Syria Updates: The Fall of Bashar al-Assad

[Chase]

Israel won, I predict Syria will turn into something like post-Gaddafi Libya or worse. It will be a nation perpetually divided by sectarian squabbles that will be fueled on the sidelines by Israel and the US/Turkey. The US will continue to occupy Syria & steal from Syria's oil + gas reserves, farmland, & other natural resources.

Turkey will probably annex land from Syria's north, Israel from the South, it's also GGs for Hezbollah, it's no coincidence all this coincided the moment the ceasefire was implemented with Israel.

Palestine is finished, no one's going to help them, they're all on their own now.

 

[Galool]

 

[Vacelere]

the sdf have arab groups in them.

True but the majority are PKK terrorists

 

[Aurelian]

Its the capital and also its symbolic meaning. Aleppo was jobs not done mentality, while Damascus was the signal they completed their mission

Aleppo was taken over by HTS, Damascus was more of mixed, but mainly the southern Syrian front (opposition)

 

[Galool]

 

[Galool]

 

[Galool]

 

[Aurelian]

These scenes are unbearable and surreal.

 

[Nilotic]

So Assad pretended to be pro-Palestinian but was really imprisoning and torturing them in horrible dungeons?

 

[Galool]

 

[Aurelian]

Took this insight text from another person


"The Victory That Didn’t Come From Nowhere"

This long and detailed text is a paraphrased from Charles Lister, Director of the Syria Program at the Middle East Institute. It answers many questions about the rapid downfall of Assad and the even faster advancement of opposition forces:

"The significant losses faced by Bashar al-Assad over the past week can largely be attributed to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), for the following reasons:

1. Military Investment: Since 2020, HTS has invested heavily in strengthening its combat capabilities, including improving the professionalism of its fighters and reducing command and control structures. From officer training courses to night operations units, to a force fully dedicated to drones (the Shaheen unit), these efforts have fundamentally changed the dynamics of the battlefield.
2. Expansion of Military Units: HTS expanded units like the “Red Bands” and created new forces like the “Saraya al-Harari” and “Kataib Shaheen.” At the same time, they launched an extensive local missile and artillery manufacturing program, which created a force that significantly challenged Assad’s regime in both direct combat and maneuvering.
3. Social and Political Expansion: HTS also worked hard on the ground to facilitate its territorial advancement. In particular, years of communication with tribes, community leaders, and other social frameworks outside of Greater Idlib proved crucial.
4. Diplomatic Engagement: HTS spent four years communicating with communities traditionally hostile to it, which developed a diplomatic tendency within the group. HTS has now been able to use this experience on multiple fronts with notable impact.
   For example, in northern Hama, HTS maintained extensive contact with the Ismaili community, Assad’s military leaders, and Sunni tribes, leading to a largely peaceful transfer of power and the safe withdrawal or defection of some regime forces.
5. Engagement with Kurdish Forces: In Kurdish areas of Aleppo, HTS adopted a pragmatic and constructive approach with Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and YPG, which ultimately had an influential effect. Attempts by Assad’s army to negotiate quickly turned into threats and then fighting.
6. Communication with Minorities: HTS’s recent language towards Christians, Alawites, Kurds, and others cannot be seen merely as public relations strategies, as it marks an unprecedented shift.
   Abu Mohammad al-Julani (the leader) spent years purging the group of those who criticized this “reconciliation” approach and now stands on firmer ground politically and strategically.
7. Government of National Salvation: HTS has heavily invested in the semi-theocratic government it created, known as the Government of National Salvation. This government works closely with international aid organizations and has even received a permanent United Nations office in Idlib. It has also taken steps to appear as an independent government by issuing ID cards, organizing banks, and implementing various administrative measures.
8. Perception of Governance: Some may view the early governance steps of HTS in Aleppo as superficial. However, after 14 years of devastating humanitarian crisis, regime corruption, and economic decline, initial impressions among many may significantly shape the upcoming phase.
9. Collaboration with Other Factions: In the past, HTS (and previously, Jabhat al-Nusra) worked to gain the trust of other opposition factions, but this has changed in recent years. The close cooperation between HTS and factions aligned with the Syrian Free Army (SFA) last week is a clear indicator of this shift.
   Regardless of military coordination, HTS has smoothly transitioned (so far) from fighting to establishing temporary governance, especially in Aleppo, where they have ceded authority to local factions more attuned to the region (like the Sham Legion and Nour al-Din al-Zenki Brigades).
10. Public Relations and Transition to Governance: The relatively developed public relations efforts, coupled with the swift transition between military and governance, are beginning to bear fruit in Aleppo, where hospitals continue to operate and defected police and military personnel are listed on the payrolls of the Interior Ministry of the Government of National Salvation.
11. The Evolution of HTS: In recent years, with some irony, HTS seems closer than ever to realizing the vision of the first generation of leaders of Ahrar al-Sham, who sought to move from "jihadist Salafism" to a "national revolution." HTS, through its rise, has eclipsed Ahrar al-Sham, the first group to adopt the green revolution flag, national discourse, and critique foreign jihadist influence. Though HTS initially opposed these steps, it has now followed this path.
12. Future Challenges: The greatest test will be how HTS’s successes in northwestern and southwestern Syria will be accepted by other components of Syria’s broader society."

