Revisiting: The Bevin Plan for Somali lands, 1897 => 1946

[𐒋𐒖𐒆𐒔𐒖𐒕𐒈]

Before the partition of the Somali lands into five, there was a plan, the Bevin plan, which is again very relevant today, for we are now back to 1946. Wanted to revisit the topic for discussion.

[ ... ]
It was the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, who proposed the Somali territories to be united in 1946 and the creation of Greater Somaliland. Prior to the announcement of his famous ‘Bevin Plan’ at the British House of Commons on 4 June 1946, the British Foreign Secretary made his original proposal at a meeting of the Prime Ministers held in London on 28 April 1946.

According to the minutes of the meeting, marked TOP SECRET, Bevin proposed the following: “Italian Somaliland, together with British Somaliland, the Ogaden and the Reserved Areas, to be placed under international trusteeship with the United Kingdom as Administering Authority”.

That proposal was clear and devoid of ambiguity. However, barely five weeks later, addressing the British House of Commons, on 4 June 1946, the Foreign Secretary presented a different version in which he also involved Ethiopia, a country to which Britain illegally gave Somali territories in 1897, by saying: “We proposed that British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and the adjacent part of Ethiopia, if Ethiopia agreed, should be lumped together as a trust territory …” (Emphasis added)

There must have been strong pressure – between 28 April and 4 June 1946 - from other powers that forced his departure from the original proposal to the new that gave Ethiopia a say on the matter, although Bevin publicly mentioned only the criticism of Molotov, Russian Foreign Minister when he said: “But what attracted M. Molotov’s criticism was, I am sure, that I suggested that Great Britain should be made the administrating authority. Was this unreasonable?”

Besides changing his original proposal, Bevin also refrained from presenting the proposal to the Paris Conference. However, despite that, Bevin’s sympathy must have been with the Somalis. He told the delegates:

“I hope the deputies at the Paris Conference will now consider a Greater Somaliland more objectively”.

https://sunatimes.com/articles/167/Somalia-Original-Bevin-plan-welcomed-and-1897-and-1954-treaties-repudiated

@Thegoodshepherd @TheMadMullah

https://www.somalispot.com/threads/the-bevin-plan-an-opportunity-for-somalis-and-the-betrayal-of-syl.20840/

 

[𐒋𐒖𐒆𐒔𐒖𐒕𐒈]

We were naive then, and still are. It was five then, and unto the remaining two now.

 

[mohammdov]

The damned Soviets were the ones who rejected this and put pressure on the United Nations and then also supported Ethiopia in 1977

 

[mohammdov]

We were naive then, and still are. It was five then, and unto the remaining two now.

Also, the Rahwain Party was refusing to unite. They were saying that we are different from the rest of the Somalis, and also other Somalis wanted Ethiopia to return to the galbeed
Only a few Somalis were educated and they were trying to make all Somali lands be under one colonial authority, but tribalism played a role in the failure of this.

 

[𐒋𐒖𐒆𐒔𐒖𐒕𐒈]

Also, the Rahwain Party was refusing to unite. They were saying that we are different from the rest of the Somalis, and also other Somalis wanted Ethiopia to return to the galbeed
Only a few Somalis were educated and they were trying to make all Somali lands be under one colonial authority, but tribalism played a role in the failure of this.

We were clueless then with our leaders being out of touch with the politics of colonialism, and justifiably so, but the shocking thing is our current crop of political leaders are as clueless, if worse than previous generation.

 

[AboveHeigtś]

British were almost on the right side of history. Unfortunately after WWII UK was incapable of pushing anything on their own.

 

[Kizaru]

should have worked with the british

 

[Aseer]

Also, the Rahwain Party was refusing to unite. They were saying that we are different from the rest of the Somalis, and also other Somalis wanted Ethiopia to return to the galbeed
Only a few Somalis were educated and they were trying to make all Somali lands be under one colonial authority, but tribalism played a role in the failure of this.

DAMN these qabiilists really F'D us all over. WOW just WOW this idiocracy has no limits. I AM GENUIENLY PISSED RN.

 

[𐒋𐒖𐒆𐒔𐒖𐒕𐒈]

British were almost on the right side of history. Unfortunately after WWII UK was incapable of pushing anything on their own.

Not only that, I read an article, which indicated SYL members did not know about the plan, were suspicious of the Brits, and instead chose Italy to administer the trusteeship, and when Bevin got wind of it, he tore up his original plan, and started working on dismembering .So to look after his sole interest, East Africa company (Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar, and Tanganyika (now Tanzania).

Bevin also had plans for Ireland, and Palestine.

 

[AboveHeigtś]

Not only that, I read an article, which indicated SYL members did not know about the plan, were suspicious of the Brits, and instead chose Italy to administer the trusteeship, and when Bevin got wind of it, he tore up his original plan, and started working on dismembering .So to look after his sole interest, East Africa company (Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar, and Tanganyika (now Tanzania).

