Post independence, Rebel groups, State Collapse and aftermath

[Kun_Ciil]

I found this website and long article after browsing online. Its a long read but it was interesting having everything written down in a chronicle way by a non-somali. What do you guys think , is it factually correct or is there a lot of mistakes/orientalism included?

Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal 1990 - 1995 | Refworld

www.refworld.org

Reading an outsider writing about Somali affairs during and after the state collapse makes it look like a real life version of a game of thrones...absolutely messy.

 

[Kun_Ciil]

@Zak12 @Idilinaa

Is this orientalism at work or does it have basis? He makes the somali nation as one which historically was a stateless nation...a nomadic nation ruled by clan and not a central power or state. We were largely a nomadic people no doubt and clan was our main system. However he seems to ignore a large part of our history, what about all the previous states that were in Somalia such as the Awdal,Adel,Ajuuran, Geledi, Hiraab Imamate, Majeerteen Sultanate? It may be true that none of them ruled all of the Somali peninsula in totality, but they were still states and had cities and forms of governing...

1.1 The Peculiar Nature of Somali Society

Somalia is not a 'country' like any other. And in many ways, it is neither 'African' nor 'Arab', although it is located on the African continent and has often been considered 'Arab' in some ways. In 1974, Somalia joined the Arab League of which it is still formally a member. The Somali people, or the Somali nation, is an unquestionable reality. But the Somali state is a much more ambiguous notion which has for the time being receded into the gray zone of a legal abstraction, probably for a good many years to come. This situation is all the more puzzling since at the time of its independence in 1960 Somalia was described as one of the few mono-ethnic states in Africa, one with a common language, a common culture and a single religion, Islam. While this was probably an exaggeration, it was substantially true[2] In any case, the challenge to the existence of the Somali state did not come from the non-Somali people of the South, but from the very core of the mainstream Somali-speaking society, that is the very society which had hitherto been described as one of the most homogeneous on the continent. This phenomenon obviously begs for an explanation. And the explanation is not too complicated, since it lies in the very nature of Somali society itself.

Somali society, like many nomadic societies of arid and semi-arid lands, is largely a product of its geographical and climatic environment. The land is very dry and it generally does not permit sedentary agriculture, except in the South, between the Juba and Wabi Shebelle rivers. Hence the social differences between 'pure' Somali and the Southern Peoples. As a result, people move, with their herds of camels, goats and sheep, forever in search of good pastures and water. Such a world is not conducive to any form of economic surplus or economic accumulation. Without economic accumulation, there are no possibilities of permanent settlements, of cities and of the distinct political structures we have called 'the state'. In such societies, politics are diffused throughout the whole social body and not separated, specialised so to speak, in a 'state' form, since people are forever moving. And since their movements imply frequent frictions in the competition over the control of pastures and wells, several consequences arise:

Firstly - blood ties are the only connections a man is sure of. One's kin group makes the only tangible social reality which explains the enormous, overpowering importance of genealogy and the lineage system.

Secondly - armed conflicts between roving groups, usually representing distinct kinship groups, are frequent.

Thirdly - since the 'state' per se does not exist, some sort of mechanism has to be found so that the conflicts do not degenerate to the point where they would be threatening the very survival of the kin groups. The only basis for such a mechanism is the lineage system itself. In Somali, these group-conflict rules are called xeer[3]3, and their supporting genealogical network jiffo.

Nomadic groups move and they fight. After a while the groups stop, meet and hold a shir (palaver), they agree on compensation and the payment of blood-price (mag). They may remain at peace for some time or ally with another kin-based related segment against other enemies. And life goes on. It is that 'classical' society we find so well described in the works of Professor Lewis[4]

The Somali people, as shown above, had been an essentially stateless society. Their vision of unity led them to rush unquestioningly forward into independence without a thought as to how their government was going to be organised. The state was thus both a foreign and an unquestioned entity. It was perceived as being two completely heterogeneous things - a direct continuation of the colonial state, and, at the same time, a tool for the 'reconquest' of the lost Somali territories.

