as the clan essentially functions as a confederation of segments—each maintaining autonomy while simultaneously revealing its federative nature through the institution of leadership roles.

Even the term "xeer", often translated by legal scholars as "customary law" or by anthropologists as a "gentlemen’s agreement," might more accurately be understood as "custom"—a term that encompasses both definitions. As custom, xeer is not voluntary but entails total adherence to shared values. This totality permeates all aspects of daily social life, with no possibility of exit except through exile, marginalization, or even loss of status—events that are not uncommon in clan histories.

It is within the framework of xeer that the leader finds recognition as the embodiment of the clan’s centrality. Precisely because of the clan’s all-encompassing nature, leadership is understood as natural, as it is collectively acknowledged. The leader thus embodies all the virtues of the clan, often inherited directly from its eponymous ancestor. This is why the principle of primogeniture ("curad") is nearly universally applied in leadership investiture ceremonies.

The centrality of the natural leader is further evident in the choice of residence, which is fixed within the territory and often tied to locations of historical significance for the clan.

3. The Traditional Somali Model and Its Precolonial Transformations Under External Pressures
In the case of the Majerteen clan, the central figure and natural leader is the "Boqor", literally meaning "king." The term also carries the connotation of a "belt", symbolizing the one who holds the clan together at its core. The Boqor is not only the leader of the Majerteen but also of the Harti and even the broader Daarood confederate groups, which stand above the clan in the hierarchy.

At a subordinate level, he is the natural leader of the Cismaan Maxamuud, an exogamous subgroup of the Majerteen, on the same level as the "Islaan", "Cise", or "Cumar Maxamuud" segments. Without overcomplicating the picture, there exists an entire hierarchy of leadership corresponding to levels of segmentation and the complexity of fission processes within the Majerteen, Harti, and Daarood groups.

It is noteworthy that in prehistorical times (documented only orally), the Boqor served solely as the symbolic center of the clan. However, around two and a half centuries ago, certain events triggered a transformation in this role.

From that point onward, the Boqor shed much of his sacral aura, adopting instead the more secular role of a ruler exercising concrete power within an entity gradually evolving toward statehood. Multiple factors drove this evolution, yet the transformation remained incomplete within the clan, despite outward appearances.

Beginning roughly a century and a half ago, in interactions with Zanzibar and regional Arab or Islamic powers (such as the Ottoman Empire), the leader began to be recognized as the "Suldaan umum Majerteen" ("Sultan of all Majerteen"). Internally, however, and in purely Somali contexts, he was still referred to exclusively as "Boqor." The title "Suldaan" implies a fundamentally secular authority, albeit one legitimized by religious figures, fitting a state-like framework.

This shift was primarily an endogenous development, modeled after Arab systems during a period of booming trade in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. This commerce brought northeastern Somalia into direct, daily contact with the Arabian Peninsula. Given the region’s geographical proximity and economic wealth (including prized exports like frankincense), Arab influence took deeper root here than elsewhere. This was particularly true among the Daarood, where the confederative structure and hierarchical leadership were more pronounced. In other words, the Boqor leveraged his superior position over other Majerteen leaders to initiate—not without upheaval—a first attempt at centralization.

Though still incipient, this centralization sparked competition among clan segments, especially those at risk of exclusion from the profits of trade.

One direct consequence was the internal conflict within the Cismaan Maxamuud between the Bah Dir and Bah Yaaquub lineages over succession to the sultanate. Since tradition reserved the title of Boqor exclusively for the Bah Dir, the Bah Yaaquub faction claimed the title of "Suldaan" instead, effectively proposing a split in leadership. This proposal ultimately failed and instead paved the way for the emergence, much further south, of the Sultanate of Hobyo.

 

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The rise of a sultanate in Hobyo represents a unique case in Somali history, embodying many characteristics of a pre-modern Islamic state. Unlike traditional Somali polities, it formed a true dynasty, entirely detached from the Hawiya clan structure in which it was embedded.

