We transitioned from being Africans first democrats (The first African nation to seamlessly transition from one president to another - Aden Adde to Sharmarke) to being a dictatorship in 1969. That is a major jump and deterioration. Then 1991 was the nail in the coffin.
There are a few things to mention however: The civil war technically began in 1978 post-Ogaden, because by definition 1991 was anarchy, it transcended warfare given no one was at the helm.
- 1969 itself didn't actually cause harm and looking at reports at the time, public welcolmed it given the clandestine and corrupt nature of the democratic govt at the time (grass is always greener). Kacaan was pretty successful for about a decade until 1978, then 15 years of civil war turned anarchy.
- Every nation goes through political turmoil and difficulties, but 1991 was a special case of unruly behaviour by moryaans who essentially made us the face of destitution and disruption politically.
- Siyaad Barre ripped the social fabric of society, Aideed burnt the remnants. Both of their roles in destroying Somalia go hand-in-hand.
1991 was the point Somalia would go into self-destruction however.
The 1977 Ogaden War, specifically how it was conducted, serves as a clear example of winning every battle but ultimately losing the war.
Siad Barre was incapable of effective politicking and overplayed his hand. The Soviets were initially torn, which was all that was needed, but Barre pushed too hard, demanding that the Soviets completely disavow Ethiopia and accept the annexation of the Ogaden. When the Soviets didn't comply, Barre severed ties with the expectation that they would come crawling back. Instead, he forced the Soviets to make a choice, allowing them to fully back Ethiopia, a country they already had an affinity for. Prior to this, the Soviets were hesitant due to Ethiopia's instability compared to Somalia's relative stability.
Barre was naive to believe that the Americans would immediately provide the same level of sophisticated weaponry, especially in the midst of the war. The fact that the entire Somali army was built on Soviet doctrine and equipment made maintaining the military even more difficult after cutting ties.
In the end, losing the war led to economic hardship and increased public questioning of Barre's leadership. His legitimacy relied heavily on the nationalist fervor he had inspired, which he ultimately failed to deliver on. To maintain power, he increasingly relied on his inner circle, setting the stage for the eventual collapse of his regime.
Barre should have done what the Armenians and Russians did post Soviet Union. Defacto annex it but de jure create an independent government and hold onto it for years. Ethiopia would have even more internal stability and put them in an even worse position during the Eritrean-Ethiopian (civil) war. At that point decades would have past and put Somalia in a better position to balkanize Ethiopia.
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