 

[Kun_Ciil]

@Zak12

You mentioned in this in another thread about the corruption of the gov before Siyad Barre's coup.....interesting that it is mentioned here as well @Idilinaa

The regime adopted for the unified Somali Republic of 1960 was a parliamentary democracy. It lasted from June 1960 to October 1969 in a constant state of confusion. There were up to 60 political parties, all expressions of the various clans and sub-clans. But as soon as the elections were over, they all rallied to the dominant Somali Youth League (SYL), the nationalist party which had been nurtured by the British Military Administration between 1941 and 1948. Since the SYL was the only 'national' party with a support that was relatively broadly based across the clans, the various other parties which were in fact clan-based interest groups, rallied to the SYL dominated government in order to be able to 'benefit' from the state. Thus the country lived both with a myriad of parties and a de-facto single party. This system led to massive corruption and a strong disenchantment on the part of the public towards its government. In October 1969, a group of 'progressive officers' in the Nasserian tradition took power in a bloodless coup d'etat.

 

[Kun_Ciil]

@jusbrowsin @The Oponian Guild @TheLand @Bari @FBIsomalia @Abdisamad

Here the author talks about Siyad Barre and his relationship with MJ.

Deprived of any foreign support[13]13, and faced with a combined military, economic, ideological and political crisis, the Siad Barre régime was going to revert to the only political resource it had left, the clan system.

1.4 The Politics of State Disintegration (1978 - 1990)

In the spring of 1978, as the Somali army fell back in defeat, a group of Majerteen officers tried to stage a coup d'état and to overthrow the now weakened Siad Barre dictatorship. The coup d'état failed and was drowned in blood. Not only were the coup-makers shot, but the whole clan was made responsible for what had happened: for about a year, the Northeastern area of the country, home to the Majerteen (who had occupied a prominent place in the 'democratic' system of the years 1960-1969), was subjected to looting, rape and murder. Siad Barre now felt them to be a global threat to his power. Many young men of the clan fled to Ethiopia where one of the leaders of the coup d'état, Colonel Yussuf Abdullahi, organised an opposition guerrilla front, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Due both to the Cold War context and to the traditional Somali-Ethiopian rivalry, the SSDF received support from President Mengistu and his communist allies.

It was then that in order to counter what had now become a clan-based political threat, President Siad Barre resorted to clan-based answers. His régime, which in its 'socialist' heyday had prided itself on a unitary anti-clan ideological position now began to systematically use a clan system of political patronage in order to strengthen itself. If we keep in mind the deeply clan-based nature of Somali traditional society and the lack of any form of 'national' foundations for state structures, this was a dangerous game to play in the long run, even if short term benefits could be alluring.

In order to counter the Majerteen threat, President Siad Barre relied mainly on three clans: the small Marehan, his father's clan, the large Ogadeen clan (his mother's clan) whose members lived mostly in the Ethiopian Ogaden province, and the medium-sized northern clan of the Dolbahante. The patronage system thus constituted was nicknamed MOD (short for Marehan-Ogadeen-Dolbahante) and soon MOD civil servants, superior officers and businessmen began to occupy the top ranks of Somali society. Since all three clans belonged to the same clan-family (the Darod), this tended to alienate not only the Majerteen, but also members of the other large clan families, especially the northern Issaq, who make up about 80 per cent of the population of the former British Somaliland, and the centrally-located Hawiye.

 

[Kun_Ciil]

@Garaad Awal @Duubpon @Itsnotthateasy

Is this true? About Ogadeen and their resettlement in Somaliland and being conscripted as askari over the Isaaq population?

Although President Siad Barre was careful to keep a few token Issaq and Hawiye in a handful of lucrative positions, he was also careful about excluding them from political or military positions of importance. The Issaq, particularly, were in a difficult position vis-à-vis the régime. The 1978 defeat had caused large numbers of Ogadeen Somali to flee the advancing Ethiopian armies sent to reconquer the Ogaden province. Later, further communist-inspired policies of compulsory settlement and villagization forced new waves of refugees over the border. It was very difficult to accommodate these refugees since the country had only limited means[14] But the Somali regime quickly realised that they could in fact become an economic resource, and exploiting the support available through the international community became a national policy.

