“We make the best choices we can at the time we make them.”
A common mistake I see is people working from a primitive, tribal-influenced mindset. Some believe that anything associated with HSM administration is inherently bad, and the only good option is the opposite. This is a simplistic and destructive way of thinking that leads to holding contradictory and paradoxical beliefs simultaneously.
Long before the MoU, Ethiopia has been a destructive force in Somali politics, through meddling, invasions, and generally keeping Somalia in a constant state of anxiety and unrest.
Not only Ethiopia, but Kenya as well can be seen as a destabilizing force. Their goal is not to support or restore Somali institutions but to project power deep into Somalia, paralyzing the Somali nation’s efforts. This is driven by a deeply rooted fear stemming from centuries of Somali dominance in the Horn of Africa, which was only truly halted in the 1990s.
The core of the current problem lies in the Federal Government's attempt to replace Ethiopian troops with Egyptian troops. Disagreement is natural, but the arguments made against this move are often weak and thinly veiled in tribalism.
From an administrative point of view, South West State is barely functional, consisting of enclaves around the largest cities, while vast areas of the countryside remain under Al-Shabaab control. After decades of AMISOM and now ATMIS presence, it is the region with the least land under state or federal control. Its people have suffered immensely from conflict, and trust in both state and federal authority is almost nonexistent. Furthermore, the population belongs to politically underrepresented clans.
Laftagareen, the leader of South West State, has strong ties to Ethiopia. Like many politicians, he is not a chosen leader by the people but a shrewd political figure who maneuvered his way into power. He is not uniquely evil or bad but stands out because, unlike most federal leaders, he lacks the ability to call upon sufficient support of his own clan for power. Many of his kin have aligned themselves with Al-Shabaab.
His power base has always been the Ethiopian occupation, with Ethiopian troops providing him with funding, training, and support for his small state militia and providing protection.
The current controversy stems from the fact that the ruling elite of South West State are losing their Ethiopian power base, and a new Egyptian presence is being installed, one that is closer to Mogadishu than to Laftagareen and his clique.
Nationally, this shift would significantly reduce Ethiopia’s influence over Somalia. Ethiopia’s ability to use South West State as a staging ground or threat to Mogadishu would be curtailed. Locally, while the elites would struggle to maintain their positions, for most people, little would change. However, some might argue it could improve, as having Muslim forces present, compared to historical Christian enemies, could lend more legitimacy to the regional and state governments.
It raises the question: what alternative would there be? Having Ethiopian troops in Somalia was a valid criticism both Somalilanders and unionists made against HSM. This seems the most realistic way to remove it.
The idea that Somalia needs a continuous presence of foreign troops is tragic, but the internal divisions are so deep that the Federal Government and southern regional states would collapse within months without them.
It’s better to negotiate terms and be selective about the troops, ensuring they come from nations with a shared interest in seeing a strong Somalia, even if it's for their own geopolitical interests.
I think Madobe, the leader of Jubaland, highlights Laftagareen’s incompetence. Both had foreign backing and troops in their regions, but unlike Laftagareen, Madobe built his own power base and loyal forces, granting him a degree of autonomy that Laftagareen simply lacks.
There are legitimate arguments to be made, such as the Federal Government pulling more power toward itself unilaterally. But this does not outweigh the existential problem of Ethiopian troops on Somali soil. Gaining more autonomy by removing such a corrupt and vile force, even for a lesser evil, is essential. Anti-Ethiopian sentiments in Somalia are so high that they’ve become toxic. The average Somali, both online and offline, welcomes the removal of Ethiopian troops, especially those within and outside of South West State.
A common mistake I see is people working from a primitive, tribal-influenced mindset. Some believe that anything associated with HSM administration is inherently bad, and the only good option is the opposite. This is a simplistic and destructive way of thinking that leads to holding contradictory and paradoxical beliefs simultaneously.
Long before the MoU, Ethiopia has been a destructive force in Somali politics, through meddling, invasions, and generally keeping Somalia in a constant state of anxiety and unrest.
Not only Ethiopia, but Kenya as well can be seen as a destabilizing force. Their goal is not to support or restore Somali institutions but to project power deep into Somalia, paralyzing the Somali nation’s efforts. This is driven by a deeply rooted fear stemming from centuries of Somali dominance in the Horn of Africa, which was only truly halted in the 1990s.
The core of the current problem lies in the Federal Government's attempt to replace Ethiopian troops with Egyptian troops. Disagreement is natural, but the arguments made against this move are often weak and thinly veiled in tribalism.
From an administrative point of view, South West State is barely functional, consisting of enclaves around the largest cities, while vast areas of the countryside remain under Al-Shabaab control. After decades of AMISOM and now ATMIS presence, it is the region with the least land under state or federal control. Its people have suffered immensely from conflict, and trust in both state and federal authority is almost nonexistent. Furthermore, the population belongs to politically underrepresented clans.
Laftagareen, the leader of South West State, has strong ties to Ethiopia. Like many politicians, he is not a chosen leader by the people but a shrewd political figure who maneuvered his way into power. He is not uniquely evil or bad but stands out because, unlike most federal leaders, he lacks the ability to call upon sufficient support of his own clan for power. Many of his kin have aligned themselves with Al-Shabaab.
His power base has always been the Ethiopian occupation, with Ethiopian troops providing him with funding, training, and support for his small state militia and providing protection.
The current controversy stems from the fact that the ruling elite of South West State are losing their Ethiopian power base, and a new Egyptian presence is being installed, one that is closer to Mogadishu than to Laftagareen and his clique.
Nationally, this shift would significantly reduce Ethiopia’s influence over Somalia. Ethiopia’s ability to use South West State as a staging ground or threat to Mogadishu would be curtailed. Locally, while the elites would struggle to maintain their positions, for most people, little would change. However, some might argue it could improve, as having Muslim forces present, compared to historical Christian enemies, could lend more legitimacy to the regional and state governments.
It raises the question: what alternative would there be? Having Ethiopian troops in Somalia was a valid criticism both Somalilanders and unionists made against HSM. This seems the most realistic way to remove it.
The idea that Somalia needs a continuous presence of foreign troops is tragic, but the internal divisions are so deep that the Federal Government and southern regional states would collapse within months without them.
It’s better to negotiate terms and be selective about the troops, ensuring they come from nations with a shared interest in seeing a strong Somalia, even if it's for their own geopolitical interests.
I think Madobe, the leader of Jubaland, highlights Laftagareen’s incompetence. Both had foreign backing and troops in their regions, but unlike Laftagareen, Madobe built his own power base and loyal forces, granting him a degree of autonomy that Laftagareen simply lacks.
There are legitimate arguments to be made, such as the Federal Government pulling more power toward itself unilaterally. But this does not outweigh the existential problem of Ethiopian troops on Somali soil. Gaining more autonomy by removing such a corrupt and vile force, even for a lesser evil, is essential. Anti-Ethiopian sentiments in Somalia are so high that they’ve become toxic. The average Somali, both online and offline, welcomes the removal of Ethiopian troops, especially those within and outside of South West State.
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