Through adjustments—some traumatic—the Hobyo Sultanate managed to consolidate its power, aided in part by the Kingdom of Italy, which secured its international recognition. Key features of this authority included: absence of a clan hierarchy, formalized administration with ministers (naib) often appointed based on merit or to accommodate subjects integrated into a new, dynamic economy.

Islam played an equally important role. The sultanate advanced Sharia law over customary law (xeer) through Islamic courts (qadi). Mirroring other Islamic states, the sultan’s authority was legitimized by ulama, who delivered the khutba (Friday sermon) in his name across major mosques.

The rise of Hobyo during Italy’s encroachment into Somalia marked a historic shift, inspiring attempts at similar centralization even in the Migiurtinia Sultanate.

Today, discussing Hobyo can provoke strong opposition, especially among its former subjects. As an experiment in creating a trans-clan Somali dynasty, it seems unthinkable in the current climate of rigid clan divisions. Yet, it remains significant not only historically but as an example of an indigenous state where clan allegiance was marginal.

4. Italian Colonial Policy: From Protectorate to Direct Rule
European colonial rule in Africa and Asia is often simplified into two extremes: The British model of indirect rule, preserving local governance (e.g., India, Nigeria). The French model of direct administration, assimilating territories. In practice, these approaches converged. The British maintained a distinction between colonies and protectorates, leaving local structures intact in the latter—though they often intervened especially in matters such as succession to positions of power—in favor of certain individuals. The French, meanwhile, introduced on the other hand, the system of "chefferies", which in practice was an adjustment of governance methods toward less involvement in local affairs.

In any case, regardless of the administrative method, the distortions of power balances and internal relations within local structures were numerous—and this was inevitable. The colonial experience, particularly for Africa, was disruptive because the governing methods, colonial administration, and traditional conceptions were fundamentally incompatible from the outset.

In the Somali case, the entire Somali-inhabited territory was divided among three colonial powers and the Ethiopian Empire, the latter exercising virtually no control over its claimed sovereign region.

The Italian colonial system, at least until the rise of fascism, leaned closer to the British model. Until 1925, when the annexation of the two northern sultanates was decided, two distinct governance systems existed: a colony in the south and two protectorates in the north. In the colony, faced with significant resistance (full occupation was only achieved by 1914), the Italians quickly sought alliances with cooperative leaders—those who saw Italy as a source of legitimacy or who, after fierce resistance, accepted its rule. This gave rise to the policy of salaried chiefs.

The decision to establish protectorates in the north was driven by: The greater military strength of the sultanates, the vast territory (comparable in size to the colony), and Italy’s inability at the time to sustain a costly occupation. Additionally, the protectorate agreements served as Italy’s entry point into the eastern Horn of Africa, and initially, Italy deemed this compromise sufficient. Under the protectorates, the two sultans received an annual stipend.

Italian policy in the two protectorates was largely—if not entirely—indirect. One might even argue there was no real governance until the 1925 occupation. The Italian consul in Aden maintained relations with the sultans, and only in 1912 (Hobyo) and 1914 (Migiurtinia) were residents installed as nominal advisors. In reality, as their letters reveal, these officials lived in complete marginalization.

However, two events had already disrupted the internal equilibria of the sultanates: In 1903, Italy authorized British troops to land in Hobyo during an expedition against Sayyid Maxamed Cabdille Xasan. The landing was met with hostility, and British commanders—backed by Italian officers—ordered the arrest of the sultan. This shattered delicate internal balances, plunging the sultanate into chaos. Within a year, Italian authorities were forced to reinstate the sultan as a peacemaker, as his absence had left the colony’s northern border exposed to Darawiish raids.