Meanwhile, the actual fate of the refugees became the object of a political tug of war. President Siad Barre, with his dislike for the Issaq, organised Ogadeni settlements in the North. Since the Ogadeen were considered to be supporters of the régime, they were systematically armed and a number of them became militiamen in charge of 'keeping order' in the former British colony. Given the differences of education and lifestyle between the newcomers and the urbanised residents of a number of northern Somali towns, tensions developed. The Issaq had traditionally been very adventurous. Most of the Somali expatriates in the Arab petromonarchies were Issaq and their remittances supported a fairly prosperous economy in the North. In the rural areas, armed clashes multiplied (especially in the Hawd border area) between Issaq pastoralists and their Ogadeen rivals who felt they had the backing of the government. These clashes quickly degenerated as the government tried to play a double game: if the Ogadeen won, the government would treat the military confrontation as a 'law enforcement problem' and pretend to be agents of a neutral entity called 'the Somali Republic'; if they lost, they would pretend that the problem was traditional fighting between nomad groups and try to extricate themselves from it by paying the customary mag (blood money) of the xeer system. As a result, both the 'modern' legitimacy of the state and the 'traditional' legitimacy of the clan-based xeer were undermined, opening the door to a cynical form of anomic gun rule which was later to become prevalent throughout the Somali space[15] One result of the alienation of the Issaq clans caused by these policies, was that Issaq exiles in Great Britain in 1981 created the Somali National Movement (SNM), a guerrilla front dedicated to the overthrow of the Siad Barre dictatorship.

 

[Kun_Ciil]

@Garaad Awal @Itsnotthateasy @Duubpon

I knew Tuur had an alliance with Caydiid, but I had no idea he went to Mogadishu in 1994 to work alongside Caydiid and potentially establish a national gov with UN support.

3.2 The Case of the Self-Proclaimed Republic of Somaliland in the Northwest
As we mentioned above, the region of the former British colony of Somaliland proclaimed independence on 18 May 1991[80] After an initial period of calm between May 1991 and early 1992, there were repeated clashes between the government forces of Abd-er-Rahman Ali 'Tur' and rebels backed mostly by the Habr Ja'alo and some sections of the Habr Awal clans[81] starting in January 1992. Although the fighting was eventually settled by a large peace shir held in the town of Sheikh in August 1992, many politicians in the North, aware of the fissiparous tendencies of Somali clan politics, felt that their 'state' needed to be put on a firmer footing. This led to a long (March to May 1993) and well-organised shir in the town of Borama, during which delegates from all over Somaliland elected a new president in the person of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal[82]

From May 1993 onwards, President Egal tried to stabilise Somaliland's difficult economic and administrative situation. His election had brought back a measure of political calm, and business, especially in the form of livestock exports, started to flourish again. In 1993 to 1994, livestock exports through the harbour of Berbera were estimated to be around US$ 140 million, a figure which compared favourably with pre-war export levels[83] A small tax base was slowly built back through export taxes in Berbera and semi-voluntary contributions from the wealthiest of the businessmen. At the end of 1994, the 'government' had collected US$ 13 million and was hoping for US$ 20 million in 1995. The capital Hargeisa, entirely destroyed during the 1988 terror bombings and the subsequent fighting of 1988-1991, began to be rebuilt. Smaller towns such as Burao and Sheikh re-established modest local tax bases in the US$ 10,000 to 20,000 range.

Yet President Egal is a Habr Awal and his election had disappointed the previous clan coalition which had held power under Abd-er-Rahman 'Tur'. Trouble started brewing in April 1993 when, with the support of UNOSOM 2, the former president declared from his self-imposed exile in London that he was still head of the Somali National Movement[84] and that he had renounced the idea of independence for Somaliland. A UNOSOM 'grant' of US$ 200,000 and a promise of help from General Mohamed Farah Aydeed seemed to have greatly helped him change his mind[85]

This was in fact partly the result of a reversal of alliances in the South. General Aydeed, the former arch-enemy of UNOSOM, had understood that the United Nations still believed in the possibility of bringing together some kind of a 'national government' as a face-saving device before withdrawing. Trying to reposition himself in the good graces of the UN, General Aydeed developed the scheme of 'resuscitating' 'Tur' and using him so as to appear himself as a 'national' leader in UN eyes, one who would oppose the secession of Somaliland which he had previously accepted. This was designed to take the wind out of the sails of his political rival 'President' Ali Mahdi before the departure of UNOSOM forces, since both were competing first for the material leftovers of the international operation and later for the continuing political support of the international community.