Bevin also had plans for Ireland, and Palestine.

The British were disastrous in Southern Somalia, they caused many hardships and in the eyes of the locals.... Italians>UK.

Also I doubt the decision to stay under Italian administration affected Bevin plan. Bevin plan was scrapped according to your sources as early as 1946 and the UN/Italian trusteeship was cemented in 1949.

 

[𐒋𐒖𐒆𐒔𐒖𐒕𐒈]

Also I doubt the decision to stay under Italian administration affected Bevin plan. Bevin plan was scrapped according to your sources as early as 1946 and the UN/Italian trusteeship was cemented in 1949.

Actually, it did. Even members of SYL later admitted as much in their memoirs. There is an old nomadic expression, which became rather popular at the time, as I read 'trust your stick only with whom you may be able to reclaim it from' - something along those lines, which precipitated Italy adminstering the trusteeship rather than Britain.

The process started much earlier, round the time of the fall of N Africa, with Field Marshall Monty on the heels of Gen. Rommel retreating to Sicily at the tail of Europe's 2nd war. At the time, Gen. Eisenhower was enjoying fine dine and wine in Casablanca mapping out the chart of the new world order with the Brits being at his right-hand. You may want to consider reading Field Marshal Monty's autobiography for the details.

 

[Grey Alien]

Ha! Another reason to be enemy of Soviets. What a bastardous they are.

 

[𐒋𐒖𐒆𐒔𐒖𐒕𐒈]

Here is the withdrawal of the United Somalia proposal. Pay attention to the name being used, for it bears relevance to conversations.

-------------------------
(c) crown copyright

Catalogue Reference:CAB/129/10 Image Reference:0043

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

CABINET

UNITED SOMALIA

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies​

1. The Foreign Secretary's telegram No. 233 of the 20th June from Paris, reporting his withdrawal of the proposal which he made at. the last Council of Foreign Ministers for the creation of a United Somalia under British trusteeship, raises an important issue of policy from the Colonial Office point of iew on which I should like to consult my colleagues.

2. I fully appreciate the immense difficulties which the
Foreign Secretary has had to contend with at Paris in trying to get a peace settlement with Italy, and I realise that the Somali question is only one part of the colonial aspect of that major problem. Everything which has proved to ho .ah obstacle to agreement between major Powers must clearly ho removed so far as this can he done consistently with securing' our essential interests. So far as I am in a position to judge, what has particularly aroused opposition among the other States concerned on this Somali issue has been our claim that United Somalia should he placed under sole British trustee ship. Though made in good faith, this claim has "been represented as.an attempt to annex further territory to the British Empire. In view of the statements which we have made, in the past disclaiming any intention to seek territorial additions out of the war, the claim for British trusteeship over a United Somalia is evidently a very, difficult one to sustain internationally, even though British administration would probably be preferred to any other administration by the inhabitants themselves. We should therefore offer no objection to the claim for a United Somalia Under British trusteeship being withdrawn.

3. I feel, however, that we should consider carefully before finally abandoning the idea of a United Somalia as such. It has, I think, long been recognised that the case for unifying the Somali territories and wiping out the existing arbitrary international frontiers which cut across thorn is a very strong one on its own merits, irrespective of the regime to he installed once the area has been unified. There is an opportunity now, in the course of the post-war settlement, of rectifying the mistakes of the nineteenth century which have produced this situation. If this opportunity of a proper settlement is not taken, it may not recur for many years to come. Over and above these considerations of general policy there is the special question which concerns my Department of the future of British Somaliland. A return to the status quo in this part of Africa would leave us with a British. Somaliland- within frontiers which past experience has shown to be most unsatisfactory and indeed unworkable.

4. A considerable part of the essential grazing areas of the British Somali tribes lie on the Ethiopian side of the old frontier, in the Ogaden and the Reserved Area. Without access to these grazing grounds, the present end future welfare of the British protected tribes cannot be secured, The most satisfactory way of remedying this situation would he by the creation of a United Somalia (which would include the grazing areas). If the United Somalia project were dropped entirely we should still he obliged, in the interests of British Somaliland, to negotiate bilaterally with Ethiopia for the cession of these vita1 areos.

5. It might be possible to make a further attempt at achieving a UnitedSomalia if we were prepared to do so at the price of accepting some regime for the whole area other than British administration. . The placing of a British protectorate under some other authority would "be a far-reaching step calling for very serious consideration. Subject to the views of my colleagues, I would not bo -prepared to recommend putting British Somaliland into a United Somalia under the administration of any single foreign State, There remains, however, the alternative of an international administration, on the lines of the collective trusteeship originally proposed by the United States for the Italian colonies as a whole. I do not foel that the same objections would apply to merging British Soinalilo.no. into an internationally-administered United Somalia. In the paper which the Foreign Secretary and I submitted jointly to the Cabinet in March"1", we stated that; "It has become apparent that the substitution of collective trusteeship for British trusteeship would not affect the merits of the case for seeking to'create a unified- Somalia. Such unification would undoubtedly be far preferable to turn to the status QUO which appears the only other-alternative.