This marked the first direct intervention in the protectorate. A second occurred with the Italian government's recognition of Cali Yusuf, the firstborn, as successor to his father instead of his brother Axmed. Despite these two episodes, authorities only managed to install a resident in 1912. These events were significant because they revealed the sultanate's structural weaknesses to Italy—particularly the growing discontent among some Hawiya clans toward the sultanate's rule, a discontent later exploited during the direct occupation.

In the Migiurtinia Sultanate, a similar intervention occurred around 1908, when long-standing internal rivalries—dating back to the sultanate's founding—resurfaced, exacerbated by Italy's policy of paying stipends to minor coastal notables. The Italian consul in Aden intervened as a mediator, effectively usurping the sultan's role while simultaneously reaffirming his authority.

Though local sources insist this episode did not fracture clan unity, it set a precedent, exposing the Boqor/Sultan's vulnerability to colonial power (some viewed the protectorate itself as an admission of weakness). It also likely intensified competition among clan segments.

While these incidents were partially absorbed—and Italy initially failed to fully capitalize on them—they laid the groundwork for the direct occupation phase beginning in 1925. Despite the sultanates' internal weaknesses, resistance persisted, especially in Migiurtinia, where annexation was only completed in 1928 after fierce opposition and the devastation of the regional economy (coastal blockades, livestock confiscations, etc.).

From 1925–28, both former protectorates were directly annexed to Italian Somaliland, extending the salaried chiefs policy. All traditional Migiurtinian leaders were cataloged, with stipends assigned by rank: The highest salary went to the Boqor (who lost his title of Sultan). The lowest went to notables of a small reer. In this ranking, the sultan of Hobya, confined in Mogadishu, was demoted to a notable of a fraction of the Cismaan Maxamuud

But what were the direct effects of the stipendiary chiefs policy in the case of Somalia occupied by the Italians?

In Migiurtinia, even during the protectorate phase, the policy triggered a failed centralization attempt by the sultanate to counter internal weakness. Over time, this eroded the Boqor's quasi-sacred legitimacy among minor segments, and accelerated the collapse of traditional structures.

The colonial experience—not unique to Somalia—forced these societies into modernity. Where traditional institutions crumbled most dramatically, they were excluded from independence processes and often found themselves in opposition to modernist leaderships. Where the traumas were less severe, curious transitions to independence were observed, managed by modernist leaderships with traditional backgrounds (perhaps Sudan is the most evident case) or, more commonly, there was adherence to modern parties by those old leaderships. This is partly the case in Somalia, where the Migiurtinian leadership split during the establishment of the Trusteeship Administration, only to largely join the program of the Somali Youth League later. It is certain that the modern programs of independence parties poorly fit the preceding reality—which, as in Somalia, still survived in the most peripheral areas.

The most perverse effect that matured precisely at the moment of transition to independence was the politicization of the clan, the antechamber of modern tribalism. Modern democratic life and the modern state poorly adapt to the exercise of political activity in a traditional sense, where every political decision is extensively discussed and unanimously voted upon before being sanctioned and blessed by the leader's final word.

The political decisions of modern states, if taken democratically, are instead based on the principle of majority. As in a perverse game, democratization has thus led to competition during electoral rounds among political leaders today tied to the clan only by material interest (political or economic). The search for political consensus within the clan or one of its segments has introduced competition internally and often contributed to irreparable splits among parts of society that previously decided collectively based on ancient codes felt by all.

In a country like Somalia, however, most people still live according to traditional rules and are involved in political activity only during electoral rounds. Politicization has therefore remained more an urban phenomenon, while the almost intact persistence of "xeer" and the legitimacy of traditional leaderships in rural areas is today of enormous help to a society suffering from a sense of disorientation following the tragic ruptures of civil war.

 

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5. Conclusions
The analysis conducted so far has sought to describe the evolution from an indigenous model that found within itself the resources to reproduce, to a new indigenous model, born under external pressures, of a dynastic character, in which pre-modern governance structures and systems began to emerge, gradually detaching from the past (Sharia at the expense of xeer) and precisely for this reason seeking resources and reference models externally. This latter model remained incomplete because its evolution was interrupted by the historical events that brought colonialism to the forefront.