UNOSOM support for Abd-er-Rahman Ali led to the expulsion of all UN personnel from Somaliland in late August 1994[86] A few days later, on 30 August 1994, the former Somaliland president arrived in Mogadishu where he met with Mohamed Farah Abdullahi, leader of the anti-SNM branch of SDA, and with Abd-er-Rahman Dualeh Ali, the USF President. The meeting was sponsored by General Mohamed Farah Aydeed and the SNA[87]87, and it meant a clear declaration of war against the Egal government.

The situation soon became complicated by a distinct (if not completely unrelated) development in Somaliland itself. A group of Eidagalley fighters had been occupying the Hargeisa Airport for the last year, demanding extortionate landing fees from aid aircraft and passengers and pocketing the money under the pretext that 'Hargeisa belongs to the Eidagalley'. President Egal had asked them to return control of the airport to the government but to no avail. In desperation, he had even gone as far as building a small airstrip 35 km from the capital and asking aid flights to use it instead of the 'National Airport'. In late September, he threatened armed action[88] and the climate became very tense.

This was all the more so because the situation in the South was moving towards a widening of political alliances, as both Ali Mahdi and General Aydeed tried to get together 'National Governments' before UNOSOM was to leave[89] All political forces in former Somalia took sides in this race, even those in areas far removed from the authority of the Mogadishu warlords. Given the fact that Aydeed had now decided to challenge Somaliland's independent existence for his own tactical reasons, President Egal felt compelled to enter the fray. In October 1994, he refused to recognize the election of Colonel Yusuf Abdullahi by the SSDF Congress, simply because he felt that Yusuf Abdullahi was now an ally of Farah Aydeed and therefore a danger to him[90] Thus, tension spread over the whole territory of the former Somalia.

In these circumstances, President Egal could no longer tolerate the occupation of Hargeisa Airport by the Eidagalley militia, even if they were not under the orders of former President Abd-er-Rahman 'Tur'. On 16 October 1994, Somaliland government troops stormed the airport, thus starting a new war[91] The conflict started badly for the Government side. On 21 October, rebel troops entered Hargeisa town and started indiscriminate shelling. The Central Bank was looted[92] and thousands of refugees streamed out of the city where violent fighting raged until early December[93] As the battle gradually spread to the countryside around Hargeisa, the refugees fled all the way to Ethiopia, where about 80,000 had arrived by Christmas of 1994[94] Fighting finally slowly abated during January 1995[95]

But to the west of the capital, USF forces, manipulated by Djibouti, took advantage of the battles between the various pro and anti-government Issaq clans to try to wrench the Issa-populated areas away from Hargeisa's authority[96] Their attempt ended in failure and their troops were badly mauled by forces loyal to President Egal, as had been the case in the past when other similar attempts had been made.

Skirmishes went on between government forces and the rebel Eidagalley - Habr Yunis coalition during most of early 1995. But the fighting moved progressively away from the capital, first to Salahley[97] and then to the eastern part of the country[98] It was there, near the town of Burao, the local capital of the Habr Yuni clan, that a major eight-day battle was fought in late March and early April 1995. Both sides used significant force, including heavy artillery and tanks. There were at least 1,000 dead and the rebels suffered a defeat[99]

Refugees started cautiously to come back to Hargeisa, which in July 1995 was back to 80 per cent of its November 1994 population. Economic activity slowly returned to near normal levels[100] The rebel leaders (Abd-er-Rahman 'Tur', Ismail 'Buuba', General Jama Qualib) were all in Mogadishu and none had dared come back to the North, even at the height of the fighting which was carried out, in a sense, independently of them. This is an important political point: there is no doubt that President Egal has acted undiplomatically in terms of clan sensibilities and alienated the various Habr Garadjis sub-clans. But this does not mean that these same clans sympathize with the reunification platform supported by the 'official' rebel leaders. Those who fought against the Egal government did so in their own name and not in support of the exiled leaders. Even President Egal's opponents support the secession, a fact Abd-er-Rahman 'Tur' and his friends are so well aware of that they do not dare to return to Somaliland for fear of being killed or arrested, even by their own 'supporters'.