6. Before his Majesty's Government finally agreed to the creation of a United Somalia under collective international trusteeship, it would be necessary to carry the Dominions with us, and also,- in view of past pledges to Parliament, to consult the British protected Somali tribes. But- the advantages to the Somali peoples as a whole of creating a United Somalia are so great that I consider the above solution is one which wo should be justified in recommending strongly to the British Somalis and to which they could reasonably be expected to agree4-

7. For these reasons I should be reluctant to see the door finally closed to the possibility of creating a United Somalia. I appreciate that the present is not a suitable moment for pressing thin solution, tfn view of the turn of events overthe Italian Peace Treaty. The question remains whether, without prejudicing the general peace settlement, the door can still be Pent open.

8. The immediate problem is one of procedure. The Ethiopians have recently suggested that they might cede to British Somaliland an unspecified portion of the grazing areas , in return for our ceding to them a corridor to the sea at Zeila in British Somaliland. The details of this offer still require elucidation; but it is probable that what they are suggesting is a settlement of the problem on the lines of Britishpolicy in the 1930's. (This policy was never brought to the stage of negotiation owing to the Italian-Ethiopian war). Such a settlement would not give us all we want, and would involve placing part of British Somaliland under Ethiopian rule. This would no doubt be muchresented by the British Somali tribes concerned, and the whole project would require very careful examination. It may

eventually prove to be the best we can get, and it is arguable that we are more likely to get it now, when the Ethiopians are evidently anxious to reach a general agreement -with us, rather than by holding it over for a year in the hope of getting a United Somalia when the disposal of the Italian colonies finally comes up. By that time (unless the present Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement can be extended) v/e should have to have evacuated the Ogaden and Reserved Area, and our bargaining position would be to that extent weaher. As against this, by holding the matter over until it can be considered in conjunction with the disposal of the Italian colonies, we might be able -to use the bargaining counter of Eritrea, which we should not possess if we embarked now on direct negotiations with Ethiopia."

9. It might be possible to get the United Somalia project mere dispassionately considered no its real merits after the conclusion of the peace treaty. It would therefore seem very unfortunate if, in the process of securing our immediate objectives, v/e were to have deprived ourselves finally of any chance of raising the United Somalia project again at that later stage. We do in fact believe it to be the best long-term solution in the interests of all concerned. Moreover, we have now publicly advocated United Somalia on the grounds that we are seeking only to promote the interests of the inhabitants. Having taken up this position, it appears to me that (in the interests of our general policy towards dependent peoples) we ought not to withdraw without at least making it plain to the world that the responsibility for preventing such a settlement does not rest with ourselves.

10. The question of" the course to be pursued at the present delicate stage of the Paris negotiations must be for the Foreign Secretary to judge; and it is also not yet quite clear how the question of the eventual disposal of the Italian colonies (as distinct from the immediate issue of what is to be said on the subject in the Italian Peace Treaty) is going to be left. The withdrawal of our position about United Somalia has already been made by the Foreign Secretary, and this must evidently been accepted as' a. fact. I would urge, however, that we should proceed on the basis of the recommendations set out below if we can do so without prejudice to the peace settlement. (Meanwhile we .should.examine with the Ethiopians the propooal in paragraph 8)..

11. My recommendations are:

(i) That, if it is decided to make any provisional" arrangements now at Paris about-procedure for eventually disposing of the Italian colonies, the "terms of reference" (or equ.ivs.lent) should if practicable bo so drawn that the possibility of taking the ether Somali territories into account as well as Italian Somaliland is not .excluded.​

​

(ii) That, if no such arrangements are made now, nothing should be done on our part which would irrevocably close the door to our putting the United Somalia idea forward again if we desired to do so at a later stage. (initialled) G.U.H.​

Colonial Office, S.W.1.

22nd June, 1946.

 

[𐒋𐒖𐒆𐒔𐒖𐒕𐒈]

SYL making the case for United Somalia, and pleading their case.

 

[Emir of Zayla]

Before the partition of the Somali lands into five, there was a plan, the Bevin plan, which is again very relevant today, for we are now back to 1946. Wanted to revisit the topic for discussion.

View attachment 307416

[ ... ]
It was the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, who proposed the Somali territories to be united in 1946 and the creation of Greater Somaliland. Prior to the announcement of his famous ‘Bevin Plan’ at the British House of Commons on 4 June 1946, the British Foreign Secretary made his original proposal at a meeting of the Prime Ministers held in London on 28 April 1946.

