Western Somalia war, CIA assessment 1977

[Aurelian]

1- Somalia needed to rapidly repair its losses in combat vehicles and aircraft, and adequately train and equip replacements to bring battalions and groups back to full strength.

Somalia received supplies from several countries, including Iraq, Egypt, Iran, Sudan, Qatar, and China. These countries contributed either medical personnel or supplies. Other nations such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, Italy, and Pakistan provided military clothing, small arms, ammunition, and spare parts. Some of these supplies were given as aid, while others were purchased. Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait financed Somali military purchases.

However, no country mentioned above, or any other, supplied Somalia with heavy equipment. Saudi Arabia was pressuring Western European countries to provide Somalia with heavy equipment.

 

[Aurelian]

2 - Logistics: One of the primary challenges Somalia faced was the shortage of essential supplies, including rations and artillery ammunition. These shortages were significant enough to cause the cancellation or delay of military operations. Furthermore, some front-line units were reportedly lacking mine detection equipment, which posed a risk to their operational effectiveness.
The transportation of POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) supplies was another significant logistical hurdle. While Somalia had or could obtain adequate POL supplies, transporting them from coastal storage facilities to the fighting areas, which were 200 to 500 miles inland, was a considerable challenge. This limitation affected the magnitude and pace of combat operations.

The Somalis managed logistics by engaging in a cycle of intensive administrative and logistical preparation before combat operations. This involved assembling an attacking force, ordering supplies and POL from divisional supply points, and recruiting locals sympathetic to their cause. This preparation typically lasted two to three weeks and was followed by two to four days of heavy fighting. The cycle was feasible because the Ethiopians were not exerting significant pressure on the Somali National Army (SNA) and insurgent forces, allowing the SNA time to relocate forces and manage limited logistical resources.

 

[Aurelian]

3 - Ethiopia's demonstrated air superiority posed a significant challenge to Somalia's defensive efforts, especially as they were operating at the outer limits of their supply lines. This air superiority, combined with poor roads, weather problems, and potential shortages of cargo vehicles, exacerbated existing equipment shortages and further weakened the units scattered along the eastern edge of the Ethiopian massif. Somalia's ability to counter this air superiority was limited by the lack of heavy combat equipment needed to replace losses in the Ogaden, as Arab allies were unwilling to provide such equipment. Ethiopian aircraft operated from Dire Dawa and Harar areas, but Debre Zeit meant that Ethiopian MiG-21s couldn't reach Harar or Dire Dawa.