In May 1995, the Guurti (National Assembly of Somaliland) decided to extend Mohamed Egal's presidential mandate for another year. Even those MPs who where opposed to the President voted for the extension, because of a feeling that the situation, although stabilised, was still too precarious to allow a major political change just then. Although the war has damaged the economy (the 'New Somali Shilling' has slipped from 50 to 80 in relation to the U.S. dollar and estimates of government tax revenue had to be scaled down from US$ 20 million to US$ 15 million), livestock exports are still strong. The major obstacle to full stabilization of the country is that it is not recognized by the international community.

 

[Kun_Ciil]

@El Nino @Jungle @Step a side @always hungryy @geeljre49 @IKHALIIL @Afar indhood @Hurder

What do you guys think? Was Caydiid in the wrong or was Cali Mahdi in the wrong? I knew Caydiid had an agreement with SNM abdirahman tuur, but here I am reading that he also had an agreement with the SPM as well in not creating a political leadership without coming together and forming a new gov. Was Cali Mahdi in the wrong for jumping the gun in accepting to become the new president of Somalia whilst causing further fragmentation and making enemies of his fellow USC caydiid, SNM and SPM?

I can understand why the Manifesto group supported Cali Mahdi because tbh Caydiid if he became president would've most likely turned into a another military dictator and would've just been groundhog day all over again. However, I can also understand Caydiid's frustration over being usurped after putting in the hard work after relieving his Ambassador post in India In order to lead the USC.

Cali Mahdi imo was a better candidate, but the hasty decision and lack of consultation and mutual consensus is a big part in the chaos that ensued in Xamar over the following years pitting HG and Abgaal against each other.

1.5 The Disappearance of the State (1991)

The violent takeover of the capital was due to the fact that it had not been possible to negotiate any political solution during the dying days of the dictatorship. Efforts had been made in that direction, though, and they were to leave consequences behind. In the spring of 1990, a group of politicians had published a manifesto, calling for President Siad Barre to resign and for a national conference to be convened. Their call had gone unheeded - in fact several had been detained by the sinking regime, thereby preventing any last chance of an orderly transition of power. The initiative had at any rate been rather ambiguous: on the one hand, it attracted moderates who rightly feared the consequences of an armed takeover of Mogadishu, but, on the other hand, it also attracted members of the Siad Barre régime who were trying to secure their own survival. Since both Italy and Egypt had supported to the very end the idea of a 'reconciliation conference ' in Cairo, the Manifesto group had gathered around itself a number of 'moderates' or 'survivors' who were looking for a way out. They rapidly found common ground in late 1990 with the Rome branch of the USC. Since early 1989, the USC had been split between an 'external' branch based in Italy and an 'internal' branch based in Ethiopia. The 'internal' branch was under the control of General Mohamed Farah Aydeed and was the only one which was physically involved in the fighting against the Siad Barre regime. In October 1990, the 'internal' USC, the SPM and the SNM had signed an agreement not to negotiate with the régime and not to act to create a new political leadership without consulting each other. But in the confusion following the fall of the dictatorship, a leader of the 'external' USC who was also a Manifesto signatory, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, was proclaimed 'president' by his close associates. Ali Mahdi was a relatively unknown figure, owner of one of Mogadishu's best hotels and married to one of the former President's advisers on public health matters. He was surrounded by several veterans of the former régime, such as the long-serving Finance Minister Mohamed Sheikh Osman and Ahmed Jilow, a former head of the Secret Police. General Aydeed, the SPM and the SNM refused to accept the 'election' of Ali Mahdi, and the civil war among the victors started almost immediately after the fall of General Siad Barre (29 January 1991). It was to last for over 18 months and eventually lead to foreign intervention.

 

[Duubpon]

@Garaad Awal @Itsnotthateasy @Duubpon

I knew Tuur had an alliance with Caydiid, but I had no idea he went to Mogadishu in 1994 to work alongside Caydiid and potentially establish a national gov with UN support.