According to the minutes of the meeting, marked TOP SECRET, Bevin proposed the following: “Italian Somaliland, together with British Somaliland, the Ogaden and the Reserved Areas, to be placed under international trusteeship with the United Kingdom as Administering Authority”.

That proposal was clear and devoid of ambiguity. However, barely five weeks later, addressing the British House of Commons, on 4 June 1946, the Foreign Secretary presented a different version in which he also involved Ethiopia, a country to which Britain illegally gave Somali territories in 1897, by saying: “We proposed that British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and the adjacent part of Ethiopia, if Ethiopia agreed, should be lumped together as a trust territory …” (Emphasis added)

There must have been strong pressure – between 28 April and 4 June 1946 - from other powers that forced his departure from the original proposal to the new that gave Ethiopia a say on the matter, although Bevin publicly mentioned only the criticism of Molotov, Russian Foreign Minister when he said: “But what attracted M. Molotov’s criticism was, I am sure, that I suggested that Great Britain should be made the administrating authority. Was this unreasonable?”

Besides changing his original proposal, Bevin also refrained from presenting the proposal to the Paris Conference. However, despite that, Bevin’s sympathy must have been with the Somalis. He told the delegates:

“I hope the deputies at the Paris Conference will now consider a Greater Somaliland more objectively”.

https://sunatimes.com/articles/167/Somalia-Original-Bevin-plan-welcomed-and-1897-and-1954-treaties-repudiated

@Thegoodshepherd @TheMadMullah

https://www.somalispot.com/threads/the-bevin-plan-an-opportunity-for-somalis-and-the-betrayal-of-syl.20840/

I wonder if the Bevin Plan came into fruition, how would the Horn look during the Cold War? Would it be Western-aligned Somalia vs Soviet-backed Ethiopia for dominance in Africa or would we stay out of it?

 

[𐒋𐒖𐒆𐒔𐒖𐒕𐒈]

I wonder if the Bevin Plan came into fruition, how would the Horn look during the Cold War? Would it be Western-aligned Somalia vs Soviet-backed Ethiopia for dominance in Africa or would we stay out of it?

In which case, with its being a Christian nation, Ethiopia would have been protected with some relevance, but not with as much importance.

This book by the former Prime Miniter A/Rasaq H Hussein is a very good reference.

-----------------------------------
The events leading up to the UN Trusteeship in part of Somalia and the policies which shaped Trusteeship rule is my subject in Chapter 2. The years between 1940 and 1949 constituted the era when Italy and its allies lost the war as well as their colonial spoils to the Allies.

In Chapter 3 I will discuss the Italian Trusteeship of Somalia (1950–1959) and the fate of other Somali territories in this decade. This period was also the time when Somalis were giving expression to nationalism in different forms at local and national levels.

The first Somali government (1960–1964) forms the subject of Chapter 4. This period was the time when the Republic of Somalia was trying to formalize its structures by breaking away from the colonial legacy and the influence under which the two territories of British and Italian Somaliland had developed during the colonial period. In this chapter I will also examine the struggle of the missing Somali territories and how our politics were shaping the Somali nation-state in Africa.

Abdirazak Haji Hussein: My Role in the Foundation of the Somali Nation-State, A Political Memoir

 

[Libaax-Joore]

Actually, it did. Even members of SYL later admitted as much in their memoirs. There is an old nomadic expression, which became rather popular at the time, as I read 'trust your stick only with whom you may be able to reclaim it from' - something along those lines, which precipitated Italy adminstering the trusteeship rather than Britain.

The process started much earlier, round the time of the fall of N Africa, with Field Marshall Monty on the heels of Gen. Rommel retreating to Sicily at the tail of Europe's 2nd war. At the time, Gen. Eisenhower was enjoying fine dine and wine in Casablanca mapping out the chart of the new world order with the Brits being at his right-hand. You may want to consider reading Field Marshal Monty's autobiography for the details.

 

[GemState]

Somali territories in 1 state would be roughly as big as Colombia, Iran and South Africa. If we got lucky with some oil discoveries too...much time wasted for everyone in the region.

Hope there's a 2nd chance.

 

[Thegoodshepherd]

The British knew they had screwed the Somalis in 1897 by giving Ethiopia 65,000 sq km of land that they were entrusted with by the clans of British Somaliland. They gave away the Haud and Reserved area when they were trusted to protect these areas.

This is a good article from 1955 addressing the issue.
Trouble in the Horn of Africa?: The British Somali Case

 

[Thegoodshepherd]

The bastard Lord Curzon spent 20 years in parliament covering his ass after giving up more than a quarter of British Somaliland to Ethiopia in 1897.