Colonialism indeed interrupted an endogenous process, not without its traumas, but overall gradual in its development. Colonialism was a system imposed from the outside, which, while relying on some local structures ("indirect rule"), drew its sustaining resources externally. Herein lie the contradictions of the modern era and the degenerative effects of colonial presence: those processes of dynastic formation, which colonialism had encouraged in other contexts, did not materialize, at least in Somalia, because there was a radical shift from indirect rule (the protectorates) to direct rule (the colony). Finally, the international recognition of traditional leaderships contributed to undermining their local prestige.

This crisis of traditional institutions inevitably culminates with the independence process, which leads to a politicization of the clan, further exacerbated by the twenty-year experience of a dictatorship that had based its exercise of power on it.

Thus, we arrive at the current situation of civil war. This war is "civil" not so much because it pits citizens of the same state against each other, but because, in the specific Somali case, it sets clans—even individual families—against one another in an absurd competition for political and economic power, under the belief that whoever controls it can rise to a position of dominance over others. This phenomenon is called "tribalism" or "clanism," which indeed references the clan as the subject/object of civil war but has nothing to do with the clan in the traditional sense; if anything, it is a degenerative evolution of it.

Today, the clan presents itself—at least defensively—as closed off to the outside, whereas traditionally, given its nomadic activity (still the majority livelihood), it was an element of encounter and a subject of pacts for sharing wells and pastures (particularly in key areas: Mudug, Galgadud, Warder, Haud, etc.), or for establishing matrimonial ties even institutionally sanctioned (for example, the Garad of the Warsangeli-Daarood chose from among the Habar Toljualo-Isaaq).

Instead, the clan has now become more an object than a subject of the ongoing conflict: it is the object of competition, which in some cases degenerates into open clashes, among a few families hoping to rely on agnatic solidarity to control the scarce resources in the territory.

After the most acute phase of all-against-all conflict, at the local level, thanks to the mediation of elders, it has nevertheless been possible to reach agreements for pacification and mutual coexistence.

What, then, could be a possible solution to the current state of crisis, considering that where tradition survives most strongly, it has been easier to reach local agreements? In my view, a possible solution could lie in the tribe or clan, however one wishes to call it, understood not as a closed entity but as a confederative pact. What is needed, therefore, is a reevaluation of the role of traditional leadership figures, whose eligibility still depends on rigid selection criteria based on sound values that have nothing to do with "tribalism" in the ideological sense, understood as a means of appropriating power through the use of kinship ties. After all, today these leaders, following four years of civil war, have inevitably become involved again as mediators. Their presence has become necessary as the more astute among the leaders of current organizations dividing up the territory—almost always military—have realized the impossibility of resolving conflicts through confrontation.

Similar pacts, gradually spreading across the entire territory—though for now only at a local level—would then be desirable between regions currently closed off but which one day might reopen to the free movement of nomads.

As far as we are concerned, historical research can help the West understand not only the real reasons for the conflict but also to find possible solutions and, where possible, strengthen those actors who by their very nature tend toward mediating interests: Somali society has naturally elected and entrusted them with a role of pacification, and in times of greatest crisis, it has turned to them with hope.

Finally, it is desirable that Italian universities not lag behind in contributing to this effort of reinforcing positive tendencies in the reconstruction process. We must not forget that even today, Italy holds—in the face of the immense tragedy of Mogadishu's destruction and its historical heritage—perhaps the most significant portion of Somali historical memory in its university and other libraries, and in private and public archives.

 

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Basically, the point the article is making is that the notion that Somalis were stateless is wrong considering that there were traditional legal, social, and leadership systems in place. The Somali states were already on a natural path to centralization before their entire collapse and upheaval due to colonialism.