Tuur was also there when Caydiid declared himself president.

 

[Kun_Ciil]

@Abaq @Removed

Ogadeen I see you, you guys are like Tywin Lannister watching the rebellion against Aerys the king and only joining the rebellions side when it was clear that the Kings time was done lool. And Omar Jess was boys with USC and Caydiid when Morgan and SNF were fighting against the USC? Why? Clan politics for Kismayo?

The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
This movement was created at the initiative of Colonel Omar Jess early in 1990, when he realised that the Siad Barre régime was going to fall. The SPM is the political expression of the Ogadeen clans. It was at first led by its founder. But Colonel Omar Jess was soon joined by former Defence Minister Adan Abdullahi Nur 'Gabeeyow ', a long-time Siad Barre stalwart who had been dismissed by the dictator. After January 1991, the two men radically diverged, Colonel Jess joined forces with General Aydeed while 'Gabeeyow' allied himself with his former colleague and rival in the Siad Barre entourage, General Mohamed Said Hersi 'Morgan', the SNF leader.

 

[Kun_Ciil]

And lastly my brother @Kamaaludeen Al Reewin @Jiron and others from Shabelle Dhexe/Bay iyo Bakool/Jubbada.

Reading about the clan/rebel groups conflicts across your regions waa xanuun....reminds me of how the riverlands were pillaged and abused by the Lannisters and their bannermen in Games of thrones. So many tribes have been violated and we mention them all the time, but I rarely hear you guys speak about what you went through...waa sabar badantiin

3.5 The Riverine Area Around the Wabi Shebelle and Jubba
Covering the former provinces of Bay and Baqol, as well as the south of the Lower Shebelle and the north of the Lower Jubba, this is the martyr area of Somalia. Populated by the large Digil and Rahanweyn sedentary peasant clan families, it was looted and trampled upon in every possible way by the invading Somali nomadic armies during 1991-1992. If we accept a global figure of 300,000 deaths in the Somalia crisis since 1989[130]130, most of the casualties, perhaps as much as 80 per cent, took place in that area. Villages were burnt, food was looted, women were raped, sheep and goats were eaten, and the local population, with few or no weapons, was not able to defend itself. Worse - when the killing and looting was over, the militiamen came back as agents of the powerful Central Region warlords, confiscated the lands and put the surviving population to work as quasi slaves. Often, these farms were shown to UN and NGO personnel as 'development achievements' and got financial support from the foreigners[131]

By late 1994, as things were changing, it became obvious that the local populations were no longer prepared to accept the horrors they had suffered at the hands of both SNA and SSA militiamen. Thus, while Ali Mahdi and General Aydeed in Mogadishu were trying to put together some kind of 'national government' for international consumption, there were collective protests in the inter-riverine areas - not by the organizations like SDM, SSNM or SNU which obeyed either SNA or SSA (or both when they had split into rival branches) -but directly by the ordinary population[132]

This led to a growing organization of the settled farmer populations, especially since, in the areas still under SSA or SNA control, the banana plantations of the pre-war period had been put back into production with a view to export. The situation had been complicated by the arrival on the scene of the U.S. fruit company "Dole" which had created a Somali branch company called SOMBANA in order to benefit from the banana import quotas into the European Union under the Lomé Agreement, something it could not do from its Central American base. This led to serious fighting with the old Italian 'banana lords' running SOMALFRUIT. Soon SOMBANA-supported SNA gunmen were fighting it out with SOMALFRUIT-supported SSA forces[133] An Italian TV cameraman eventually died in the crossfire, a fact which drew attention to this dubious business, especially when the slave-like working conditions on the plantations of both companies became known after peasant leader Ibrahim Mohamed Diriye organised a press conference in Mogadishu[134]

On 25 May 1995, a 'Supreme Digil-Mirifle Council' was created in Baidoa[135] under the leadership of Abd-el-Gadir Mohamed 'Zoppo'[136] and Hassan Sheikh Ibrahim[137]137, two men whose past does not put them above a banana deal. But they intend at least to organise the relatively undefended riverine populations, with the support of the Ali Mahdi alliance but not automatically of Ali Mahdi himself. A few days after the creation of the Council, when General Aydeed was considering his stance as regards this new entity, the warning not to attack came not from Ali Mahdi, but from Osman Atto[138] And characteristically, he threatened Farah Aydeed with action not from the SSA, but from himself and from General Mohamed Said Hersi 'Morgan', the SNF leader. To understand why, we should now examine the last of the epigone statelets left in the wake of Somalia's shipwreck.