 

[Galool]

 

[Galool]

 

[Galool]

 

[Galool]

 

[Garaad Awal]

A democratic and free Syria that follows the democracy found in neighbouring Turkey and in countries like Malaysia & Indonesia. Syrians are a high iq people, I believe they can create a prosperous state inshallah

 

[Galool]

 

[Galool]

 

[Galool]

 

[GemState]

Took this insight text from another person


"The Victory That Didn’t Come From Nowhere"

This long and detailed text is a paraphrased from Charles Lister, Director of the Syria Program at the Middle East Institute. It answers many questions about the rapid downfall of Assad and the even faster advancement of opposition forces:

"The significant losses faced by Bashar al-Assad over the past week can largely be attributed to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), for the following reasons:

1. Military Investment: Since 2020, HTS has invested heavily in strengthening its combat capabilities, including improving the professionalism of its fighters and reducing command and control structures. From officer training courses to night operations units, to a force fully dedicated to drones (the Shaheen unit), these efforts have fundamentally changed the dynamics of the battlefield.
2. Expansion of Military Units: HTS expanded units like the “Red Bands” and created new forces like the “Saraya al-Harari” and “Kataib Shaheen.” At the same time, they launched an extensive local missile and artillery manufacturing program, which created a force that significantly challenged Assad’s regime in both direct combat and maneuvering.
3. Social and Political Expansion: HTS also worked hard on the ground to facilitate its territorial advancement. In particular, years of communication with tribes, community leaders, and other social frameworks outside of Greater Idlib proved crucial.
4. Diplomatic Engagement: HTS spent four years communicating with communities traditionally hostile to it, which developed a diplomatic tendency within the group. HTS has now been able to use this experience on multiple fronts with notable impact.
   For example, in northern Hama, HTS maintained extensive contact with the Ismaili community, Assad’s military leaders, and Sunni tribes, leading to a largely peaceful transfer of power and the safe withdrawal or defection of some regime forces.
5. Engagement with Kurdish Forces: In Kurdish areas of Aleppo, HTS adopted a pragmatic and constructive approach with Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and YPG, which ultimately had an influential effect. Attempts by Assad’s army to negotiate quickly turned into threats and then fighting.
6. Communication with Minorities: HTS’s recent language towards Christians, Alawites, Kurds, and others cannot be seen merely as public relations strategies, as it marks an unprecedented shift.
   Abu Mohammad al-Julani (the leader) spent years purging the group of those who criticized this “reconciliation” approach and now stands on firmer ground politically and strategically.
7. Government of National Salvation: HTS has heavily invested in the semi-theocratic government it created, known as the Government of National Salvation. This government works closely with international aid organizations and has even received a permanent United Nations office in Idlib. It has also taken steps to appear as an independent government by issuing ID cards, organizing banks, and implementing various administrative measures.
8. Perception of Governance: Some may view the early governance steps of HTS in Aleppo as superficial. However, after 14 years of devastating humanitarian crisis, regime corruption, and economic decline, initial impressions among many may significantly shape the upcoming phase.
9. Collaboration with Other Factions: In the past, HTS (and previously, Jabhat al-Nusra) worked to gain the trust of other opposition factions, but this has changed in recent years. The close cooperation between HTS and factions aligned with the Syrian Free Army (SFA) last week is a clear indicator of this shift.
   Regardless of military coordination, HTS has smoothly transitioned (so far) from fighting to establishing temporary governance, especially in Aleppo, where they have ceded authority to local factions more attuned to the region (like the Sham Legion and Nour al-Din al-Zenki Brigades).
10. Public Relations and Transition to Governance: The relatively developed public relations efforts, coupled with the swift transition between military and governance, are beginning to bear fruit in Aleppo, where hospitals continue to operate and defected police and military personnel are listed on the payrolls of the Interior Ministry of the Government of National Salvation.
11. The Evolution of HTS: In recent years, with some irony, HTS seems closer than ever to realizing the vision of the first generation of leaders of Ahrar al-Sham, who sought to move from "jihadist Salafism" to a "national revolution." HTS, through its rise, has eclipsed Ahrar al-Sham, the first group to adopt the green revolution flag, national discourse, and critique foreign jihadist influence. Though HTS initially opposed these steps, it has now followed this path.
12. Future Challenges: The greatest test will be how HTS’s successes in northwestern and southwestern Syria will be accepted by other components of Syria’s broader society."

Its a lot simpler. Bashar ran out of money. run at the top by a tiny Alawite minority and a middle class of sunni uncle Tom's paid for muscle. bashar kept paying the alawites and cut corners on the paychecks for the sunni seculars. No ideology. So they gave up to the islamists.

If HTS dont improve the economy and try to implement Sharia Law across the country you will see the Alawi/Christian/Middle class Sunni create an Assad 2.0