Musa gives Ethiopia a port and a military base on the Gulf of Aden. It's over

B

Bazed

Tired.
VIP
Aseer said:
Where is this being done?
Click to expand...
It's being done all over. Mostly in the south as that has a large supply of lumber. I remember reading that Kismayo was the export hub. The UN banned all further sales of charcoal due to climate issues but also the fact that revenue will possibly be going to Al Shabaab.

Regardless there are small Somali based charities fighting it but we need to provide education and employment to fully end the practice.
 
mohammdov

mohammdov

Nabadshe
Ethiopians are trolling on Google Map 😂
FB_IMG_1704553588207.jpg
 
G

GaradShabeel

VIP
3LetterzMM

3LetterzMM

LG gang we gon slide for my nigga 🤐🥷
This is an L for everyone lol Somalia looks like a huge embarrassment, Somaliland sold their asses for recognition from a country that doesn't even matter on the world scale, Ethiopia is throwing rocks from a glass house which can backfire badly considering they alienated basically the whole region. Djibouti lost a fat chunk of money they rely on. Eritrea took a W ngl but they're probably gonna side with Somalia and Djibouti just out of spite for Ethiopia trying to take their ports in the beginning.
 
Sophisticate

Sophisticate

~Gallantly Gadabuursi~
Staff Member
Here is a little background about Ethiopia's political landscape/issues. If you thought Somalis and their tribal issues were a headache. Goodness gracious, these guys are also dealing with state fragility and always have. They also have the problem of managing their heterogeneity. You will be fine. This is probably a distraction, so people won't pay as much attention to the internal issues Ethiopia is dealing with.
Ethiopia not only is segregated along ethnolinguistic, religious and regional lines but is also partitioned along rural and urban communities. Inequalities, extreme poverty, a history of tribal conflicts, religious tension and the politics of ethnicity have deepened the division between rural voters and heterogeneous urban voters. Similarly, the constitutionally imposed politics of ethnically and regionally based societies and the overlap of religion create a marginalisation of minority groups and social segregation, even in urban locations (Svensson, 2019). The outcome is a state fragility and conflict nexus, which can be attributed to the ethnography–linguistic diversity, different political orientations, nationalist– separatisms and endemic corruption.

Electoral victory amounts to total power in Ethiopia, triggering grievances that spiral into violence (Smith, 2009). Again, opposition parties in Ethiopia are mostly too weak, dispersed and divided to challenge the ruling EPRDF, thereby limiting the options of the predominantly urban electorates (Lyons, 2019). The main opposition parties boycotted the 1992, 1994 and 1995 elections, citing the government’s domination of the media space to interfere in the political process (Abbink, 2000). Although they were profoundly fragmented and unable to challenge the ruling party, the opposition parties contested the 2000 and 2001 elections (Arriola, 2003). In the 2000 national elections, the opposition garnered a meagre 12 seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives because these political parties represented distinct local constituencies, and only a few had national roots (Kefale, 2011)

On the 2nd of April 2018, reformist politician Abiy Ahmed assumed the position of Prime Minister of Ethiopia. This was preceded by a prolonged political crisis reviving deep-seated grievances across the highly populated and ethnically fragmented country (Breines, 2019). Abiy announced economic and political reforms, including freedom for political prisoners, to address inequalities, promote political liberalisation and ensure a free civil society (Ylönen, 2019). Prime Minister Abiy’s reforms further weakened rather than strengthened the state. For instance, on the 23rd of June 2019, indications of fragility surfaced with forces from the Amhara region launching a failed coup to dislodge Abiy’s government. More recently, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched a retaliatory military offensive against the Tigray regional forces for its attack on a military facility in Mekelle and Dansha—both in Tigray (Labzaé, 2022). The Abiy government looks increasingly vulnerable due to deep divisions in the ruling coalition, lingering ethnic conflicts, discontent and the problem of internally displaced people. However, a renewed conflict could resuscitate weakened and repentant emancipation groups or inspire ethnic mutation opposed to the central government—an ironic twist given the efforts of the Abiy administration to eliminate the politics of identity.
Click to expand...
 
Last edited:
You must log in or register to reply here.

Trending

Latest posts

Top