 

[Kun_Ciil]

Tuur was also there when Caydiid declared himself president.

I always hear people from my mums side saying habar younis didn't get their just dividends after the civil war...saying that a large part of SNM that fought was made of HY and they lost a lot of manpower back then.

But if you're an Isaaq separatist I can see why Habar Awal/Habar Jeclo are suspicious of your unionist tendencies lol

 

[Duubpon]

I always hear people from my mums side saying habar younis didn't get their just dividends after the civil war...saying that a large part of SNM that fought was made of HY and they lost a lot of manpower back then.

But if you're an Isaaq separatist I can see why Habar Awal/Habar Jeclo are suspicious of your unionist tendencies lol

I'm HA and SNM was equally made up of every Isaaq qabiil even including subs only found in the Hawd.

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[Zak12]

Reading the first quote:

"In any case, the challenge to the existence of the Somali state did not come from the non-Somali people of the South"

"Hence the social differences between 'pure' Somali and the Southern Peoples"

"Such a world is not conducive to any form of economic surplus or economic accumulation"

"there are no possibilities of permanent settlements, of cities and of the distinct political structures we have called 'the state'."

All blatantly BS statements for anyone who is remotely familiar with Somali history.

 

[Kun_Ciil]

Reading the first quote:

"In any case, the challenge to the existence of the Somali state did not come from the non-Somali people of the South"

"Hence the social differences between 'pure' Somali and the Southern Peoples"

"Such a world is not conducive to any form of economic surplus or economic accumulation"

"there are no possibilities of permanent settlements, of cities and of the distinct political structures we have called 'the state'."

All blatantly BS statements for anyone who is remotely familiar with Somali history.

The whole opening chapter was just weird and felt like orientalist revisionism. Even I was confused by what he meant by pure Somali and Southern people.

Somali society, like many nomadic societies of arid and semi-arid lands, is largely a product of its geographical and climatic environment. The land is very dry and it generally does not permit sedentary agriculture, except in the South, between the Juba and Wabi Shebelle rivers. Hence the social differences between 'pure' Somali and the Southern Peoples.

By pure I'm guessing he means the nomadic Somalis, but the Southerners is he trying to make them a different group...like the Somalis who mainly agricultural(digil iyo mirifle), live in the fertile areas such as bantu, and the reer barawe/gibil cad who are not nomads and city dwellers? Maba fahmin.

Anyways, his whole premise just goes on to show that as a clan based society the whole rebellion against Siyad Barre and the aftermath was a natural consequence of clan based society.

Thus, from the beginning, the opposition to a clan-based regime was itself clan-based.

I just found interesting his breakdown of the rebel groups and what happened after the collapse of the state, but who knows if its codswallop so that's why I tagged everyone...

 

[Garaad Awal]

@Garaad Awal @Duubpon @Itsnotthateasy

Is this true? About Ogadeen and their resettlement in Somaliland and being conscripted as askari over the Isaaq population?

Yes. I have heard first-hand reports from family and family friends about Barre’s policy of giving out stolen land & homes to these Darood Ethiopians like OG,Bartire etc. Generally all top officers in Hargeisa were Darood and generally abused the Isaaq population. You would have MJ, OG, Mx and even Jabarti yaryars officers.

The enmity between Isaaqs & the Ethiopian Jabarti is deep as SNM had to battle out with the Jabarti WSLF who consistently massacred Isaaqs within Ethiopia. Most recently these thugs who changed shirts massacred a village of Arap Isaaqs a few months ago.

Jabartis will never rule Isaaq lands. Today Isaaqs are reminded that Jabarti threat isn’t over. Today in Eastern SL they have created gangs that pay lip service to your blue flag. They are attacking Isaaq villages in Sool and recently attempted to capture and displace the Isaaq majority of Ceerigaabo.

Stick your blue flag up your ass. And f*ck the Jabarti clan until Yawmul qiyamah.

 

[Garaad Awal]

@Garaad Awal @Itsnotthateasy @Duubpon

I knew Tuur had an alliance with Caydiid, but I had no idea he went to Mogadishu in 1994 to work alongside Caydiid and potentially establish a national gov with UN support.

Tuur was a traitor. He fled south due to being ousted by HA militarily during battles near Berbera and skirmishes in Hargeisa as HY had zero revenue since Wajaale/Qat trade belong to the JB HA and Berbera Port revenue belonged to the CM HA. The political animal known as Ina Cigaal, the true father of the nation returned to the country. Ousted Tuur politically and managed to outmaneuver every faction politically to create SL.

Everything from the SL shilling to the SL military was created under Ina Cigaal. Very intelligent man which is why Afweyne imprisoned him for many years in Xamar as even that danyeer could see his potential.

 

[Kun_Ciil]

Yes. I have heard first-hand reports from family and family friends about Barre’s policy of giving out stolen land & homes to these Darood Ethiopians like OG,Bartire etc. Generally all top officers in Hargeisa were Darood and generally abused the Isaaq population. You would have MJ, OG, Mx and even Jabarti yaryars officers.

The enmity between Isaaqs & the Ethiopian Jabarti is deep as SNM had to battle out with the Jabarti WSLF who consistently massacred Isaaqs within Ethiopia. Most recently these thugs who changed shirts massacred a village of Arap Isaaqs a few months ago.

Jabartis will never rule Isaaq lands. Today Isaaqs are reminded that Jabarti threat isn’t over. Today in Eastern SL they have created gangs that pay lip service to your blue flag. They are attacking Isaaq villages in Sool and recently attempted to capture and displace the Isaaq majority of Ceerigaabo.

Stick your blue flag up your ass. And f*ck the Jabarti clan until Yawmul qiyamah.

Walaal this thread was meant for us all to freely speak about Somali history in a civil manner and bring about a fruitful discussion . Your first part of your post is informative, you can be pro-isaaq/sland and not want Darood in your affairs but you didn't have to be so crude in the end...caadi iska dhig don't make this thread into a tic for tac qabiil insults.

 

[Zak12]

By pure I'm guessing he means the nomadic Somalis, but the Southerners is he trying to make them a different group

Its a stereotype that koonfur clans and especially Rx are the agricultural type but in reality, ALL Somali clans practiced some form of agriculture. In fact, the so called "nomadic" Somalis were agro pastorialists who practiced a wide variety of economic activities from farming to fishing so that author is oversimplifying the complex social-economic interactions Somalis had. Especially laughable is the claim that Somalis had no states or settlements. I suppose Mogadishu, Merca, Barawe, Berbera, Harar, Bosaso and more all just willed themselves into existence?

the whole rebellion against Siyad Barre and the aftermath was a natural consequence of clan based society.

It would be remiss to not mention the fact that the "rebellion" was done by Ethiopian backed proxies. It wasn't natural by any means since the rebels had to set up base in Ethiopia.

 

[Duubpon]

Its a stereotype that koonfur clans and especially Rx are the agricultural type but in reality, ALL Somali clans practiced some form of agriculture. In fact, the so called "nomadic" Somalis were agro pastorialists who practiced a wide variety of economic activities from farming to fishing so that author is oversimplifying the complex social-economic interactions Somalis had. Especially laughable is the claim that Somalis had no states or settlements. I suppose Mogadishu, Merca, Barawe, Berbera, Harar, Bosaso and more all just willed themselves into existence?


It would be remiss to not mention the fact that the "rebellion" was done by Ethiopian backed proxies. It wasn't natural by any means since the rebels had to set up base in Ethiopia.

It was a rebellion that occurred due to your hero's oppression of his own citizens based on their clans.

If the Derg was responsible for them being capable of defending themselves,then kudos to Mengistu for the assistance he gave us.

 

[Zak12]

It was a rebellion that occurred due to your hero's oppression of his own citizens based on their clans.

It was a rebellion from disgruntled officers mad about Barre cutting ties with the USSR. If they really cared about citizens then they wouldn't have continued fighting after Barre fled.